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Previous research indicates that typical district budgeting practices mask large 
between-school teacher compensation expenditures (TCE) differences, that teacher 
sorting drives those TCE differences, and that TCE differences drive overall resource 
inequities. While scarce accurate school-level resource data has hindered intradistrict 
equity research, extant analyses have shown substantial TCE differences disadvantage 
schools with more non-white, poor and low-performing students.  Though compelling, 
these findings are limited empirically because they examine small numbers of districts 
and conceptually because they examine average salaries, which cannot control for 
between-school differences in pupil-teacher ratios or student compensatory needs that 
could legitimately alter TCE between schools. Empirically, this study expands evidence 
of intradistrict inequities by measuring TCE variation using universe teacher-salary data 
for schools and districts in 16 states.  Conceptually, this study allows for improved 
intradistrict TCE equity comparisons through a novel weighting approach that adjusts 
per-pupil TCE to control for differences in schools’ compensatory needs and pupil-
teacher ratios. Using detailed data for four states, each district’s de facto staff-allocation 
weights are estimated and used to weight schools’ student counts to statistically control 
for different allocations of teachers relative to student compensatory needs. Schools’ TCE 
is indexed by weighted pupil counts to control for legitimate TCE differences associated 
with compensatory needs. By measuring TCE at the student level while controlling for 
compensatory needs, this weighted per-pupil TCE approach provides a more precise 
measure of intradistrict TCE equity than the average salaries used in previous research. 
 Using descriptive statistics, district-level OLS regressions and hierarchical 
models on schools within districts, these analyses gauge the scope of TCE inequity and 
identify the district and school characteristics associated with it. Findings reveal that TCE 
variation is a widespread district phenomenon, and that districts with greater between-
school variation in student poverty, race, and performance have more TCE variation. 
Within districts, schools with more poor, non-white, and low performing students receive 
below-average TCE. At the district and school levels, teacher sorting is strongly 
associated with the distribution of TCE.  These findings suggest that intradistrict TCE 
inequities are widespread and divert targeted compensatory funds. Moreover, intradistrict 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Resource equity has long been a central concern in school finance. Since the 
Supreme Court’s 1973 San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez decision closed the door 
to school finance equity challenges at the federal level, the vast majority of research, 
litigation, and legislation attending to educational equity has focused on resource 
differences between school districts within states. Historically, public schools have been 
primarily funded with local property taxes, with additional funding coming from state 
and federal sources. Since localities’ property wealth and ability to pay for public 
education varies, school finance research has been concerned with the equity or adequacy 
of educational resources across districts. Interdistrict analyses evaluate district funding 
based on the principle that the quality of schooling should not be dependent on district 
wealth (Serrano v. Priest 1971; Guthrie et al, 2006). This legal context has kept districts 
as the primary unit of analysis in the majority of school finance research. 
Public education accounting systems have developed in this same legal context to 
make districts, not schools, the primary units for accounting systems. Districts receive 
funds from local, state, and federal sources and accounting systems have evolved to meet 
the accounting requirements associated with those funds. In these finance systems, 
districts, not schools, are typically the lowest level where expenditures or resources are 
tracked. District-level data have been widely available for analyses of interdistrict 
resource differences because districts are the primary unit of school finance accounting 
(Roza, 2010; Guthrie, 2007). Districts have had little incentive to track expenditures or 




relatively scarce (Roza, 2010). With the dominant lens of school finance focused on the 
district level and with limited access to school-level data, intradistrict equity analyses— 
those focusing on resource differences between schools within a district— have been far 
less common than interdistrict equity analyses. 
Intradistrict finance differs from interdistrict finance because taxation and school 
funding is determined at the district level. Within districts, schools do not vary in terms of 
property wealth or tax rates, and thus have an equal claim on district funding relative to 
the student number and composition. Intradistrict analysis focuses on the distribution of 
school resources relative to student race, poverty and geographic differences,1 and not on 
the interdistrict concerns of property wealth, ability to pay, or adequacy (Berne & Stiefel, 
1994). 
Studies of both inter- and intradistrict resource equity have employed Berne and 
Stiefel’s (1984, 1994) equity framework which establishes three equity principles that can 
evaluate resource equity across agencies nested within a higher-level institution (e.g., 
districts within a state, or schools within districts). The first equity principle is horizontal 
equity, which requires that similarly situated students receive equivalent resources. A 
second principle, called vertical equity, is required because not all students are similarly 
situated. States and districts recognize that some students, such as those living in poverty 
or those with disabilities, legitimately require more resources. Vertical equity accounts for 
these differences by requiring that students with legitimate additional educational needs, 
                                                 
1 Geographic differences are often legitimate reasons for differential allocations between districts or states, 
however in intradistrict analyses the geographic differences are much smaller and only in exceptional cases 
would they be considered a legitimate cost difference.  More often, geographic differences in intradistrict 





such as limited English proficiency or disabilities, receive additional resources. Some 
differences between students, such as race/ethnicity or within-district residential location, 
are unrelated to legitimate educational needs but have historically been associated with 
resources. The third equity principle, equality of opportunity (EEO), addresses these 
illegitimate differences by holding that resources should not be related to characteristics 
that have no legitimate relation to education. An equitable distribution of resources, either 
between districts in a state, or between schools within a district, should meet all three of 
these equity standards. In the long record of interdistrict equity research, scholars have 
applied these principles, often jointly, to evaluate resource equity between districts. 
Scholars have employed the same principles in intradistrict research, but the body of 
research focusing on within-district resource equity is much less extensive than that on 
between-district resource equity.  
In the past 15 years, scholars have increasingly recognized intradistrict equity 
analysis using school-level data as an important area for research. In 1997, the Journal of 
Education Finance focused an entire issue on the topic. In that issue, Busch and Odden 
(1997) suggested that school-level analysis could inform a number of issues including the 
“efficiency and productivity of resource utilization, accountability, equity, adequacy, 
comparability of data, and longitudinal analysis” (p.228). Since that time, school-level 
analyses have increased. 
 Though early intradistrict analyses date to the 1970’s (Owen, 1972; Summers & 
Wolfe, 1976), limited data have slowed the accumulation of empirical studies. Since the 
mid-1990s, intradistrict analyses have increased with maturing data systems (e.g., Berne 




have found that intradistrict resource variation is as great as or greater than interdistrict 
variation (Hertert, 1996; Rubenstein, 1998; Lankford, Loeb & Wyckoff, 2002). This 
growing body of research has revealed substantial differences between schools in per-
pupil funding (Condron & Roscigno, 2003; Owens & Maiden, 1999; Schwartz, 1999), 
centrally administered programs (Roza, 2010), teacher qualifications (Lankford et al., 
2002; Betts, Reuben & Dannenberg, 2000; Pesky & Haycock, 2006), and teacher 
compensation (Roza & Hill, 2004; Roza, 2010; Education Trust West, 2005). This 
research includes mixed findings regarding the intradistrict distribution of funding, but 
consistently shows that schools with more poor, non-White and low-performing students 
have lesser-qualified and lower-paid teachers (Roza, 2010; Miller & Rubenstein, 2008). 
An important concomitant finding included in many of these studies is a teacher 
quantity/quality trade-off in schools with high proportions of disadvantaged students who 
receive lower-salaried and lower-qualified teachers, but have more teachers per pupil 
(Rubenstein, 1998). Such tradeoffs are important because they might balance per-pupil 
resources, in terms of expenditures or quality, despite differences in average teacher 
salary. 
Unlike interdistrict equity analyses, teachers are a primary focus in much of 
literature on intradistrict equity. Teachers are important not only because they are the 
most powerful school-related predictor of student achievement (Rice, 2003), but also 
because they represent the largest component of school spending (Loeb, Miller, & Strunk, 
2009) constituting approximately 75% of school operating expenditures (Roza, 2010). 
Teachers are particularly important for intradistrict resource equity because unlike most 




When higher paid teachers concentrate in particular kinds of schools, they directly 
influence the distribution of resources between schools. Researchers have identified 
several sources of within-district resource variation, and principal among these are 
between-school differences in average teacher compensation expenditures (TCE) (Roza 
& Hill, 2004; Roza, 2010; Miller & Rubenstein, 2008; Goldhaber, 2008). 
Intradistrict differences in TCE are partly due to teacher sorting, which is a 
function of teacher workplace preferences (Imazeki, 2005; Boyd, Lankford, Loeb, & 
Wyckoff, 2005b), and are facilitated by an array of commonplace district budgeting and 
allocation policies. Districts typically use a process called staff-based budgeting to 
allocate resources to schools (Odden & Picus, 2004). Districts allocate staff positions to 
schools using district formulas that are based on the number of students enrolled and their 
compensatory needs. The compensation for these positions constitutes the bulk of 
operating expenditures (Roza, 2010). Teachers preferences to teach in schools with fewer 
poor, non-White and low-performing students (Hanushek, Kain, & Rivkin, 2004), 
coupled with district policies such as seniority based transfer privileges and “last in, first 
out” (LIFO) staff reductions (Sepe & Roza, 2010), concentrate more highly qualified 
teachers in some schools (Roza, 2010).  
Generally, single salary schedules define teacher pay. Under single salary 
schedules, teacher pay increases with experience and education, such that schools with 
more highly qualified teachers receive more TCE per teacher. One practice that 
complicates the evaluation of intradistrict TCE is “district salary averaging” in which 
school budgets are calculated by multiplying the number of full time equivalent (FTE) 




budgets do not reflect the actual salaries going to schools and thus researchers seeking to 
examine actual salary data have had to limit analyses to the few districts where real salary 
school-level data are available or laboriously reconstruct school budgets from the ground 
up (e.g., Miller & Rubenstein, 2008; Roza, 2010). Where scholars have been able to 
evaluate intradistrict distributions of TCE using real salary data, they have found 
substantial TCE differences. Such analyses most often examine large urban districts 
(Argue, Honeyman, & Schlay, 2006; Roza & Hill, 2004; Rubenstein, 1998; Stiefel, et al., 
1998), but some have examined wider ranges of districts in a single state (Miller, 2010; 
Education Trust West, 2005), as well as mid-sized districts (Miller & Rubenstein, 2007). 
All these studies have shown significant TCE variation between schools. Specifically, 
these studies show that schools with more non-White, poor and low-performing students 
often have below-average teacher salaries (Roza, 2010). Between-school TCE differences 
are substantial, with average school differences constituting roughly five percent of 
budgets, regularly totaling over $100,000 and in some instances close to $1 million (Roza 
& Hill, 2004; Education Trust West, 2005; Miller, 2010).  
The findings of intradistrict TCE analyses are compelling; however, important 
empirical and conceptual gaps remain in this nascent literature. First, with most analyses 
limited to select large districts (e.g., Roza & Hill, 2004), the proportions of districts that 
have substantial gaps in TCE remain unclear, as do the relationships between-district 
characteristics and overall TCE variation. Second, most intradistrict studies have focused 
on the schools at the tails of the district teacher compensation spectrum (e.g., Education 
Trust West, 2005), revealing compelling findings but providing little evidence on how 




breadth of the analyses on variation in TCE would help fill these gaps. Further, while 
research has repeatedly shown associations between TCE differentials and student 
poverty, race/ethnicity, performance, and geography, the research base has been too thin 
to quantify these relationships with specificity. School-level data on real salaries across 
many districts would allow for multivariate analyses of these relationships. 
Third, intradistrict studies have used inadequate measures of TCE. Most measure 
TCE using school-level average teacher salaries without controlling for differences in 
pupil-teacher ratios or the compensatory needs of schools’ students. Without such 
controls, average teacher salaries are difficult to evaluate based on the horizontal, 
vertical, and EEO equity principles used in school finance research. Pupil-teacher ratios 
are essential to evaluating equity because of the quantity/quality trade-off found in many 
intradistrict analyses. Average teacher salaries could differ substantially between schools 
even while quantity/quality trade-offs make per-pupil teacher compensation equitable. 
Controlling for students compensatory needs is also essential because districts may 
legitimately allocate additional teachers to schools with higher populations of 
disadvantaged students. Compensatory allocations of teachers would drive the pupil-
teacher ratios down and per-pupil measures of TCE up in these schools. As a result, 
comparisons of per-pupil measures of TCE could appear equitable when in fact they are a 
product of compensatory allocations made on top of inequitable base allocations. 
The research on TCE is important because it highlights a potentially substantial 
school finance equity issue. However, the limits to this research in terms of scope—the 
number of districts, and the proportion of schools within those districts, that have been 




for equity standards— have left substantial empirical and conceptual gaps which have yet 
to be adequately addressed.  
Purpose of the Study 
With this dissertation study, I intend to fill some of the empirical and conceptual 
gaps in the literature on the intradistrict distribution of teacher compensation. In this 
study, I will extend the empirical evidence on the intradistrict distribution of TCE by 
examining population data on teachers in 16 states included in the 2006-07 Teacher 
Compensation Survey (TCS) data from the National Center for Education Statistics 
(NCES). I will supplement the TCS data with data from NCES’s Common Core of Data 
(CCD), the National Longitudinal School-Level State Assessment Score Database 
(NLSLSASD), and administrative records from state departments of education. In this 
study, I will statistically adjust measures of TCE for between-school differences in pupil-
teacher ratios and student compensatory needs. These adjustments improve the TCE 
measures in this study in comparison to average teacher salaries because they allow for 
clear application of equity principles. By analyzing the distribution of these adjusted 
measures of TCE, this study will reflect the intradistrict distribution of teachers more 
accurately than previous research. Further, with data on a large number of districts and 
schools, I will be able to apply multivariate analyses to determine what district and 
school characteristics are associated with intradistrict variation in TCE. 
Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual framework (graphically illustrated in Figure 1) that guides this 




the relationships between school and district characteristics hypothesized to relate to the 
intradistrict distribution of teacher compensation expenditures (TCE). Conceptually, I 
define TCE as the total expenditures for instructional staff compensation at a given 
school.2 Within schools, TCE is a function of the number of positions allocated to a 
school by the district (arrow a) and the qualifications of the teachers who fill those 
positions. Largely based on school characteristics, district formulae determine the number 
of positions allocated to schools, illustrated by arrow d influencing arrow a. School 
characteristics include total enrollment, the percentage of students with compensatory 
needs, and the school level.  
Under single salary schedules, teacher qualifications largely determine teacher 
salaries. Thus, a fundamental relationship in this conceptual model is that between 
teacher sorting, illustrated by arrow b, and TCE. Research shows that teacher 
qualifications vary across schools, and that this variation, or teacher sorting, is driven in 
part by teacher preferences for schools with fewer low-performing, poor and non-White 
students. Since, on average, teachers prefer schools with certain characteristics, schools 
with those characteristics enjoy a greater supply of applicants compared to less-preferred 
schools. Assuming that school administrators prefer to fill positions with more highly 
qualified candidates, the schools that are most attractive to teachers will have a hiring 
advantage in the teacher labor market (Goldhaber, 2008). Over time, this hiring 
advantage allows more higher-qualified and higher-salaried teachers to concentrate in 
                                                 
2 In the analyses for this study, I measure TCE using teacher salaries. Total compensation would include 
salaries, bonuses and benefits; however, salary is a good proxy for total compensation and is a better 
measure across districts and states than total compensation, since the proportion of benefits to salary will 




preferred schools. In the figure, teachers’ preferences for certain school characteristics 
influence how teachers sort themselves, as depicted by arrow c influencing arrow b. For 
example, schools with high proportions of low-performing students may lose higher-
qualified teachers to schools with more high-performing students. If lower-qualified and 
lesser-paid teachers replace these teachers, TCE differentials would grow. The literature 
on teacher sorting has shown school characteristics that relate to teacher sorting include 
the proportion of students in poverty, limited English proficient (LEP), non-White, 
special education, and low-performing students, as well as administrator quality, Title I 
status, and AYP status (Lankford, et al., 2002; Hanushek, et al., 2004; Boyd, Lankford, 
Loeb, & Wyckoff, 2005a; 2005b; Clotfelter, Ladd, & Vigdor, 2005; Imazeki, 2005; 
Scafidi, Sjoquist, & Stinebrickner, 2007).  
The district-level hypothesis relates to contextual effects that can affect teacher 
sorting and thereby affect a given school’s variation in TCE from the district TCE 
average. For instance, larger districts and districts with greater variation in school 
characteristics have more schools and/or greater differences between schools that provide 
a context where teachers’ preferences increase teacher sorting, as illustrated by arrow e 
influencing arrow b. In districts with few schools or few perceivable differences between 
the schools, teacher preferences and teacher sorting may be less pronounced. Thus, TCE 
variation may be low. Similarly, district policies such as seniority hiring privileges and 
“last in, first out” staff reduction practices can potentially exacerbate teacher sorting, as 
illustrated by arrow e influencing arrow b. Total variation across districts, as measured by 
the district Gini coefficient of TCE, will be greater when differences between schools’ 
TCE are greater, as illustrated by arrow g. 
 
 






Specifically, this study focuses on three research questions: 
1.  What proportions of school districts have substantial between-school variation in 
TCE as measured by the Gini coefficient? What district characteristics are associated 
with this variation?  
2. What proportions of schools are affected by substantial TCE variations? What is the 
average magnitude of between-school TCE differentials? What school characteristics 
are associated with greater or lesser TCE?  
3. Do legitimate student compensatory needs—such as poverty, special education status, 
limited English proficiency, and low performance—explain between-school TCE 
differentials? Does intradistrict variation in teacher qualifications explain away the 
influences that student compensatory needs have on these differentials? 
Data Sources 
 The primary data for this dissertation come from the 2006-07 Teacher 
Compensation Survey (TCS), which includes universe data on the salaries of public 
school teachers in 17 states, and include 1.1 million records on 33% of the nation’s 
teachers (Cornman, Johnson, Zhou, Honneger, & Noel, 2010). I will exclude Arkansas 
from the analyses because of missing district ids. The remaining 16 states provide 
measures of salary, demographics experience and education for 973,430 teachers in 
29,770 schools (Cornman, et al., 2010). While the TCS is not nationally representative, it 
includes the population of schools and school district in many states and this NCES 




I will supplement the TCS data from three sources: the Common Core of Data 
(CCD), the National Longitudinal School-Level State Assessment 
Score Database (NLSLSASD), and data from state departments of education. The CCD is 
an annual data collection of NCES that includes data on all public schools in the United 
States. CCD data are provided by state education agencies and include name, location, 
level, school size, Title I status, urbanicity, racial composition and Free and Reduced 
Price Lunch participation at the school level. 
 The National Longitudinal School-Level State Assessment Score Database 
(NLSLSASD; www.schooldata.org) is collected and housed by the American Institutes 
for Research (AIR) for the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES). The 
NLSLSASD includes data from state testing programs across the US and includes state 
proficiency percentages at the school level for all states participating in the TCS for the 
2006-07 school year. I will link the NLSLSASD to the TCS to include measures of 
school proficiency for multivariate analyses. I will further supplement TCS data with data 
provided by state education agencies to provide measures to estimate district allocation 
weights and other measures useful in examining the distribution of TCE. School-level 
data on the percentages of students qualified as special education or limited English 
proficient are not widely available. After requesting these data from all TCE participating 
states, I was able to obtain data for four: Colorado, Florida, Minnesota and Texas. I will 
focus the analyses in this dissertation on these four states because they are the states for 






 As elaborated below in chapter three, I propose to adapt techniques used by Miles 
and Roza (2002), and Toutkoushian and Michael (2007) to calculate average district 
teacher allocation relationships. In this study, I will calculate the average relationships 
between school characteristics and the number of full-time equivalent teaching positions 
allocated to schools based on data from the population of schools in each district. I use 
these calculated district allocation relationships to create “de facto allocation weights” 
which I then use to weight the number of students in each school. The resulting per-pupil 
measures of TCE are adjusted for between-school differences in student compensatory 
needs. I use these district-specific weights to remove variance in schools’ student 
populations’ compensatory needs between schools within districts. By controlling for 
these differences in compensatory needs I can use these new measures to directly 
compare schools using horizontal and EEO equity standards. Since I use the de facto 
weights to control for district-specific “legitimate” vertical equity resource adjustments, 
any remaining between-school differences in the adjusted per-pupil TCE measures cannot 
be attributable to legitimate educational differences and will thus constitute horizontal 
inequities.  
At the district level, significant variation in adjusted per-pupil TCE represents 
inequitable district TCE allocation. I propose to calculate Gini coefficients for adjusted 
per-pupil TCE for every district to gauge the magnitude and frequency of district TCE 
variation. At the school level, any systematic relationship between adjusted per-pupil 




Through statistically controlling for the district-average legitimate vertical allocations, 
this approach allows me to include both illegitimate characteristics such as student 
race/ethnicity and legitimate vertical characteristics, such as student poverty, in an EEO 
evaluation. The adjustments to per-pupil TCE remove legitimate differences due to 
vertical characteristics (e.g., student compensatory needs). Thus, any remaining 
systematic relationships between school characteristics and adjusted per-pupil TCE 
violate the EEO standard, even if they favor schools with higher proportions of students 
with compensatory needs. I will use descriptive statistics to gauge the magnitude and 
scope of school-level differences in adjusted per-pupil TCE. Further, I will use 
hierarchical linear models (HLM) with schools nested within districts to explore 
associations between school and district characteristics and school-level differences in 
adjusted per-pupil TCE. 
Significance of the Study 
Existing research on intradistrict resource variation has revealed important 
between-school disparities in total resources and in the quality, qualifications, and 
compensation of teachers. As accurate school-level data become increasingly available, 
new and more detailed research on intradistrict resource equity will inform policies on 
district resource allocation, federal Title I policy, and state compensatory programs as 
well. This study will expand the current empirical evidence on the intradistrict 
distribution of TCE by looking across hundreds of districts to identify the nature and 
scope of this variation. 
 This research will add conceptually to the research on intradistrict TCE 




TCE per pupil after adjusting for school differences in compensatory needs. Taking 
advantage of the detail in the combined TCS and supplementary state data, this novel 
measure is a better basis for making equity comparisons than measures used in previous 
research. Additionally, this analysis will shed light on the teacher quantity/quality 
tradeoffs that are often discussed in previous literature, but never explored in depth. 
These analyses will be able to describe how often such teacher tradeoffs are apparent and 
whether or not they are the product of compensatory allocations. 
The findings of this research may also contribute to understanding differentiated 
teacher pay programs. This study will not be able to evaluate the effectiveness or 
feasibility of such programs, but will examine the costs borne by schools below the 
district TCE per-pupil average— in terms of foregone teacher compensation 
expenditures— to fund above-average TCE in other district schools. Describing these 
costs can provide important contextual information for policies that differentiate pay to 
alter the distribution of teachers within districts.  
This research will also add substantial new evidence to inform Title I 
comparability legislation. Discussed in greater length below, Title I requires that districts 
use Title I funds to “supplement, not supplant” an equitable base allocation of resources. 
More simply, Title I funds are intended to provide additional resources for students in 
poverty, and the “supplement, not supplant” requirement is intended to insure Title I 
resources are not used to balance inequitable base funding. However, currently 
intradistrict salary differences can be hidden by calculating school budgets based on 
district average salaries. This provision has been criticized and legislation aimed at 





29f407c1890). Since the very differences in teacher compensation that are the topic of 
this dissertation are the bases for these proposed changes to Title I comparability 
legislation, this new evidence will inform that policy and legislative discussion.  
Most importantly, if the variation between schools using these novel measures of 
TCE is as significant as previous research suggests (e.g., Roza & Hill, 2004; Miller, 
2010), the between-school differences in TCE described in this dissertation will amount 
to more than just differences in TCE. Sizable differences found in ex post analysis of 
TCE are not likely to be balanced by non-teacher resources and are thus likely indicators 
of overall resource inequities that shortchange schools with the neediest students. This 
study will broaden and deepen the understanding of intradistrict resource equity, in terms 
of teacher compensation specifically and overall resources as well, and will add to the 
literature on school-level equity in education. 
The remainder of this dissertation consists of four chapters. In the next (second) 
chapter, I review literature that provides a context and foundation for this study. In the 
third chapter, I review the data and methodology for the dissertation study. In the fourth 




Chapter 2: Literature Review 
The research presented in this literature review provides a context for this equity 
analysis of intradistrict teacher compensation spending. This chapter consists of four 
sections. The first section presents the equity framework that I will employ in this study. 
The second section describes typical district resource allocation practices and how those 
practices allow resources to vary across schools. This section also focuses on how teacher 
sorting affects intradistrict resource distributions, on the district policies that allow 
teacher sorting to advantage some schools, and the district policies and practices that 
keep such advantages hidden from view. The third section reviews the literature on 
intradistrict resource equity. This section begins by briefly reviewing research on the 
intradistrict distribution of non-teacher resources, which provides an important context 
for the research focused on the intradistrict distribution of teachers. The second half of 
this section contains a more specific review of research focused on three facets of the 
intradistrict distribution of teachers: teacher qualifications, teacher quality, and teacher 
compensation. The last part of the third section identifies several gaps in the research on 
the intradistrict distribution of teachers, with particular attention on the distribution of 
teacher compensation expenditures, and an examination of newly available data sources 
that I will use to fill those gaps. The fourth section summarizes the findings in the 
literature. 
Equity Framework  
Intradistrict disparities in the distribution of teacher resources across schools have 




equity requires that resource distributions account for these differences. Because absolute 
between-school disparities in teacher resources are not necessarily inequities, evaluating 
resource equity requires judgments about the fairness of a distribution of resources. Such 
equity judgments require a framework that establishes clear standards for equity and 
defensible means of measuring a distribution against those standards. I present my equity 
framework for this study in two parts. In the first part, I review Berne and Stiefel’s (1984, 
1999) equity framework and the three equity standards defined in it, and discuss how I 
propose to apply the framework in an intradistrict analysis. In the second part, I discuss 
the approach I will use to measure equity in the distribution of teachers. 
Berne and Stiefel (1984) defined a popular framework to evaluate school equity in 
their book The Measurement of School Finance. The authors developed the framework 
around four key questions: (1) Who is the basis for equity claims? (2) What resource 
objects should be equitably distributed? (3)What principal serves as the basis for equity? 
and (4) How shall equity be measured? In turn below, I review how scholars have 
answered these four questions in previous work on education resource equity. 
Who is the basis for equity claims? Berne and Stiefel (1999) emphasize the 
roles of taxpayers and students as the foci of equity evaluations. Taxpayers are typically 
the focus in questions of state and district tax revenue and funding systems and have been 
a legitimate center of decades of school finance work aimed at improving fiscal equity 
across districts or providing students with the resources for an adequate education 
(Warner-King & Smith-Casem, 2005). Districts fund schools within the same district. 
Thus, within districts, schools share the same revenue sources and funding system. Since 




on the taxpayer does not apply in intradistrict analyses as it does in interdistrict analyses. 
Students are the equity focus in this study. 
Typically, children are the primary concern when discussing resource distributions 
based on the concerns that students have fair access to educational resources, and that 
they have access to the resources necessary for them to reach minimum levels of 
achievement or performance (Berne & Stiefel, 1999, p.10). However, in the current post-
NCLB, high-stakes accountability environment, schools would also be a valid center for 
resource equity concerns. Specifically, since schools and schools’ staffs are the locus of 
most accountability mechanisms and are held to similar standards (in terms of meeting 
AYP under NCLB, for instance), schools have a legitimate claim to equitable resources 
(Warner-King & Smith-Casem, 2005). Analytically, equity analyses that use the school as 
the primary unit of analysis (as this research proposes to do) can address resource equity 
for both students and schools. Although recent research has shown the school level is not 
necessarily the lowest level required to evaluate resource equity fully for students 
(Houck, 2006), the unit of analysis for this study is the school, and students and schools 
are the basis for equity claims. 
What resource objects should be equitably distributed? Equity analyses often 
use dollar measures to capture resource object distributions because dollar measures can 
capture the entire range of resources. By comparison, evaluating teachers as resource 
objects is complex because, unlike dollars, teachers vary along an array of important 
dimensions (e.g., in terms of quality and qualifications), some of which do not directly 
related to their compensation. For reasons briefly reviewed above, and reviewed in more 




school districts report at the school level do not accurately reflect the actual amount of 
dollars that go to schools. In fact, researchers have found that teacher compensation 
substantially drives intradistrict resources differences, but that because school budgets are 
calculated using district average salaries, school budgets mask these between-school 
resource differences (Roza & Hill, 2004). Since the dollar measures used in school 
budgets do not accurately reflect the resources that go to schools, researchers require 
alternative measures that do reflect between-school differences to evaluate resource 
equity accurately. 
In this dissertation study, I use administrative records of actual TCE at the school 
level to examine intradistrict resource equity. Administrative records accurately reflect 
differences in TCE across schools and enable me to analyze equity of TCE. However, 
these data do not include the entirety of school resources and therefore cannot serve as 
the basis for overall equity conclusions. Districts may allocate other school resources that 
balance unequal TCE distributions, thereby achieving overall resource equity in the face 
of apparent TCE inequity. This could be a clear limitation for this study. However, as I 
discuss in detail in section two of this chapter, there are reasons to doubt that districts 
make such balancing allocations to achieve overall resource equity. In fact, as the 
research reviewed in section three of this chapter shows, TCE differences between 
schools drive overall resource differences (e.g., Roza, 2010).Without accurate dollar 
measures that capture the actual resources going to schools, the distribution of TCE is a 






What principal serves as the basis for equity? Berne and Stiefel include three 
equity principles in their framework: horizontal equity, vertical equity, and equality of 
educational opportunity (EEO). Horizontal equity requires that students who are similarly 
situated receive equal resources. In district-level horizontal equity analyses, researchers 
compare general or base funding per pupil (separated from compensatory or categorical 
funding), across similarly situated units to identify resource variation and measure its 
extent without regard to specific school or student body characteristics (Iatarola & 
Stiefel, 2003). 
Vertical equity requires that students receive compensatory resources according to 
legitimate educational needs.3 Within districts, legitimate student educational needs for 
compensatory funding typically include poverty, learning disabilities or giftedness, and 
limited English proficiency (Berne & Stiefel, 1999; Miles & Roza, 2002). Policymakers 
weight student needs when they target certain amounts of categorical compensatory funds 
(Miles & Roza, 2002). Vertical equity analyses of funding typically measure the 
distribution of base and compensatory funding against the average amount of 
compensatory need in districts or schools to determine if resources are distributed to meet 
differential student needs.  
EEO holds that there should be no relationship between the distribution of 
resources and student characteristics not legitimately associated with educational needs 
(Berne & Stiefel 1999). EEO analyses examine the relationships between resources and 
student characteristics such as race or geographic location. For example, student race is 
                                                 
3 There are multiple considerations for legitimate vertical equity differences, including the ability to benefit 
from additional resources, in the case of students, and the ability to pay, in terms of taxpayers ( from a 




not a legitimate educational need. Thus, under an EEO standard, resources should not 
systematically relate to the racial constitution of a district or school.  
In the 1999 update of their framework, Berne and Stiefel (1999) added adequacy 
to their framework. Adequacy refers to a minimum level of resources sufficient to 
achieve educational goals reflected in accountability requirements. Although adequacy 
has become a primary focus of interdistrict finance research, the shift away from equity 
does not preclude considerations of resource equity. Within an adequacy framework, the 
equity of resource distributions above the adequacy floor still deserves consideration. 
Whether the resources available to districts are sufficient to meet basic education 
requirements is an adequacy concern and districts have the freedom to raise more revenue 
for education without harming students in other districts. For instance, if a locality 
approves higher tax rates to provide additional resources, there is no effect on students in 
other districts. Within districts, schools have the same funding source and, controlling for 
vertical equity differences between schools, they are entitled to an equal share of the 
finite pool of district resources. If all schools in a district have adequate resources, but 
some schools receive a smaller share of resources, again controlling for vertical equity 
differences, the district may meet the adequacy standard while failing to meet the 
horizontal equity standard. In addition, if the average resources across schools in a 
district are adequate, but the intradistrict distribution of resources is inequitable, schools 
that receive an inequitably lower share of district resources may have both inadequate 
and inequitable resources. Therefore, not in spite of, but apart from the adequacy of 
resources, resources equity continues to have a place in school finance and is central for 




How shall equity be measured? In this study, I use all three equity concepts to 
evaluate intradistrict resource equity. The first research question deals with horizontal 
equity. However, since schools have legitimate differences in compensatory needs (e.g., 
students with disabilities or limited English proficiency), unadjusted measures of teacher 
compensation are not a sufficient basis for horizontal equity comparisons. I apply the 
logic of vertical equity to adjust resource measures so that I can make horizontal equity 
comparisons between similarly situated schools. The simplest example of differences in 
need is numbers of students. A school with twice as many students as another would 
legitimately qualify for more resources. Thus adjusting the total measures of schools 
resources by the number of students (e.g., using per-pupil resource measures) is clearly 
an appropriate means to compare resources across similarly situated units. Adjustments 
that are more complicated are necessary to arrive at resource measures that are 
comparable, or similarly situated, betweens schools with varied proportions of students 
with legitimate educational needs, such as learning disabilities, or limited English 
proficiency. As described in detail in chapter three, this study will adapt techniques used 
in previous intradistrict studies (Roza & Miles, 2007; Toutkoushian & Michael, 2007) to 
adjust school resource measures and make comparisons of horizontal equity. Using the 
logic of vertical equity to adjust resource measures, this study will use the horizontal 
equity standard to evaluate district resource distributions. 
I propose to use the Gini coefficient of the adjusted measures of TCE to evaluate 
the equity of TCE distributions at the district level. Described in more detail in chapter 
three, the Gini coefficient is a measure of resource inequality that ranges between zero 




the Gini to evaluate horizontal resource equity (e.g., Hertert, 1999, Rubenstein, Ballal, 
Steifel & Schwartz, 2008), and most often a Gini of 0.05 is used as a benchmark for 
equality (Odden & Picus, 2004). 
By examining schools nested within districts using the adjusted TCE measures, I 
propose to use the EEO standard to evaluate whether illegitimate student or school 
characteristics (e.g., student race, or poverty) are associated with greater or lesser 
resources. Specifically, I will measure schools dis/advantages in TCE as the schools’ 
adjusted TCE differential from their district’s adjusted TCE average. Since I control for 
legitimate resource inequalities using the vertical adjustments described above, any 
remaining systematic relationships between school characteristics and total resources 
would be violations of the EEO standard.  
Framework summary. Berne and Stiefel’s equity framework provides an 
excellent structure for these analyses. In this study, the equity concern is for schools and 
the students who attend them. Though it is an imperfect measure for evaluating overall 
resource equity, TCE is a resource object that districts should distribute equitably, and 
that can serve as an indicator of total resource inequity. I propose to employ all three of 
Berne and Stiefel’s equity concepts to evaluate intradistrict distributions of TCE. I will 
adjust measures of TCE for vertical equity adjustments that districts make when 
allocating teachers to schools in order to evaluate the horizontal equity of TCE within 
districts and the EEO of TCE across the schools in those districts. 
Understanding how districts allocate resources in general, and teachers in 
particular, to schools is fundamental to understanding how TCE varies within districts, 




worth examining. The following section of this literature review examines how districts 
typically allocate resources to schools. This section provides context for my review of the 
literature on the intradistrict distribution of teachers and for the methods I use to evaluate 
intradistrict TCE equity. 
District Resource Allocation 
District resource allocation processes, specifically those related to teachers, are 
fundamental to evaluating the equity of school-based distributions. This section of the 
literature review has five subsections that provide context for this study because it 
explains typical district roles in resource allocation and typical district data systems. The 
first subsection provides an overview of how revenues flow into districts and how 
districts use those revenues to provide resources to schools, with particular attention to 
the provision of teachers. The second subsection reviews several sources of intradistrict 
resource variation that often thwart the equity intentions of district allocation systems. 
The third subsection looks in detail at teacher sorting as a source of intradistrict variation, 
which is a central element of this study. The fourth subsection reviews how 
commonplace district practices and data systems often mask intradistrict resource 
differences. The fifth subsection examines the plausibility that districts allocate non-
teacher resources to balance between-school differences in the allocation of teachers. The 
literature review concludes with a summary of district resource allocation. 
Typical district resource allocation. School districts have a central role in 
school finance. Districts receive funds from a combination of local, state and federal 




school districts received funds primarily through local property taxes. Since tax bases and 
rates varied substantially between localities, the ability to raise local revenues to pay for 
education also varied. States have addressed these local tax revenue differences through 
state aid formulas that allocate funds to districts. The goal of the formulas has been to 
achieve financial equalization between districts or to ensure that students in all districts 
receive resources sufficient for an adequate education (Odden & Picus, 2004). States 
have provided additional aid targeted to meet school needs through a variety of means, 
including per-student allocations, competitive grants, flat grants, targeted compensatory 
funds, cost sharing or reimbursement, staff-allocations, and funds for specific services 
(Roza, Guin, & Davis, 2007). The specifics of state aid varied substantially from state to 
state.  
Similar variance was present in federal aid allocations. Historically, the federal 
government awarded funds to districts for specific programs to serve student populations 
with additional educational needs (e.g., students in poverty or with disabilities) based on 
student population driven formulae. These federal allocation attempted to promote 
equitable (on vertical equity grounds) and sufficient levels of funding. Over the years, 
federal and state agencies have funneled aid to districts through a multitude of programs 
with program-specific accounting requirements (Miller & Rubenstein, 2010). 
Consequential to these various accounting requirements was using the district as primary 
accounting unit and resulting data that reflected district-level resource measures, such as 
total expenditures per pupil (Roza, 2010; Guthrie, 2007). Though incentives to track 
resources and expenditures to schools are currently mounting, historically districts have 




because most districts do not actually “fund” schools, they “resource” schools (Roza, 
Miller, & Hill, 2005). Rather than provide funds for schools to procure goods and 
services, districts “resource” schools by centrally acquiring, accounting for and providing 
schools with staff, services, and supplies. In fact, districts account for the inventory of 
school-level resources rather than the actual expenditures for the resources. 
Consequentially, measures of school-level funding have often inaccurately reflected 
school resources (Roza, 2010). 
Most districts allocate staff to schools through a process called staff based 
budgeting in which districts allocate full time equivalent (FTE) positions, not dollars, to 
schools according to district formulae (Odden & Picus, 2004; Rubenstein, et al., 2007). 
Districts allocate a base of non-instructional staff, such as a principal and a minimum 
number of administrative staff, to every school. Districts use staff-based budgeting 
formulae to determine the number of teaching positions at a school based on the number 
and the type of students attending. Districts weight students with compensatory 
educational needs (e.g., special education or LEP students) more heavily than students 
without such needs in district allocation formulas so that districts will allocate appropriate 
additional resources to schools with legitimate additional educational needs. Further, 
districts assign additional administrative and guidance staff based on formulas similar to 
those that determine teaching positions (Roza & Miles, 2002). 
Federal and state categorical programs provide districts with additional resources 
to meet students’ compensatory educational needs. Categorical aid carries spending 
constraints. For instance, the federal government constrains Title I funding through a 




not supplant” state and local funds. In other words, districts should add Title I funds to 
already equitably distributed state and local general funding, not replace the state and 
local funding. Districts can use categorical funds to provide additional teaching and 
instructional aide positions to schools, to fund central district staff or programs, or to 
provide non-staff resources to schools (Odden & Picus, 2004). After meeting the 
minimum funding constraints, districts have substantial leeway in how they target 
categorical funds (McClure, Wiener, Roza, & Hill, 2008). For instance, one district might 
target Title I funds to high-poverty elementary schools, while another might evenly 
distribute funds across all schools according to the proportion of students in poverty. The 
resources districts purchase with Title I and other categorical funds also vary. A recent 
GAO study suggested that many districts spend the vast majority of their Title I dollars to 
supply additional teaching staff to schools (GAO, 2011).  
Categorical aid programs and commonplace district allocation mechanisms are 
intended to allocate resources to district schools equitably. School based budgeting in 
particular is designed to equitably allocate teaching positions to schools according to 
student need. However, despite the intent of their designs, these mechanisms still allow 
substantial intradistrict resource differences to develop (Guthrie, 1997, 2007). 
Researchers have identified several sources of “unintentional” intradistrict resource 
variation, by which I mean variations that function outside the designs of district 
allocation systems. These sources of resource variation not only work apart from, but 
often in spite of between-school differences in legitimate educational needs. In the 





Sources of intradistrict resource variation. Resources allocations vary across 
schools intentionally and unintentionally. Districts vary resources intentionally when they 
allocate additional resources to meet particular program requirements or to meet student 
compensatory needs. This subsection focuses on unintentional sources of intradistrict 
resource variation that allow resources to concentrate in some schools despite the 
intentions of district allocation mechanisms. Researchers have identified at least three 
primary sources of unintentional intradistrict resource variation: uneven school use of 
centralized district staff and services, extra-formulaic allocations of teaching positions, 
and heterogeneous distributions of teachers across schools (Roza, 2010).  
The first of these sources of variation involve centralized services and district-
based staff. School budgets reflect only a portion of the actual operating expenditures at a 
school (estimated between 40 and 60 percent) (Roza & Hill, 2007; Cohen & Miller, 2011; 
Miller, Roza & Schwartz, 2004). Centralized services constitute a large portion of the 
remainder. The incomplete attribution of centralized expenditures to the school level is 
important because districts intend for centralized staff to serve schools equitably based on 
schools’ needs. However, the proportion of staff time and amount of services received at 
different schools can vary widely for reasons unrelated to school needs. Districts rarely 
track the use of centrally controlled staff at the school level (Miller & Rubenstein, 2008), 
but anecdotal evidence suggests substantial differential expenditures across schools. 
Studies have shown that districts unevenly distribute the assignment of centralized 
district staff members across the schools within a district (Roza & Hill, 2007; Roza, 
2005; Roza & Miles, 2002). For example, Roza and Hill (2007) found a school 




preferences, primarily served a small number of the schools in the district and never 
served others. Similarly, in another district Roza and Hill found substantial differences 
such that one district school received more than $3000 per pupil in central services 
compared to $400 per pupil in another. Again, the authors attributed these differences in 
centralized services to staff preferences, instead of intentional allocations. The variation 
in the deployment of these centrally held resources can be substantial and can exacerbate 
resource allocation inequities that already exist.  
A second source of unintentional resource variation is extra-formulaic staff 
allocations. Extra-formulaic staff allocations can run counter to the allocation design 
embedded in district formulae and may have a substantial impact on the share of per-
pupil resources in schools. In theory, districts allocate extra staff to schools with 
particular programming needs based on district formulae. However, in practice, districts 
also allocate extra-formulaic staff for illegitimate reasons, such as in response to vocal 
students and parents, savvy principals, or school officials that have political influence in 
district offices (Miles & Roza, 2006). The effect of each extra-formulaic FTE at a school 
is a substantial reduction in the pupil-teacher ratio and an increase in per-pupil resources. 
In some districts, extra-formulaic allocations result in between-school differences in 
pupil-teacher ratios equivalent to more than $5,000 in per-pupil spending (Roza & Hill, 
2007). Once a district commits these resources to a school, they tend to remain, even if 
the original reason for the allocations no longer exists, and thereby perpetuate resource 
variations (Roza, 2005; Miles, Ware & Roza, 2003).  
The most significant source of illegitimate intradistrict resource variation, and 




or more simply, teachers sorting across schools. District policies that govern school hiring 
practices and the matching of teachers to schools allow teacher workplace preferences 
and school administrators preferences for higher qualified teachers to influence the 
distribution of teachers across district schools. Teacher preferences can result in a 
predictably skewed distribution such that teachers with above-average qualifications and 
salaries concentrate in more “attractive” district schools, leaving less “attractive” schools 
with lesser-qualified and lower-salaried teachers (Roza & Hill, 2004; Clotfelter, Ladd, 
Wheeler, & Vigdor, 2006). While I review the findings of research on the distribution of 
teachers in detail in sections two and three below, I review here the mechanics of district 
policies, including staff-based budgeting (described above), single-salary schedules, 
seniority transfer privileges, and LIFO staff reduction. These district policies facilitate 
teacher sorting and lead to intradistrict resource variations (Rubenstein, et al., 2007; 
Roza, 2005).  
The mechanics of teacher sorting. The vast majority of school districts in the 
U.S. public school system use single salary schedules that typically base teacher pay on 
certification, experience and education (Stronge, Gareis & Little, 2006). Districts allocate 
teaching positions to schools. The schools are then able to recruit and hire the most 
qualified (and more expensive) teachers to fill the open positions with no fiscal impact at 
the school level. Within districts, there is no between-school difference in salary; hence, 
teachers are attracted to schools for non-pecuniary reasons. Non-pecuniary teacher 
preferences can vary across district schools (Clotfelter, et al., 2006; Hanushek, Kain & 
Rivkin, 2004). These preferences are numerous and include class size, school leadership, 




and student behavior (Rice, Rollke, Sparks & Kolbe, 2009). 
Researchers have documented numerous non-pecuniary teacher preferences for 
school placements. Teachers often prefer schools with higher proportions of non-poor 
and higher-achieving students. White teachers show some preference for low-minority 
schools. Teachers working in schools with more disadvantaged students (high-need 
schools4) are more likely to leave their school district or to transfer within the district to 
schools with fewer disadvantaged students (Lankford, et al., 2002; Hanushek, et al., 
2004; Boyd, Lankford, Loeb, & Wyckoff, 2005a; 2005b; Clotfelter, Ladd, & Vigdor, 
2005; Imazeki, 2005; Scafidi, Sjoquist, & Stinebrickner, 2007; Feng, 2010; Clotfelter, 
Ladd, Vigdor, & Diaz, 2004; Feng, Figlio, & Sass, 2010). There are many reasons for 
teachers’ preferences. For example, evidence indicates that teachers in higher-poverty 
schools experience more negative student behavior issues, have access to fewer 
resources, and experience less teacher support than those in lower-poverty schools 
(Smerdon 1999). Accountability pressures and the stigma attached to schools designated 
as “low performing” can exacerbate the problems that schools serving low-achieving 
student populations face in retaining high-quality teachers (Feng, Figlio, & Sass, 2010). 
Further, school leadership has proven to be one of the strongest influences on teacher 
retention (Boyd, Grossman, Ing, Lankford, Loeb & Wyckoff, 2009), but principal sorting 
is influenced by the same non-pecuniary aspects of schools that sort teachers. Principal 
sorting may strengthen teacher sorting patterns (Clotfelter, et al, 2007; Loeb, Kalogrides 
                                                 
4The term “high-need school” refers to schools with higher proportions of poor minority and low 




& Horng, 2010) Simply put, teacher preferences moderate school staffing such that some 
district schools are much more attractive to teachers than others (Roza, 2010). 
The staffing advantages that “attractive” district schools enjoy are often 
disadvantages for other district schools. Research on teacher transfers shows that when 
teachers move between schools within a district they tend to “trade up” to schools with 
fewer poor and minority students, and higher school achievement than the schools they 
leave (Clotfelter, et al., 2007, Lankford, et al., 2002; Hanushek, et al., 2004). Further, the 
schools least preferred by teachers often have the most open positions and the most 
difficulty hiring. For instance, schools in more urban locales suffer from greater attrition 
rates than suburban and rural schools (Guarino, Santibanez, & Daley, 2006) and have 
more pointed perennial shortages of teachers particularly for mathematics, science, 
special education and bilingual positions (Imazeki, 2002). Even when urban and 
suburban schools have a similar number of vacancies, urban schools are much more 
likely to report these vacancies as difficult or impossible to fill (Imazeki, 2002). For 
instance, in a study of turnover in a single district, Guin (2004) found positions in high-
turnover elementary schools had an average of five applicants per position compared to 
over 150 for low-turnover schools.  
With fewer applicants for existing vacancies, schools with more attributes that run 
counter to teachers’ preferences are more likely to hire less-experienced, lower-qualified 
and lower-salaried teachers. As teachers gain experience, higher percentages are likely to 
‘defect’ from unattractive schools to schools that are more attractive (Imazeki, 2002). 
Research has shown as teacher experience increases the likelihood of moves within and 




easier-to-staff schools, gain experience and then move to more attractive district schools 
(Hanushek, et al., 2004). Teachers with less experience and lower salaries often replace 
the teachers that “trade up.” In many districts, this pattern results in a “revolving door” 
effect that can perennially disadvantage some schools in terms of the qualifications of the 
teachers they receive and in terms of the total amount of teacher compensation spending 
that serves those schools (Hanushek, et al., 2004).  
Many scholars site seniority transfer privileges as a significant driver of 
intradistrict disparities in teacher qualifications and experience (Moe, 2006; Stiefel, 
Rubenstein & Berne, 2006; Hanushek, et al., 2004). Seniority privileges provide teachers 
with access to open district positions before districts hire new and lower-salaried teachers 
and often give teachers with more seniority priority over less-experienced colleagues 
when filling open district positions (Boyd, et al., 2003; Warner-King & Smith Cassem, 
2005). Senior teachers have more experience and higher salaries compared to less-
experienced teachers. When seniority allows senior teachers to act on their preferences, 
“attractive” schools tend to have more-experienced and higher-paid teachers than less-
attractive schools. 
Periods of significant change in school staffing demand offer opportunities to 
observe the effects of seniority-based practices. For instance after statewide class-size 
reduction in California, there were many more open positions across schools, and 
seniority-based policies allowed qualified teachers to cluster much more quickly in the 
best schools, leaving less attractive schools understaffed (Clotfelter, Ladd, & Vigdor, 
2008; Reichardt, 2000). When demand decreases such that schools must reduce staff, 




slips. Widely used LIFO policies generally dictate that reductions in force begin with 
teachers who have the least experience. In the National Center on Teacher Quality’s 
purposive sample of 100 school districts, all districts factored seniority into layoff 
decisions and 75% of districts reported use of seniority as the primary factor (NCTQ, 
2010). LIFO policies disproportionately harm hard-to-staff schools that have more 
inexperienced “last in” teachers, while they protect the more-experienced and more-
expensive teachers (Sepe & Roza, 2010; NCTQ, 2010).  
District allocation formulas are intended to distribute resources to schools fairly, 
but other common district policies reviewed here counter those intentions and create the 
potential for between-school resource differences (Guthrie, 2007; Miller & Rubenstein, 
2008). Unfortunately, the sources of variation, particularly with respect to the distribution 
of teachers, often work to shortchange schools with more disadvantaged students (Roza, 
2010). Policymakers have not been able to easily identify or address between-school 
differences due in part to common school budget reporting practices and district data 
systems that obscure intradistrict differences. I review these district practices and data 
systems in the following section.  
District practices and data systems that mask intradistrict differences. A 
number of stakeholders have an interest in intradistrict resource equity. Students, parents 
and the public would rightly be concerned if some schools were systematically 
disadvantaged. Ideally, district officials would want to be able to identify maldistributions 
of resources, identify their sources, and redress them. Researchers, too, are interested in 
gauging resource equity for equity’s sake alone, as well as to evaluate the relationships 




district budget reporting and data collection systems make it difficult for the public, 
district officials, or researchers to assess the intradistrict distribution of resources 
effectively. Published school budgets should reflect the distribution of district resources, 
but districts often calculate school budgets using district salary averages that mask 
between-school variation in teachers’ salaries (Roza & Hill, 2004; Roza, 2010). The 
resultant school budgets inaccurately reflect the resources that serve different schools. 
Thus, the public has no clear vantage on intradistrict equity. Similarly, researchers who 
evaluate equity using flawed budgets cannot arrive at sound conclusions about equity. 
District data systems do contain reams of information about school resources. However, 
in most districts the data systems are incapable of providing district officials with a clear 
view of what resources go to which schools (Roza, 2010). The insufficiency of these data 
systems hampers district officials’ capacity to identify and redress resource 
maldistributions (Miller & Rubenstein, 2008; Roza & Hill, 2004; Roza, 2010). Except for 
a few intrepid researchers, the opacity of these data systems has made intradistrict 
resource evaluations impractical if not impossible. 
I present the remainder of this section on district reporting practices and data 
systems in four parts. In the first part, I discuss how districts erroneously report school 
budgets using district salary averaging. Next, I discuss how district data systems have 
historically been unable to accurately record and report comprehensive resource data at 
the school level. The third part examines the challenges that these data systems pose for 
district officials who want to allocate resources equitably. The fourth and final part 





School budget reporting using district salary averages. Most districts calculate and report 
school budgets using district salary averages (Roza, 2010). Instead of reporting the sum 
of the actual salaries of school staff, districts multiply the number of FTE staff by the 
district average salary and report the product in school budgets (Odden & Picus, 2000; 
Berne & Stiefel, 2000; Roza, 2005, Roza, Guin & Davis, 2007). District salary averaging 
accurately reflects the district’s expenditure, since districts pay all teachers, but 
erroneously reports school resources. While scholars have challenged this practice, most 
districts use district salary averaging which systematically underreports intradistrict 
resource differences (Roza, 2006, 2010).  
Widespread use of district salary averaging is reified by language in the federal 
Title I accountability rules that explicitly allow districts to satisfy the Title I 
comparability provision using salary averages.5 The comparability requirement for 
federal Title I funds requires that Title I funds supplement and not supplant base state and 
local funds which should be comparable across district schools. The law reads: 
(b) FEDERAL FUNDS TO SUPPLEMENT, NOT SUPPLANT, NON-FEDERAL 
FUNDS.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—A State educational agency or local educational agency 
shall use Federal funds received under this part only to supplement the funds that 
would, in the absence of such Federal funds, be made available from non-Federal 
sources for the education of pupils participating in programs assisted under this part, 
and not to supplant such funds… 
(c) COMPARABILITY OF SERVICES.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.— 
(A) COMPARABLE SERVICES.—Except as provided in paragraphs 
(4) and (5), a local educational agency may receive funds under this part only 
if State and local funds will be used in schools served under this part to 
provide services that, taken as a whole, are at least comparable to services in 
schools that are not receiving funds under this part. 
                                                 




(B) SUBSTANTIALLY COMPARABLE SERVICES.—If the local 
educational agency is serving all of such agency’s schools under this part, 
such agency may receive funds under this part only if such agency will use 
State and local funds to provide services State and local funds to provide 
services that, taken as a whole, are substantially comparable in each school. 
	
However, the Title I regulations that determines how localities must satisfy this 
comparability allows for the use of district salary averaging and specifically removes 
between-school salary differences based on teacher experience from the written assurance 
requirements. The law reads: 
(2) WRITTEN ASSURANCE.— 
(A) EQUIVALENCE.—A local educational agency shall be considered to have 
met the requirements of paragraph (1) if such agency has filed with the State 
educational agency a written assurance that such agency has established and 
implemented— 
(i) a local educational agency-wide salary schedule; 
(ii) a policy to ensure equivalence among schools in teachers, 
administrators, and other staff ; and 
(iii) a policy to ensure equivalence among schools in the provision of 
curriculum materials and instructional supplies. 
(B) DETERMINATIONS.—For the purpose of this subsection, in the 
determination of expenditures per pupil from State and local funds, or instructional 
salaries per pupil from State and local funds, staff salary differentials for years of 
employment shall not be included in such determinations. 
The allowance of district salary averaging in Title I reporting, known as the 
“Comparability loophole”, supports the local use of district salary averaging in 
calculating school budgets (Roza, 2010). The federal and local use of district salary 
averaging results in school budgets that under-report intradistrict resource differences and 
allows districts to allocate federal Title I funds to schools and students who are outside 




Districts’ budget reporting practices are not the only impediment to uncovering 
intradistrict resource differences. District data systems rarely track real expenditures to 
the school level, thus school-level data poorly reflect the actual resources that go to 
schools (Guthrie, 2007; Roza, 2010). The following section details the limits of most 
school-level data systems and the resultant budget reporting practices that hide many 
intradistrict resource gaps. 
District data systems. Concerns over school data systems are not new. In 1994, Berne and 
Stiefel wrote about the pressing need for quality student- and school-level data for the 
study of educational productivity, resource equity and resource allocation. They described 
the then current deficiencies in education agency data-collection systems and outlined a 
strategy to gather better data. Despite growing calls for school-level data among 
researchers, state and district data systems have been slow to answer. Guthrie’s, 2007 
lament of the current state of data availability echoed many of the concerns he voiced 
twelve years earlier (Guthrie 1997). The limits of school-level data come in to sharp relief 
when compared to widely available district data. Understanding why sufficient school-
level data are typically unavailable helps make sense of the limits to analyses of 
intradistrict resource distributions, and the lack of available data is in large part a product 
of a district-centric school finance structure. 
The culture surrounding state and district data systems has been one built for 
compliance rather built for better decision-making (Gazzero, 2008). Districts track 
revenues to meet the varied legal and accounting requirements associated with the 
multiple revenue streams they receive (Palaich, Good, & van der Ploeg, 2004; Roza, et 




districts to track revenues by their source (making district-level data on funding readily 
available) (Miller, Roza, & Schwartz, 2004). Before recent changes at the federal level 
(discussed below) districts had not had comparably powerful incentives to track resources 
to the school level (Guthrie, 2007). Since districts are the operational unit for resource 
allocation, accounting, and budget reporting, funding agencies do not treat schools as 
accounting centers. Thus, it is relatively easy to know how much is spent on teachers at 
the district level, but not how those compensation dollars are distributed across schools 
(Roza, et al., 2006; Miller, et al., 2004). 
The availability of school-level data is on the rise. Federal programs and research 
groups have challenged the culture of compliance (Data Quality Campaign, 2010). 
Several recent federal policies, including the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB), Race to 
the Top grants, and data reporting requirements attached to American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act (ARRA) funds are all federal policies that encourage data system 
modernization and require school-level data reporting. Additionally, watchdog groups 
like the Data Quality Campaign have raised the profile of education data issues 
(http://www.dataqualitycampaign.org/). Federal data collection efforts are also pressing 
states for more detailed school-level data. For instance, the ED’s Office of Civil Rights 
(OCR) biannual data collection now requires states to report disaggregated school data 
including actual school-level teacher salaries, for nearly all of the nation’s schools 
(Miller, 2010; See also http://ocrdata.ed.gov ). Though progress has been uneven, specific 
states and select districts have led the way in modernized data systems and currently have 
data systems that allow district officials and researchers unprecedented access to the 




districts have not yet realized the promise of these data systems, and until school-level 
data is readily available, policy makers and researcher will continue to face the 
challenges posed by available data systems. 
Do district officials know what goes where in districts? District officials have 
significantly limited knowledge of resource distributions in their own districts. Complex 
district allocation and budgeting systems and the systems that record data on the resulting 
allocations pose significant problems for district leaders who want to ensure equitable 
allocation of school-level resources. The many compensatory funding streams and the 
accompanying web of disjointed accounting requirements make it difficult for district 
officials to maintain a “bird’s eye view” of what money is going where. Further, in many 
districts base resource allocations (allocations made prior to additions from compensatory 
funding) are made independently of categorical allocations, and allocations from one 
source are not informed by allocations of the other (Miller & Rubenstein, 2008). Simply 
put, district finance is so complex that officials do not allocate supplementary resources 
in a way that is both systematic and comprehensive (Miller & Rubenstein, 2008; Roza, 
2010). District officials’ inability to know the full school-level resource picture inhibits 
their ability to ensure equity in initial resource distributions. Further, it makes it difficult 
for officials to identify under-resourced schools and then allocate additional resources to 
redress inequities. 
District finance systems make it difficult for district officials to redress the 
intradistrict resource variation outlined above; however, some evidence suggests a deeper 
problem, that district officials may not understand that a resource allocation problem 




sorting drives intradistrict resource differences, other research suggests that district 
officials underestimate the impact of teacher sorting, and that they do not consider 
between-school differences in teacher qualifications when allocating teaching positions 
(Miller & Rubenstein, 2008; Roza & Hill, 2004). Two studies that interviewed district 
personnel about teacher-allocation practices, found that though each districts used single 
salary schedules and district salary averaging, all respondents indicated that they believed 
any differences in teacher qualifications and compensation between schools would be a 
wash (Roza & Hill, 2004; Miller & Rubenstein, 2008). In one of these studies, again 
without exception, those interviewed reported that they did not consider the distribution 
of teacher salary and qualifications during the resource allocation process (Miller & 
Rubenstein, 2008). Contrary to district officials’ perceptions, both studies revealed that 
teacher sorting resulted in substantial between-school differences in teacher qualifications 
and teacher salaries in these districts.  
Can researchers discover what goes where in districts? District data systems pose 
similar problems for researchers who try to evaluate the distribution of school-level 
resources retrospectively. Two major problems in these systems are that they do not 
reflect the full amount of resources going to schools and the school-level resource data 
are often inaccurate. Both of these challenges obstruct researchers’ holistic view of what 
resources go where within districts. 
As researchers have used them in interdistrict analyses, measures of per-pupil 
funding are potentially excellent resource measures at the school level. However, since 
districts do not typically track resources to schools, the reported school-level per-pupil 




instance, the Cross City Campaign for Urban School Reform found that in ten large 
districts the percentage of total district operating expenditures reported at the school level 
varied from 38 to 99 percent, with seven districts reporting 80 percent or less (CCCUSR, 
2001). Working with incomplete resource data keeps researchers from accurately 
evaluating intradistrict resource equity or resource effectiveness (Miller, Roza, & Swartz, 
2004). A second issue that researchers face when using school-level per-pupil funding 
measures are inaccuracies due to salary averaging. As previously discussed, district use of 
averages understates potential between-school differences in teacher salaries, which are 
the largest portion of school operating procedures. The result of these two problems is 
that school per-pupil funding data are usually incomplete and often conceal important 
between-school resource differences. Measures of per-pupil funding are a good way to 
evaluate resource distributions because they capture the entire value of the mix of 
resources in schools and allow for clear comparisons (Berne & Stiefel, 1999). However, 
since available school-level funding measures are problematic researchers have looked at 
the distribution of specific resources across schools. Chief among these resources are 
teachers, again due to their importance and expense (Roza, 2006, 2010). Unfortunately, 
data systems pose some problems for assessing the distribution of teachers as well. 
Districts record data on funding, positions, qualifications, student records and 
teacher compensation. These data systems are not typically interoperable, meaning 
fragmented data systems make it difficult to connect multiple databases to supply 
researchers with data that is both comprehensive and accurate (Palaich, et al., 2004; 
Collins & Fruth, 2007; Goertz 1998, Guthrie, 2007; Gazzerro, 2008). For example, when 




located in 133 different isolated databases (Aarons, 2009). Faced with limited resources 
and with no incentive to undertake the significant task of redesigning unified data 
systems, districts have long been unable to make basic connections between data 
(Palaich, et al., 2004). Another challenge for researchers has been the inability to connect 
resources to their funding sources. In part, compensatory funds may pay for district-
allocated positions with the remainder of the expenditure coverage coming from 
unrestricted operating funds (Roza, et al., 2007). Thus directly identifying which 
positions, or the proportion of positions, that were allocated by source is not easily done 
(Roza, Guin, & Davis, 2007; Roza, 2010; Miller & Rubenstein, 2008). 
Since school-level measures of funding are incomplete and inaccurate, several 
analyses have examined equity by looking more narrowly at teacher compensation (e.g., 
Roza & Hill, 2004). Analyses of teacher compensation can yield valuable information on 
intradistrict resource equity because it is the largest portion of school operational 
expenditures (by some estimates 80% of a schools operating budget (Roza & Hill, 2004)) 
and because research has shown that variation in teacher compensation can drive 
between-school resource differences (Roza, 2005, 2010). However, equity conclusions 
based on ex post analyses of teacher compensation data alone implicitly assume that 
districts do not allocate other non-teacher resources to compensate for differences in 
teacher compensation. Any ex post analysis of per-pupil teacher compensation would 
capture the additional per-pupil teacher compensation coming from the allocation of 
additional staff positions, so this assumption would be limited to equity through non-
teacher resources. Such an assumption is impossible to verify on a large scale, however 




compensate for differences in teacher compensation with non-teacher resources. 
No mechanism balances TCE differences with non-teacher resources. There are 
two reasons to doubt that districts have mechanisms that compensate for TCE differences 
with supplemental allocations of non-teacher resources: their dubious feasibility as a 
remedy and the lack of evidence that such mechanisms are in use. First, since the expense 
of non-teacher resources is comparatively small, supplementing significant differences in 
teacher compensation would be impractical (Roza & Hill, 2004, Roza, 2005; Goldhaber, 
2008). Empirical analyses of TCE differences have revealed average differentials 
between high- and low-poverty schools can be substantial; indeed, in some instances they 
constitute roughly 5% of total school budgets. At the extremes, the total between-school 
differences approach one million dollars per year (Miles & Roza, 2002; Roza & Hill, 
2004; Education Trust West, 2005). 
The principal means of balancing substantial differences would likely be to 
allocate more teachers, because most other educational resources are less expensive than 
teachers are and less important to the educative process. A reasonable response to 
balancing these differences would be to add another FTE teacher position, assuming 
additional investments in materials and technology in amounts sufficient to balance salary 
differences would likely be less educationally productive than additional teachers. For 
example, assume the average difference in TCE within a district is $72,500.6 Arguably, 
non-teacher resources could balance the mean difference of $72,500, but in this district, 
the maximum school loss due solely to TCE differentials was over $260,000, an amount 
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that nothing short of additional staff would practically remedy. However, any ex post 
TCE analysis would capture any compensatory allocations of staff, as the differential in 
this example does. It is hard to imagine that non-teacher resources, even if allocated to 
balance TCE differences, would be a prudent, practical or probable remedy to 
compensate for differences at these dollar amounts. 
One possible non-teacher resource that could practically balance these 
differentials is teacher’s aides. While teachers’ aides earn significantly less than teachers 
do, their compensation is large enough that district officials could allocate aides to 
balance differences in TCE spending. Researchers have shown that aides are not 
associated with increased student achievement, as increased teacher quality and reduced 
class-sizes are (Gerner, Finn, Achilles, & Boyd-Zecharias, 2001; Grissmer, Flanagan, 
Kawata, & Williamson, 2000), and some research suggests that spending dollars on 
teachers instead of aides is cost effective for increasing student achievement (Normore & 
Ilon, 2006). Despite evidence on the effectiveness of teachers’ aides, they could balance 
differentials in TCE spending across schools, however this possibility is not very likely 
given the research on district allocation processes which show that districts typically 
allocate aides on a per-pupil basis using general funds or for specific student needs using 
compensatory funding (Rubenstein & Miller, 2008; Guthrie, 2007; GAO, 2011).  
Beyond the probabilities of balancing compensation differences through non-
teacher resources, there is no evidence of district allocation mechanisms that use non-
teacher resources, including teachers’ aides, to balance TCE differences exists (Roza, 
2010). If districts compensated for between-school teacher differences, research on 




and that there is an identifiable means to fill those gaps. Not only is there a lack of 
evidence of such a mechanism in research on district allocations (e.g., Miller & 
Rubenstein, 2008), but interviews with district officials have revealed that many doubt 
teacher differences amount to substantial inequities (Miller & Rubenstein, 2008). There 
are substantial resources going to several existing policies mechanisms aimed at 
addressing between-school teacher differences. For example, some states, districts, and 
federal programs provide bonuses or salary increases to draw teachers to hard-to-staff 
schools (Clotfelter, Glennie, Ladd, & Vigdor, 2008; Roza & Hill, 2004). While these 
policies are on the rise, they are only in place in a minority of districts. Importantly, ex 
post analyses of teacher pay would capture the additions such policies make to teacher 
pay. Districts would have to balance remaining differences in teacher compensation with 
non-teacher resources to achieve equity in per-pupil expenditures. The important point is 
that some policies are aimed at changing the distribution of teachers to improve equity 
when the contextual problem is rooted in the distribution of teachers, but that no such 
non-teacher based allocation mechanism is mentioned in the research on district 
allocations (Roza, 2010; Roza & Hill, 2004; Roza, 2005; Miller & Rubenstein, 2008). 
Without such a mechanism, it is reasonable to assume that substantial between-school 
differences in per-pupil teacher indicate inequities in overall resources (Goldhaber, 2008). 
Indeed these assumptions are implicit in many intradistrict teacher compensation studies 
(Roza, 2010; Roza & Hill, 2004; Education Trust West, 2005). 
Summary of district resource allocation. Predominant school district resource 
allocation practices and policies are based on formulae that have a stated intent to provide 




educational needs. However, these allocation policies and practices are not foolproof, and 
research has shown these systems contain numerous sources of variation that thwart their 
design. In practice, districts allocate resources based on the preferences of district staff, 
parents, administrators and teachers, not according to legitimate educational needs. 
District accounting and data systems make it difficult to detect this variation, particularly 
in terms of TCE. The difficulties of these data systems not only pose challenges for 
researchers attempting to assess intradistrict equity, but also make it difficult for district 
staff to systematically and comprehensively allocate resources and staff according to 
legitimate school needs. Given that TCE is the primary school-level expense, that TCE 
differences drive intradistrict resource differences, and that there is no evidence of a 
mechanism to balance TCE differences with non-teacher resources, evaluating the 
intradistrict distribution of teachers and teacher compensation provides an important 
vantage for evaluating school equity in general.  
In this section of the literature review, I have fully discussed the mechanics of 
district resource allocation, but have only tangentially addressed the findings of the 
research on the intradistrict distributions of resources these mechanism produce. In the 
following section, I review the findings of research that examines those distributions, and 
use that literature to contextualize this dissertation study. 
The Intradistrict Distribution of Teachers 
This section has five parts. The first part reviews research that has examined the 
intradistrict equity of broad resource objects, such as funding figures or arrays of multiple 
resources. While this research does not focus on teachers—the central focus of this 




The remaining four parts focus on specific aspects of the distribution of teachers within 
districts. The second part of this section examines research on the intradistrict distribution 
of teachers focusing on teacher qualifications, both the qualifications directly related to 
teacher compensation and those less directly related to compensation but more closely 
associated with teacher effectiveness. The third part focuses on research that assesses the 
distribution of teacher effectiveness by looking at measures of teachers’ value added. The 
fourth part looks at research on the intradistrict distribution of TCE. Since the distribution 
of TCE is central to this dissertation, and the limitations to extant research on TCE are 
fundamental to the methodology I present in the following chapter, I discuss the 
limitations to the extant research on TCE separately in the fifth part of this section.  
Research on the intradistrict distribution of educational resources. For 40 
years, scholars have assessed equity in school finance primarily between states and 
districts, primarily because available data systems support analyses at the state and 
district levels. Since the mid 1990s, the body of research on intradistrict equity and calls 
for improved school-level data began to increase. Berne and Stiefel’s 1994 study applied 
their own equity framework to intradistrict equity and argued that the “dominance of the 
district as the unit of analysis in school finance equity” might change due to three factors. 
They argued that there was a growing “belief that the most critical educational activities 
are those closest to the student.” That there was an increasing and “developing interest in 
studying the relationship between inputs, processes and outcomes, which were assumed 
to more effectively studies at the school level,” and that data systems in the near future 
would make “the collection and review of school-level data both possible and palatable 




intradistrict resource analyses has steadily increased. 
Early intradistrict research dates to the 1970’s (Owen 1972; Summers & Wolfe, 
1976) and in the mid 1990’s intradistrict analyses increased pointedly. The Journal of 
Education Finance committed an entire 1997 issue to intradistrict data and equity 
analyses, increasing the profile of the intradistrict equity problem. Intradistrict equity 
analyses increased with early advances in data systems (e.g., Berne & Stiefel, 2004) or 
laborious data collection (e.g., Roza & Hill, 2004). The following section reviews central 
studies on intradistrict resource distributions. Considering the variation in the design, 
samples, and approaches, these studies have remarkably consistent findings succinctly 
summarized in an article by Stiefel, Rubenstein, and Schwartz who wrote:  
“First, though evidence directly comparing school-level and district-level 
disparities is limited, the resource disparities found across schools within districts are 
often large and, in some cases, may be larger than the more widely-recognized 
disparities across districts. Second, these disparities are generally perversely related 
to school and student characteristics; schools with greater student needs often find 
themselves disadvantaged relative to other schools in the same district, particularly in 
terms of the quality of teacher resources. Third, these patterns are not caused by the 
intentional targeting of resources to lower-need schools…. these resource disparities 
are frequently the result of intradistrict funding formulas that allocate positions, 
rather than dollars, to schools, and teacher sorting patterns that allow higher paid 
teachers to systematically opt into lower need schools without financial ramifications 
for the schools to which they transfer (2004, p.11).” 
The majority of intradistrict equity research has examined large and urban 
districts based on the logic that larger districts have more schools and substantial student 
diversity across schools and are more likely to both have resource variation and sufficient 
data to examine the variation statistically (Miller & Rubenstein, 2008). Looking measures 




found as much or more resource variation between schools within districts than the 
variation between districts (Burke 1999; Rubenstein 1998; Owens & Maiden 1999). Most 
studies found relationships between per-pupil funding measures and school 
characteristics such as student race and poverty level (e.g., Stiefel, Rubenstein & 
Schwartz, 2004). Many of these studies examine the distribution of teachers by a variety 
of measures, alongside measures of funding (e.g., Iatarola & Stiefel, 2003). Consistently 
these studies find that teachers’ qualifications and salary vary across schools, and that 
schools with more low-performing, poor and non-White students tend to have the least 
qualified and lowest paid teachers (Lankford, et al., 2002). While this dissertation focuses 
on the intradistrict distribution of teacher compensation spending, the research on the 
distribution of other resources reviewed in this section contextualizes the more specific 
issues the distribution of teachers and teacher compensation.  
School-level resource differences both within and across districts. Several studies 
have approached school-level equity by examining how much variation in school 
resources, variously defined, lay within districts, across districts, and in some cases 
between states. These studies establish that as much or more of the variation in school 
funding, as well as measures of teacher resources, lies within districts as it does between 
them. For instance, Burke (1999) examined school-level horizontal equity using a 
national dataset. Burke calculated Gini coefficients, a statistic that measures the equity in 
a distribution,7 to measure variation in per-pupil funding and decomposed the Gini 
coefficient into between state, between-district and intradistrict variance components. 
                                                 




Burke found most of the variation in expenditures and teacher student ratios within 
districts as opposed to across them. Comparatively little of the between-school variation 
was found between states or districts.  
Owens and Maiden (1999) examined base and total per-pupil expenditures across 
elementary schools in Florida, again without respect to district boundaries. As Burke 
(1999) did, they found more variation between schools within districts and significant 
inequities. Using regression Owens and Maiden found that schools with more black and 
poor students received less base expenditures than other schools. After adding 
compensatory funds, Owens and Maiden found that districts (or the state) had reduced 
but not eliminated the inequities. Owens and Maiden interpreted their results as potential 
evidence that Title I funds are allocated without comparability and that compensatory 
programs may lessen resource gaps, but not completely. Importantly, Owens and Maiden 
replicated their analyses at the district level and found that none of their findings 
remained. This comparative finding underscores the importance of analyzing school-level 
resource measures.  
Looking both between and within districts in a sample of California districts, 
Hertert (1996) examined the horizontal and vertical equity of base expenditures, 
independent of categorical funds. Using a variety of indexes (including the range, 
restricted range, federal range ratio, the coefficient of variation, the Gini coefficient and 
the McLoone index; these measures are explained in more detail in chapter 3) to assess 
horizontal equity, and used multiple regression to assess vertical equity. Hertert did not 
find that student race had a strong relationship with expenditures, and attributed this lack 




funding. Hertert found the majority of variation in school expenditures lay between 
schools within districts, and that differences in school level (e.g., elementary, middle and 
high school) explained much of the variation.  
These studies by Burke (1999), Owens and Maiden (1999), and Hertert (1996) 
identify funding inequities across schools. More importantly for this study, all three find 
that resource variation within districts is as great as or greater than the variation between 
districts. Given the attention that interdistrict resource equity has garnered in the past, 
these findings suggest that intradistrict equity deserves more scrutiny than it has received. 
In particular, Owens and Maiden’s study demonstrates the importance of using the school 
as the unit of analyses, as many of their findings were not apparent at the district level. 
These studies suggest that much of the inequity in school resource has flown “under the 
radar” of school equity research that predominantly uses districts as the unit of analysis, 
and underscores the importance of the intradistrict equity research reviewed below. 
Studies of intradistrict funding measures. Several studies have focused on 
intradistrict equity in large cities without cross-district comparisons. In an early example, 
Owens examined intradistrict equity in nine cities using the Coleman sample (1972). 
Owens calculated elasticities between student race and income and resource levels at the 
schools and used regression to analyze six dependent variables, including real teacher 
salary expenditures per pupil, average teacher salary, teacher experience, teachers’ verbal 
ability, the proportion of White teachers, and facility quality. Consistently, Owens found 
that schools in neighborhoods with fewer non-White students and those with lower 
incomes received fewer resources. Teacher salary had the strongest relationship with 




(2004), Owens also attributed the school differences he found to the teacher-allocation 
system, writing,  
“The immediate cause of the economic and racial biases in the allocation of 
teaching resources appears to lie in the teacher assignment system: the single 
city-wide salary schedule, the allocation of attractive teaching posts to the 
most experienced teachers, and, in some cities, the informal pressures that 
are exerted to keep black teachers in black schools” (1972, p.38) 
Decades later, subsequent intradistrict studies echo Owens’s findings and causal 
attribution. 
In another early study, Summers and Wolfe (1976) examined vertical equity in 
Philadelphia using two years of school-level data. Their regression analyses showed that 
schools with more black and poor students received greater amounts of compensatory 
funding, and that schools with more black students had lower pupil-teacher ratios. 
However, these same schools had teachers with less experience, lower licensure exam 
scores and salaries, principals with less experience, and more teacher turnover. The 
relationships they found between school resources and student race and poverty remained 
after alternatively controlling for both race and poverty. Summers and Wolfe were the 
first to identify the “quantity/quality” tradeoffs in the distribution of teachers, tradeoffs 
found in subsequent research and drive the methodology for this study. 
Berne and Stiefel (1994) adapted their equity framework to intradistrict analyses 
using data on 800 New York City schools in 32 sub-districts. They examined vertical 
equity using regression analyses with multiple dependent variables including general 
education budgets and expenditures per pupil, budgeted and average teacher salaries per 




district averages, so the researchers based their conclusions on data more detailed than 
the typical district salary averages, but still less than actual school salaries. Berne and 
Stiefel (1994) found mixed results in elementary schools where student poverty was 
negatively associated with funding and teacher salaries, but positively associated with 
pupil-teacher ratios. These findings suggest there some trade-off between the number of 
teachers and their salary (driven by experience). High-poverty schools had an average 
student to teacher ratio of 15.49 compared to 17.59 in low-poverty schools. Curiously, 
the findings on funding were opposite for middle schools, though again teacher salaries 
were lower in high-poverty schools. Berne and Stiefel (1994) concluded that these 
differences were due to differing allocations of teaching positions where districts 
compensated middle schools8 for the lower salaries with additional positions but did not 
compensate elementary schools. This early foundational study established two important 
precedents for this study that are borne out in much of the later literature. First, teacher 
experience and pay differ systematically within many districts, and second, the primary 
option districts have to compensate for these differentials is allocating additional staff.  
 In another study using more detailed school-level data, Rubenstein (1998) 
examined Chicago schools data on multiple funding measures, beginning with base 
funding per pupil and then by adding compensatory funding streams, and again found 
evidence of quantity/quality trade-offs. Rubenstein’s horizontal equity evaluation found 
lesser general (base) funding went to high-poverty schools. His vertical equity analysis 
showed compensatory funding streams increased high-poverty school funding above the 
                                                 




district average, but only did so when the district (or state) added funding to compensate 
for the inequitable bases. Rubenstein also found a teacher trade-off where schools with 
more poor students had more teachers per pupil, but had lower-salaried and less-
experienced teachers. Again, Rubenstein observed this teacher quantity/quality trade-off, 
but neither established any associated intent in district allocations, nor investigated the 
nature of these trade-offs in depth. 
In, 2003, Iatarola and Stiefel used detailed school-level data from 1997-98 New 
York City schools to examine intradistrict variation in several dependent variables that 
captured differences in funding, teachers and student outcomes across schools. Iatarola 
and Stiefel’s (2003) study is important in three ways. First, they provide a holistic 
evaluation of intradistrict equity by applying Berne and Stiefel’s framework to multiple 
resource distributions at the same time. Second, their models included a comprehensive 
set of controls for student characteristics associated with legitimate student needs 
including student poverty, LEP status, mobility, and special education status. Their use of 
these controls allow for vertical comparisons between schools by explicitly examining 
differences in school’s compensatory needs. Third, their study was one of the first to look 
at multiple dimensions of teachers simultaneously to try to gauge teachers by per-pupil 
number, salary expenditures, and qualifications in a unitary analysis. Iatarola and Stiefel 
measured funding using general revenues and total revenues, as well as pupil-teacher 
ratios, teacher salaries and the percentage of teachers who were certified. These teacher-
related measures captured multiple dimensions of the distribution of teachers specifically 




Iatarola and Stiefel (2003) explicitly applied Berne and Stiefel’s framework 
evaluating horizontal equity in base funding, as well as measures of teachers and 
outcomes using the coefficient of variation. They evaluated vertical equity of total 
funding and other measures with regressions that included legitimate student needs and 
evaluated equality of opportunity in terms of student race and geographic location. Their 
regression results showed a negative relationship between student poverty and base 
funding and no relationship between poverty and total funding in elementary or middle 
schools. This pattern of results suggests that base funding was inequitable and that 
compensatory funds supplanted, rather than supplemented, base funding. As Rubenstein 
(1998) found in Chicago the authors found schools with more minority and high-poverty 
students received more teachers-per-pupil, but had lower salaries and lower certification 
percentages. Again, the authors attributed the teacher salary and qualifications differences 
to teacher assignment and transfer policies, and attributed differences in pupil-teacher 
ratios to the “system allocate[ing] more teacher resources to schools with needier 
students” (2003, p.77). However, the nature of these trade-offs was not thoroughly 
discussed.  
Condron and Roscigno’s (2003) study is particularly important because they 
attempt to close the circle between intradistrict resources and education production. The 
authors used regression analysis on data from one large Ohio district to estimate the 
effect of school funding and composition on achievement measures in five subjects. They 
included a numerous control variables, including students’ prior achievement, and 
independently evaluated base funding measures and federal Title I funding. Condron and 




positive associations between funding and many achievement measures. That they found 
the potential for resources to influence student achievement adds to the importance of 
examining intradistrict resource variation. 
Stiefel, Rubenstein and Schwarz (2004) used regression to evaluate intradistrict 
school funding, teacher salaries and qualifications in New York, Cleveland and 
Columbus, Ohio. Like Iatarola and Stiefel (2003), their analyses controlled for special 
education and LEP students but also included performance and a measure of school size. 
In New York, greater amounts of funding went to schools with more poor and special 
education students, but these schools had lower-salaried teachers, and fewer teachers with 
graduate degrees. All three cities showed trade-offs with poverty associated with 
increased funding but lower teacher qualifications and salaries.  
Summary of research on general intradistrict finance. The literature on 
intradistrict differences in funding informs this study with several common findings. 
First, resource differences between schools within districts are as substantial as 
differences between states and districts, and research using district-level data fail to 
capture the full range of resource variation. Second, base funding often favors low-need 
schools. Third, categorical funds often supplant rather than supplement base funding as 
they are intended. Fourth, these differences between schools are frequently attributed to 
intradistrict teacher sorting. Trade-offs between the quantity and quality (in terms of 
salary and qualifications) of teachers complicate between-school teacher related 
differences. Though observed often, researchers have not thoroughly investigated the 
nature of these trade-offs, and these trade-offs are central to the methodology for my 




measures, because these measures are inaccurate when based on district salary averages 
(e.g., Owens & Maiden, 2003, or Iatarola & Stiefel, 2003) and because overall funding 
measures do not capture quantity/quality differences in teachers.  
Teachers’ centrality in the above research on general intradistrict equity is plain. 
Given the challenges in evaluating intradistrict resource equity generally, several 
researchers have focused on teachers within districts. In the following section, I review 
research specifically focused on the intradistrict distribution of teachers. 
Dimensions of the intradistrict distribution of teachers. The literature focused 
on the intradistrict distribution of teachers consistently echoes two findings from the 
overall intradistrict resource equity. First, the distribution of teachers often disadvantages 
higher-need schools in terms of qualifications, effectiveness, and salaries. Second, 
scholars primarily attribute these differences to district allocation policies that predictably 
allow teacher sorting across schools.  
Generally, scholars have assessed the distribution of teachers along three primary 
dimensions: teacher qualifications, teacher quality, and TCE. Researchers have most 
frequently examined the distribution of teachers by their qualifications, some of which 
drive teacher compensation and others of which are more strongly associated with teacher 
quality (e.g., Lankford, et al., 2003). Researchers have also evaluated the distribution of 
teacher quality or effectiveness using value-added measures (e.g., Sass, Hannaway, Xu, 
Figlio & Feng, 2011). Methods for estimating teachers’ value-added are still developing 
and with limited data for such analyses, investigations of the intradistrict distribution of 
teachers’ value-added are uncommon. However, the research on the distribution of 




better than teacher qualifications do. Finally, scholars have assessed the distribution of 
teachers by examining TCE (e.g., Roza & Hill, 2004; Education Trust West, 2005).  
Several of the studies I review below include references to teacher 
quality/quantity tradeoffs. These tradeoffs are more relevant to the distribution of TCE 
than to teacher qualifications and quality. However, I take care to note when studies 
reference these tradeoffs because accounting for them is essential to evaluating the equity 
of TCE and to the methodology for this dissertation. In my discussion of the literature 
specifically focused on the distribution of TCE and in chapter 3, I will elaborate on the 
importance of these tradeoffs for assessing equity in TCE and for the methodology of this 
study. 
 This study focuses on the distribution of TCE, but the research findings on the 
distribution of teachers along all three dimensions warrants a holistic review because the 
distributions of teacher compensation, quality and qualifications are interrelated. TCE 
differences are important in their own right, but are more important if schools with 
above-average teacher compensation concurrently have teachers that are more effective. I 
review research on the differences in teacher compensation as a section separate from the 
first two because it is the integral component of intradistrict variation for this study. 
In the remainder of this section, I review research on teacher qualifications and 
teacher, quality, in turn by examining the conceptual approaches, measures, and equity 
standards researchers have applied to each dimension; by a summary of the associated 
research findings; and by a discussion of what the findings add to the holistic 





The intradistrict distribution of teachers by qualifications. Teacher qualifications 
are measurable indicators that researchers have used as proxies for teacher quality (e.g., 
Lankford et al., 2002; Presley, White & Gong, 2005) and teacher compensation at the 
school level (Education Trust West, 2005; Condron & Roscigno, 2003). In most districts, 
teachers’ experience, education, and certification determine their pay. Though recent 
research suggests that specific measures of salary-determinant qualifications –namely 
experience and in-field certification, particularly in combination– are credible predictors 
of student achievement (Clotfelter, et al., 2007; Boyd, et al., 2008), salary dependent 
teacher qualifications are generally considered to weakly indicate teacher quality 
(Hanushek, 1997; Rice, 2003). Therefore, researchers have examined other teacher 
qualifications that are more strongly associated with teacher quality (Lankford, et al., 
2002; Clotfelter, Ladd, Vigdor & Wheeler, 2006). 
 Studies have shown that teacher test scores on general aptitude tests (e.g., SAT, 
and ACT) or licensure examinations, teachers’ college selectivity and GPA, and National 
Board Certification to be better indicators of teacher quality than experience, certification 
and education (Lankford, et al., 2002; Clotfelter, et al., 2006; Ballou & Podgursky, 1997). 
Since many teacher attributes are correlated within schools, some researchers have made 
composite factors of teacher characteristics to evaluate the distribution of teacher quality 
(Presley, White, & Gong, 2005; Lankford, et al., 2002, DeAngelis, Presley & White, 
2005). Scholars have used other measures, such as the proportion of teachers who teach 
subjects out of their certification field, to look at how well teachers are matched to their 




Scholars have assessed the equity of the distribution of both salary-determinant 
and non-salary-determinant teacher qualifications using horizontal, vertical and equal 
opportunity standards. Horizontal equity is a natural equity standard because all students 
are “equal” with respect to teacher qualifications (e.g., Lankford et al., 2002; Betts et al., 
2000). For example, while districts legitimately allocate more FTE positions to schools 
with more special education students, there is no reason they would expect teachers that 
are more experienced or teachers with higher licensure scores compared to other schools. 
A number of analyses have assessed the vertical equity of teacher qualifications as part of 
analyses primarily aimed at funding equity (e.g., Iatarola & Stiefel, 2003; Stiefel, et al., 
1998; Berne & Stiefel, 1994).9 For instance, researchers have used multiple regression 
analyses to examine pupil-teacher ratios, average teacher salary, teacher experience, and 
teacher certification in addition to funding measures to determine if schools with greater 
compensatory needs receive more resources (Iatarola & Stiefel, 2003). However, the 
reasons these qualifications are apt for horizontal equity analyses– that there are no 
legitimate reasons for qualifications to vary across schools systematically – make them ill 
fit for vertical equity analyses.10 EEO is a more apt equity standard for teacher 
qualifications because any relationship between teacher qualifications and student or 
school characteristics has no legitimate basis. When teacher qualifications systematically 
                                                 
9A number of teacher sorting analyses include measures of variation in teacher resources that parallel the 
vertical equity analyses discussed here, but do so without explicitly naming any equity standard.  I discuss 
these in the section on EEO because there is no explicit equity standard, and because I believe these 
measures constitute an equal opportunity analysis due to a lack of legitimate reasons for compensatory 
teacher resources. 
10 For instance, in one such study, Iatarola and Stiefel invoke the concept of vertical equity regarding 
funding, but describe the pattern of results regarding teacher resources without referencing any equity 
concept directly (2003). This omission may be happenstance, or may reflect the problematic nature of using 




vary across schools, they violate the EEO standard. Researchers have evaluated the EEO 
of teacher qualifications using descriptive statistics and using regression analyses that 
describe the relationship between qualifications and student race, poverty, LEP, special 
education and immigrant status (e.g., Lankford et al., 2002; Iatarola & Stiefel, 2003).  
In the remainder of this section, I review research on the distribution of teacher 
qualifications in three parts. First, I overview research focused on salary-determinant 
qualifications. Second, I review research that looks at a broader set of non-salary-
determinant qualifications, usually alongside salary-determinant qualifications. Third, I 
review studies where scholars have created composite measures of teacher qualifications 
at the school level. 
The distribution of salary-determinant teacher qualifications. Studies examining 
the intradistrict distribution of teachers in large and midsized school districts consistently 
find substantial variation in a range of teacher qualifications, and yielded consistent 
conclusions. Generally, high-need schools have higher proportions of uncertified, lower-
salaried, less-experiences, and less-educated teachers (Owens, 1972, Summers & Wolfe, 
1976, Rubenstein, 1998; Schwartz & Stiefel, 2003; Lankford, et al., 2002; Clotfelter, 
Ladd & Vigdor, 2005, 2006).  
An illustrative large-scale study of salary-determinant teacher qualifications is 
Betts, Rueben and Dannenberg’s (2000) examination of 1997-98 data on California 
schools. This study focuses narrowly on salary-determinant qualifications across a large 
number of districts. The authors focused on the distribution of salary-determinant teacher 
qualifications as well as class size, teacher preparation and curriculum by schools’ 




found low variation in class size11 but substantial variation in salary-determinant teacher 
qualifications by student poverty and performance. The authors also found the 
distributions of specific teacher credentials were dependent, indicating there are “have” 
and “have not” schools in California. Students in the “have not” schools were 
disproportionately low performing, non-White and poor. Though some evidence of 
teacher quantity/qualification trade-offs were found in a weak correlation between class 
size and teacher education, the variation in class size was small suggesting trade-offs 
were minimal. Though the student performance data were not ideal for connecting 
teacher resources and performance, the authors found small relationships between 
experience and performance after controlling for the more powerful effects of student 
SES. Betts and colleagues summarized their findings writing,  
“Our exploration of resource allocations shows very small variations in 
class size among schools. In sharp contrast, we find large variations in the 
characteristics of teachers, especially in teacher education and experience. The 
percentage of teachers who are not fully certified also varies in important ways 
across schools. These variations in teacher characteristics are systematically 
related to differences in student socioeconomic status. In general, schools with 
more-disadvantaged students tend to employ teachers with lower levels of 
experience, certification, and education.” (2000, p. 205).  
Many studies before and since have similar findings, in terms of salary-determinant 
qualifications and many other qualifications not directly related to teacher salaries. 
The distribution of a broad array of teacher qualifications. Most studies of the 
intradistrict distribution of teacher qualifications examine salary-determinant 
                                                 





qualifications alongside a broader scope of qualifications that have proven to be 
indicators of teacher quality. These non-salary determinant qualifications have included 
various types of teacher test scores, certification in the subject taught, undergraduate 
selectivity, and National Board Certification (Barr, 2005; Goldhaber, Choi, & Cramer, 
2004; Ingersoll, 2002; Lankford, et al., 2002; Stiefel, et al., 1998; Clotfelter, et al., 2005, 
2006; Pesky & Haycock, 2006; Clark & Teonjes, 1996). As with salary-determinant 
qualifications, the distribution of other qualifications disadvantage higher-need schools. 
Further, the variation among qualifications is correlated, such that if a school is bereft in 
one teacher qualification, they are likely bereft of others (Lankford, et al., 2002; Betts, et 
al., 2000). Most longitudinal analyses of the intradistrict distribution of teacher 
qualifications have found that variation is not decreasing, but is either stable (Lankford, 
et al., 2002) or increasing (Clotfelter, et al., 2006; Boyd, et al., 2005b).  
In one of the most comprehensive of such studies, Lankford, Loeb and Wyckoff 
(2002) analyzed detailed New York State data on numerous teacher qualifications, 
including novice teachers, those with advanced degrees, certification, NY state teacher 
exam performance, undergraduate selectivity, and salaries. Lankford et al. found that, 
“By almost any measure, the qualifications of New York's teachers are unevenly 
distributed across schools” (Lankford, et al., 2002, p.41). Second, they found correlations 
among school-level average teacher qualifications, such that schools with higher 
measures in one teacher qualification are likely to have higher measures on others. Third, 




schools within districts.12 Student characteristics were related to teacher qualifications 
such that students in urban and/or higher-need schools had teachers with below-average 
qualifications. For instance, non-White students were fifty percent more likely to have a 
teacher with no previous teaching experience and 400 percent as likely to have a teacher 
not certified in any assignment. Further, the Lankford et al. study provides evidence that 
suggests teacher mobility contributes to the between-school differences in teacher 
qualifications, and that teacher salaries vary along the same lines as non-salary 
determinant teacher qualifications. Looking at the same data longitudinally, the authors 
found the differences apparent in 1999-2000 had been stable since 1985. 
In 2008, Boyd, Lankford, Loeb, Rockoff and Wyckoff followed up on this 2002 
research by evaluating the distribution on teacher qualifications using New York City 
data from 2000-2005. New York City was an important district for study because in their 
2002 study Lankford, Loeb and Wyckoff showed that the qualifications of New York 
City teachers were more disparately distributed that all the other New York state districts. 
The authors examined teacher experience, demographics, undergraduate selectivity, test 
scores, and pathways to teaching (whether teachers completed a college recommended 
certification program or an alternative certification program) across schools by student 
poverty. Again, the authors found that in 2002 teachers’ qualifications were inequitable 
across schools by poverty and that qualifications were correlated at the school level. 
However, they find a narrowing of these teacher qualification gaps by 2005, particularly 
in elementary schools. Boyd et al. attribute this narrowing to policy changes that removed 
                                                 





temporary licenses for uncertified teachers (which reduced the number of uncertified 
teachers in New York City) and the development of alternative certification routes for 
teachers. The authors also found achievement gaps diminished between low and high-
poverty schools. As discussed below, the authors also found that teacher qualifications 
were related to teachers’ value-added. Boyd et al.’s follow up study is informative 
because it again suggests a positive association between qualifications and quality in 
schools and because it suggests that policy changes that affect the distribution of teachers 
may improve student outcomes. 
Clotfelter, Ladd and Vigdor (2007) used ten years of North Carolina data that 
linked students’ test scores to teachers to investigate the relationships between teacher 
qualifications and student achievement. Their study not only catalogues the distribution 
of multiple qualifications in a large state, but also estimates the impact of qualifications 
differences with value-added measures. Further, the study compares the effects of higher 
qualifications and class size differences, which has implications for the net impact of 
qualification quality trade-offs. Controlling for multiple student measures, the authors 
examined the associations between average student test scores and class sizes, teachers’ 
licensure and license test scores, teachers’ undergraduate institutions, graduate degrees, 
National Board Certification and years of experience. Concurrently, they measure the 
impacts of class size on student achievement. The authors found that experience 
(primarily in the first few years), and teacher licensure were the largest indicators of 
differences in student scores. The other teacher measures were also positively related to 
student achievement, except for graduate education. As an illustration, estimated 




achievement between 0.15 and 0.21 standard deviations, compared to 0.08 and 0.12 
standard deviations in reading. The effects for lower class sizes were smaller with 
decreases of five students associated with less than 0.03 standard deviations increases in 
both mathematics and reading. The authors’ findings are consistent with other research 
on teacher credentials (Rockoff, 2004; Clotfelter, et al., 2006), and indicate that the 
distribution of teacher credentials matter for student achievement, and thus support a link 
between teacher qualifications and teacher quality. Further, in comparing the impact of 
teacher credentials and class size differences, this research suggests that the trade-offs 
evident between schools may be uneven in terms of instructional productivity. 
Composite measures of teacher qualifications. Several studies have shown 
correlations between teacher qualifications at the school level, echoing Betts et al.’s 
observations of “have” and “have not” schools. For instance, Clotfelter , Ladd, Wheeler, 
and Vigdor compared North Carolina schools’ teacher qualifications by student poverty 
and found the patterns in teacher experience, licensure, test scores, undergraduate 
institution quality and National Board Certification that were “strikingly consistent” 
(2007, p13). In every case, teachers in low-poverty schools had higher qualifications than 
those in high-poverty schools and in many cases, these differences were large. 
Correlations between teacher qualifications have been strong enough that several studies 
have created and evaluated composite measures of teacher qualifications (Presley, White, 
& Gong, 2005; Lankford, et al., 2002, DeAngelis, Presley & White, 2005). For instance, 
Lankford et al. created a composite of overall teacher quality constructed from school 
percentages of teachers with no experience, not certified in any assignment, New York 




competitive colleges (2002). Essentially replicating Lankford et al.’s New York analysis 
in Illinois, DeAngelis, Presley and White created a composite using the school percentage 
of teachers with degrees from competitive colleges, those with less than four years 
experience, percent with emergency certification, test failure, and teachers’ ACT 
composite score (2005). In both studies, the composite qualification measures explain 
about half of the variation in teacher qualifications, and the authors showed that teachers 
are more highly qualified in lower-need schools. Both studies decomposed the variation 
in composite teacher quality measures across regions, districts within regions, and 
schools within districts, and in both more than 60 percent of the variation in the 
composite measures lay between schools within districts. 
 The evidence from the research reviewed in this section clearly shows that the 
intradistrict distribution of teacher qualifications often violates the EEO standard. Lower-
need schools consistently have teachers with higher qualifications than do higher-need 
schools. Further, the distributions of qualifications are correlated, such that many schools 
are winners or losers in terms of overall teacher qualifications. In large part, researchers 
are interested in the distribution of teacher qualifications because qualifications serve as 
indicators of teacher quality. However, since qualifications are proxies for teacher quality 
researchers have used more direct approaches to assessing the distribution of teacher 
quality, principally using value added measures. I review these studies in the following 
section. 
The intradistrict distribution of teachers by teacher quality. Perhaps the most 
direct approach to measuring teacher quality directly is through value-added measures. 




after controlling for a variety of other measures. Teachers’ value-added varies 
substantially with potentially large associated effects on student achievement (Hanushek, 
1997, Sanders & Horn, 1998). In a seminal value-added analysis Sander and Horn 
concluded that ‘‘the effectiveness of the teacher is the major determinant of student 
academic progress’’ (Sanders & Horn, 1998, p. 247). Though Sanders and Horn’s analysis 
has received some critiques, most agree that teachers are the most important school 
resource for improving student achievement (Rice, 2003).  
Districts do not allocate teachers based on quality so there is no legitimate 
educational reason that teacher quality should vary by student needs. Therefore, any 
systematic associations between teacher quality and student or school characteristics 
would violate horizontal equity and equality of opportunity. Since teacher quality is not 
allocated in relation to compensatory need the vertical equity standard does not readily 
apply. Measures of teacher quality are relative measures and do not have an absolute or 
standard value, nor can they be indexed by pupil-teacher teacher ratios for a “quality per 
pupil” metric. However, researchers have examined the relative importance of teacher 
quality and pupil-teacher ratios and the results suggest that teacher quality may have 
more influence on student achievement (Clotfelter, et al., 2007). 
Value-added measures are statistically complex, require uncommonly large and 
detailed data sets, cannot be applied to new teachers or teachers with untested students 
(e.g., Hanushek, 2011), are potentially unstable across time (Sass, 2008) and are difficult 
to compare across districts (Lankford, et al., 2002). Despite these difficulties, some recent 
studies have addressed the intradistrict distribution of teacher quality. These studies 




Though these studies find teacher quality is typically higher in low-poverty schools, the 
distribution of quality is complex. 
Sass, Hannaway, Xu, Figlio and Feng (2011) examined North Carolina and 
Florida data and found that teacher quality is generally higher in low-poverty schools, 
though differences are small in magnitude and inconsistent. Though this is evidence that 
there are differences in teacher quality by poverty the authors assert their results “cast 
doubt on the conventional wisdom that teacher quality in high-poverty schools is 
uniformly worse than in lower-poverty schools” (2010, p.14). They found the differences 
in teacher quality are primarily in the bottom of the teacher quality distribution, meaning 
that high- and middling-quality teachers are comparable across schools, but the low-
performing teachers in high-poverty schools are significantly worse than the low-
performing teachers in low-poverty schools. The authors attribute most of these 
differences to a varying relationship between experience and quality in low and high-
poverty schools. Simply put, experience engenders higher teacher quality in low-poverty 
schools faster than it does in high-poverty schools. 
In another study, Feng and Sass examined teacher sorting by teacher quality in 
Florida schools (2011). Consistent with other literature, they found that teachers tend to 
move to schools with fewer black, low-income and low-performing students. However, 
holding the teacher’s own quality constant, Feng and Sass find that teachers appear to be 
attracted to and to stay in schools whose average teacher quality matches their own. 
Regarding retention, they find that schools in the top quartile of teacher quality attract 
more high-quality teachers compared to schools in the bottom quartile. Further, schools 




attrition, they find that teachers in general remain in positions in high-performing schools 
longer than in low-performing schools. Further, they find low-quality teachers are more 
likely to leave all kinds of schools faster than average-quality teachers are, and that high-
quality teachers leave at higher rates in lower- than in higher-performing schools. “The 
net result is that the “rich get richer” and the movement of teachers across schools tends 
to exacerbate differences in teacher quality” (2011, p18). 
Though they did not examine the distribution of teacher quality directly, Boyd et 
al. (2008) examined the shifting distribution of teacher qualifications in New York City 
from 2000-2005. They found teacher qualifications inequitably distributed across schools 
by poverty. Further, they found teachers with the lowest value-added scores had very 
little experience, were uncertified, and had histories of poor test performance. Boyd, et 
al.’s analysis suggests there is a bridge between differences in school-average teacher 
quality and qualifications. 
It is important to consider how closely linked the school-level distributions of 
teacher quality, qualifications are. TCE is directly related to salary-determinant 
qualifications. While Boyd et al.’s (2008) research suggests a positive relationship 
between salary-determinant qualifications and teacher quality, the relationships not 
strong. However, the linkages between quality and qualifications are greater for non-
salary determinant qualifications than they are for salary-determinant qualifications. 
Thus, the link between TCE and teacher quality is probably positive, indirect and weak, 
but difficult to establish clearly with current evidence (Roza, 2010; Rivkin, Hanushek & 
Kain, 2005; Rice, 2003). 




reasons to expect stronger associations between teacher quality and TCE at the school 
level. For example, Roza and Hill (2004) argue that schools with above-average salaries 
are more attractive to teachers and since evidence shows these schools have greater 
numbers of applicants for open positions they are more likely to attract higher-quality 
teachers (Guin, 2004; Roza, 2005). On the opposite end of the spectrum, schools that are 
“revolving doors” often have disproportionate proportions of novice teachers who are 
less effective and paid the least (Imazeki, 2002; Roza, 2005). These schools are likely to 
have lower average schools salaries, more teachers who are less effective, and have a 
lower school-wide capacity for instruction due to the instability of the staff (Roza, 2005). 
Further, several studies suggest that a greater per-pupil quantity of lower-qualified 
teachers, often found in high-need schools, is not as beneficial to students as higher- 
quality teachers are (Nye, et.al., 2004; Clotfelter, 2007). These linkages are loose and 
inconclusive, but they fall in line with the “rich get richer” hypothesis, and suggest that 
schools with above-average teacher qualifications and salaries may also have above-
average teacher quality, and there is little if any evidence that there would be an 
associated teacher quality deficit. 
The findings of research on teacher quality are complex and inconclusive, but 
they suggest that higher-need schools receive lower-quality teachers. This general finding 
is important for this study because it suggests that the distribution of teacher quality is 
distributed across schools in ways that advantage lower-need schools and disadvantage 
high-need schools. Similar to the literature on teacher qualifications, of the research on 
teachers’ value added suggests a “rich-get-richer” effect. Further, scholars have argued 




differences) and teacher quality would be stronger at the school level compared to 
connection at the teacher level. 
Summary of the research on intradistrict distributions of teacher qualifications 
and quality. Intradistrict distributions of teacher qualifications and quality show 
significant overlap in that the same types of schools with below-average teacher 
qualifications have below-average teacher quality. This research provides important 
context for the research focused on the intradistrict distribution of TCE because the 
distribution of TCE advantages and disadvantages the same kinds of schools. The likely 
scenario of compound advantages makes the examination of TCE more important than if 
these distributions were independent. Unfortunately, this “rich get richer” effect is not 
limited to qualifications and quality. The research on the distribution of TCE, which I 
review in the next section, indicates that the same schools that receive less-qualified and 
lower-quality teachers are often shortchanged in terms of TCE.  
The intradistrict distribution of teachers by compensation expenditures. The 
conceptual approach to evaluating the intradistrict distribution of TCE differs from the 
approaches for teacher qualifications and quality because the former focuses on input 
equity in dollar terms while the latter primarily focus on the productive capacity of 
schools. The distribution of TCE is like a zero-sum game where the total of district TCE 
is divided among schools. With a finite set of district resources, each school’s share of 
resources should be equal, conditional on the legitimate educational needs of students 
(e.g., LEP or disabilities) or schools (e.g., special district allocations for special programs 
such as magnet schools). However, unless other non-teacher resources balance 




game, and schools with above-average TCE are the winners. Researchers have looked at 
the intradistrict distribution of TCE to determine what kinds of schools are most often 
losers and what kinds are most often winners (Roza, 2010; Roza & Hill, 2004; Education 
Trust West, 2005; Reagan, 2010; Cohen and Miller, 2011) 
TCE differences between schools are denominated in dollars, which are fungible 
and of equivalent value within school districts. Because other resources also have a dollar 
metric, the magnitude of between-school TCE differences is easily measured. Differences 
in qualifications or quality are neither easily measured nor fungible, making it difficult to 
redress between-school differences. For instance, balancing differences in teacher 
qualifications is difficult when the relative value of those qualifications is uncertain. In 
addition, even if differences in teacher quality were measurable, redressing differences 
with other resources would be similarly difficult. 
When between-school differences in actual TCE are estimated, the value of 
schools’ gains and losses are much clearer than are the value of differences in teacher 
quality or qualifications. For example, a schools loss in TCE is the dollars they would 
otherwise receive, if not for TCE differentials (Miller, 2010; Roza, 2010). Schools could 
use the money lost to TCE differentials for non-teacher resources, more teachers, or as 
incentives to improve the quality of teachers in the school. The bottom line is that in 
districts some schools are not receiving the resources they are entitled to because districts 
ignore measurable and addressable teacher salary differentials.  
I organize the remainder of this subsection on the intradistrict distribution of TCE 
into three parts. In the first part I discuss in detail the measures that researchers have used 




section on TCE because the limitations of these measures play a significant role in the 
methodology for this dissertation. In the second part, I review research on the intradistrict 
distribution of TCE by looking at studies that have included findings on the distribution 
of TCE, studies focused in detail on the distribution of TCE in a few districts, and studies 
that have looked at the distribution of TCE in less detail but in a larger number of 
districts. In the third and final part, I examine the limitations to and gaps in extant 
research on the intradistrict distribution of TCE. 
Measures of TCE. Researchers have measured TCE in two principal ways. Most 
often TCE is compared across schools by looking at average teacher salaries (TCEFTE –
the total school TCE divided by the total number of FTEs) (Roza & Hill, 2004; Iatarola & 
Stiefel, 2003; Lankford et al., 2002). Most analyses focused on the intradistrict 
distribution of TCE discuss differences in average teacher salaries (Roza & Hill, 2005; 
Roza, 2005; Education Trust West, 2005; Miller, 2010). Though not stated explicitly, 
these studies probably use average salaries because doing so permits a direct focus on the 
effects of policies such as district salary averaging that have long hidden between-school 
TCE differences. Fewer studies have used per-pupil measures of TCE (TCEPP - the sum 
of total TCE at the school divided by the number of pupils) (Education Trust, 2008; 
Argue, Honeyman & Schlay, 2006; Roza, 2005). 
Evaluating average teacher salaries by horizontal equity and EEO standards is 
straightforward because in most districts there are no legitimate reasons why average 




schools using any equity standard.13 Districts often use compensatory funds to provide 
more teachers for schools with compensatory needs, but these additional teachers need 
not affect TCEFTE. Further, since these extra teachers are part of compensatory funding 
they should not necessarily be included in a horizontal evaluation. One exception would 
be districts that use salary bonuses as incentives to retain teachers in hard-to-staff 
schools. Higher average salaries would be expected in the targeted schools unless base 
pay (minus bonuses) was used for these salary averages.14 Programs such as the federal 
Teacher Incentive Funds grants are making such targeted retention incentives more 
common, but such programs are the exception rather than the rule (Stronge, Gareis & 
Little, 2006). Most districts do not have targeted retention programs, and in these 
districts, there are no legitimate reasons for TCEFTE to vary across schools, and thus no 
basis for a vertical equity analysis using average teacher salary. Any substantial variation 
in TCEFTE would indicate horizontal inequalities (different from inequities, discussed 
below), and any relationship between a school characteristics and average salaries would 
indicate EEO violations.  
Average teacher salaries are informative as they accurately signal teacher sorting, 
but they are insufficient bases for equity conclusions for several reasons. First, evaluating 
equity by any measure of teacher compensation alone assumes that other, non-teacher 
resources are not allocated to achieve resource equity. If district officials understand that 
the variation in teacher salaries divert resources from needy schools, they may allocate 
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other non-teacher resources to fill those gaps. A second reason is that differences in pupil-
teacher ratios may counterbalance differences in teacher salary. Differences that are 
apparent in school-average teacher salaries may change substantially when examining 
per-pupil TCE, especially if there are significantly more teachers per pupil in schools 
with below-average teacher salaries (Education Trust, 2008). The quantity/quality teacher 
tradeoffs mentioned in many studies reviewed above underscore the importance of 
controlling for pupil-teacher ratios when comparing school salary averages (Rubenstein, 
Stiefel & Schwartz, 2007; Stiefel, et al., 2004; Stiefel, et al., 1998, Rubenstein, 1998; 
Summers & Wolfe, 1976; Owen, 1972). 
Establishing the true nature of these trade-offs is difficult because it is often 
unclear whether the additional teachers are attributable to 1) variable concentrations of 
students with compensatory needs or 2) to what I call “corrective allocations” which are 
district allocation strategies that attempt to balance teacher quality or expenditure 
differences with additional positions. To appropriately evaluate pupil-teacher ratios across 
schools and accurately identify true quantity/quality trade-offs, analyses would have to 
evaluate horizontal equity of pupil-teacher ratios separately using only base allocations of 
teaching positions. Vertical equity evaluations might examine total pupil-teacher ratios 
while controlling for between-school differences in compensatory student needs. 
Unfortunately, most district data systems make it difficult to decompose schools’ FTE 
allocations into base and compensatory components (Roza, 2005, 2006; Miller & 
Rubenstein, 2008), and researchers have not previously been able to separate 
compensatory and “corrective allocations.” As a result, these quantity/quality trade-offs 




explained (e.g., Rubenstein, Stiefel & Schwartz, 2007; Rubenstein, 1998; Summers & 
Wolfe, 1976). 
Equity evaluations of TCE that use per-pupil measures are still limited by the 
possibility of equity through non-teacher resources, they do control for trade-offs 
between quantity and compensation. Higher TCE per pupil in schools with greater 
compensatory needs would indicate vertical equity. The quantity/quality trade-off so 
often mentioned in the literature reviewed above can only be evaluated with a per-pupil 
measure of TCE, and not by school-average salaries, which most intradistrict TCE studies 
have examined. These school-average salary measures used in most intradistrict TCE 
studies makes drawing equity conclusions difficult (Roza & Hill, 2004; Roza, 2010; 
Education Trust West, 2005, 2006; Miller, 2010; Cohen & Miller, 2011). 
Research on the intradistrict distribution of TCE. Despite measurement issues, studies 
focused on intradistrict TCE have consistently shown that the distribution of TCE 
benefits the same kinds of lower-need schools that often have above-average teacher 
quality and qualifications. I review this research into three categories. The first category 
includes studies that examine measures of TCE, but focuses on the intradistrict 
distribution of teachers more generally. The second category includes studies that have 
used uncommonly detailed data on a small number of districts to examine the distribution 
of TCE. The third category includes studies that examine less detailed data on a large 
number of districts to examine the magnitude and the scope of inequitable distributions of 
TCE. I review the research in each of these categories in turn below, and conclude with a 




Intradistrict studies that include measures of TCE. Many of the studies reviewed 
above examined both teacher qualifications and measures of TCE, most often in terms of 
average teacher salary (Burke, 1999; Education Trust West, 2005; Stiefel, et al., 1998; 
Stiefel, et al., 2004; Lankford, et al., 2002; Owen, 1972; Summers & Wolfe, 1976; Roza 
& Miles, 2002; Rubenstein, 1998; Iatarola & Stiefel, 2003). These studies examine 
average teacher salaries using descriptive statistics such as means, interquartile and 
federal range ratios (e.g., Betts et al., 2000) and regression analyses (e.g., Iatarola & 
Stiefel, 2003). Studies that use regression have analyzed average teacher salaries without 
controls for pupil-teacher ratios, essentially showing salary differences (e.g., Iatarola and 
Stiefel, 2003). In many, but not all of these studies, researchers have found lower pupil-
teacher ratios in schools that have teachers with higher salaries and greater qualifications 
(Rubenstein, Stiefel & Schwartz, 2007; Stiefel, et al., 1998, 2004; Rubenstein, 1998; 
Summers & Wolfe, 1976; Owen, 1972). These authors suggest that these trade-offs may 
offset inequities in TCEFTE, but these suggestions are not the focus of these analyses and 
never fully explored. 
Studies focused on the intradistrict distribution of TCE in select large districts. In 
recent years, several studies have taken direct aim at gauging the impact that the unequal 
distribution of teachers has on school budgets. These studies analyze TCE in a few 
districts with more detail than do the studies above that include but do not focus on TCE 
measures, or compared to studies in the next section that analyze the distribution of TCE 
in a larger number of districts. Such focused and detailed studies are few, as are the 




 In, 2004, Roza and Hill wrote a seminal article on intradistrict differences in 
teacher salary. Unable to rely on published district data, the authors reconstructed school 
budgets “from the ground up” (p.203) for four large urban districts in order to include 
real salary variation in school funding measures. In this article, Roza and Hill highlighted 
the inequities hidden by the use of district salary averaging, and their analyses focused on 
showing the magnitude of the school budget differences hidden by this practice. 
Importantly, they present the differences between the published budgets and what the 
budget totals would have been using actual teacher salaries instead of district averages. In 
these districts, the average school-budget differences hidden by salary averaging were 
substantial, ranging from 4.9 to 6.5% of published school budgets. In terms of per-pupil 
spending, the differences ranged from $145 to $246, which translated into average school 
disparities of between $72,500 and $120,000. These averages were far less than the 
maximum differences found in these districts, which ranged from $949 to $2800 per 
pupil. At the extremes, these per-pupil differences sum to huge amounts, with gains from 
$230,000, to $550,000 annually, and losses from $263,000 to $960,000.  
Roza and Hill found systematic salary differences. In all four districts, high-
poverty, and to a greater degree, low-performing schools had lower salaries, despite 
district formulas and federal funds that targeted funds to high-poverty schools. The 
authors show that teacher sorting affects compensatory funds as well as the distribution 
of general funds. They showed that Title I funds provide additional staff for high-poverty 
schools and, that these staff are accounted for with district average salaries. However, 
because high-poverty schools have below-average salaries, Roza and Hill argue that the 




above-average teacher salaries in low-poverty schools. Further, they showed that a 
program in Baltimore City schools that provided salary bonuses to retain fully certified 
teachers in low-performing schools fell far short of equalizing the differences in TCE. 
While their findings highlight the importance of the distribution of teacher salary, 
Roza and Hill’s measurement focus on the differences made by salary averaging are 
problematic for drawing equity conclusions. For instance, in a hypothetical school with 
twenty teachers and an average salary $2,000 below the district average, the “gain or 
loss” made by salary averaging would equal $40,000. Roza and Hill present these 
differences in total, per-pupil, and as a percentage of total published school budget (2004, 
p. 209). The first problem with only focusing on the “gains or losses” is that the authors 
failed index these differences by pupil-teacher ratios, which leaves no vantage point for 
evaluating equity between schools, because the authors never present the absolute 
amounts of resources per pupil. For instance, if these districts used the “quantity/ quality” 
trade-off mentioned above, Roza and Hill’s analysis would capture differences in the 
school budgets made by differences in “quality” (in terms of TCEFTE), but not in 
“quantity”, because there was no control for the number of teachers relative to students. 
In districts where high-need schools received more, but lower-salaried teachers, Roza & 
Hill’s examination of TCEFTE is blind to the additional per-pupil spending associated with 
additional allocated positions. Further, using their calculations of schools’ “gains and 
losses” —by multiplying the number of FTE times the salary differential—overstates the 
losses in schools with lower salaries because they have more teachers. With more 
teachers below the district average, there are more losses to sum in high-need schools, 




provide more teachers, and thereby more TCE, to these schools to promote equity. Roza 
and Hill’s calculations follow this pattern where average school “losses” are larger than 
average “gains”.  
In another study of five large city districts, Roza (2005) used a similar focus on 
“gains or losses” due to salary averaging. Again calculating school-level budgets with 
actual salary data, Roza first examined base levels of funding by subtracting categorical 
funding from total school budgets. In four of the five districts she examined, Roza found 
that the base allocation of funds favored high-performing, low-need schools.15 Roza then 
determined how much of the spending gap in these schools is due to variation in teacher 
salaries. Again calculating school “gains or losses” due to salary averaging, Roza found 
salary differences account for most of these gaps. For example, in Denver salaries 
accounted for 82% of the gap between high- and low-poverty schools (2005, p. 14). 
However, after adding categorical funds to the base level of resources, three of the five 
districts provided more resources to schools in the lowest poverty quartile.  
While Roza’s findings show that salary gaps did favor low-poverty schools, in 
some cases high-poverty schools received more total resources even after accounting for 
differences in actual salaries. However, the base amount of resources that are intended to 
be equal before adding categorical resources, were inequitable more often than not, and 
by substantial margins. Roza argued that vertical resources adjustments are insufficient to 
achieve resource parity because of the unequal base funding. Roza further argued that 
even in districts that have higher average total spending in high-poverty schools, salary 
                                                 





differences undermine the original intent of the compensatory allocations. Other research 
has shown that compensatory funds often balance overall funding between schools, but 
that they are layered on top of horizontally inequitable base allocations (Scafaldi, 2004; 
Miller & Rubenstein, 2008; Roza, 2005; Roza & Miles, 2004; Rubenstein 1998; Roza, 
Guin, & Davis, 2007). Roza’s research provides reason to believe teacher salary variation 
either drives or exacerbates these unequal bases. 
 Analyzing TCEFTE and TCEPP in Philadelphia schools from 2001 to 2005, Argue, 
Honeyman, and Schlay (2006) found substantial differences in teacher salary and 
qualifications across schools by poverty. The related experience and salary gaps between 
low- and high-poverty schools were substantial, averaging eight years of experience and 
around $8000 (TCEFTE). Argue, Honeyman, and Schlay computed TCEFTE gaps in the 
same way that Roza and Hill did in their 2004 study, however they also report TCEPP. 
Though class-size differences between high- and low-poverty schools were slight, 
differences in TCEPP were substantial. Differences in per-pupil spending between high-
poverty and low-poverty schools were $270 in 2001, and grew to almost $700 in 2005. 
The average difference in the total instructional budgets between high- and low-poverty 
school budgets during this period was over $240,000. Argue, et al. concluded that salary 
differences between schools amounted to considerable inequities. While these findings 
from Philadelphia cannot directly confirm that Roza and Hill’s analytic approach of 
calculating the “salary gaps” accurately reflect inequities, they suggest “salary gaps” may 
reflect inequities even after controlling for quantity-quality trade-offs.  
These studies by Roza and Hill (2004), Roza (2005), and Argue, Honeyman, and 




districts. However, they provide little information about the scope of the problem they 
address or about the magnitude of TCE differences across districts. The extant literature 
on intradistrict TCE does not indicate the scope of this problem, but larger scale studies 
reviewed in the next section have begun to clarify the scope of the problem of TCE 
variation. 
Studies focused on the intradistrict distribution of TCE in many districts. Several 
research and policy reports have analyzed salary differences in less detail, but in a larger 
number of districts in a single state. These studies provide some sense of what proportion 
of districts may have substantial imbalances in the distribution of TCE. Education Trust 
West (2005) examined TCE in California’s 50 largest school districts. Without accurate 
school-level salary data, they estimated teacher salaries based on salary-determinant 
teacher qualifications and district salary schedules. Confirmatory analyses using actual 
salary data in two large districts confirmed the validity of their estimation approach. 
Using these estimates, they found consistent and large differentials between schools in 
the top and bottom quartiles of minority composition and student poverty. While eight 
districts had higher salaries in higher-need schools, the vast majority showed large salary 
gaps favoring higher-need schools. On average, salary gaps between high- and low-
poverty schools averaged over $3,000 per teacher, amounting to over $100,000 losses in 
typical high-poverty school budgets. In some examples these differences amount to 
$450,000, enough to “hire nine additional teachers with five years of experience each” 
(Education Trust West, 2005, p.12). The authors did not report per-pupil TCE 
differences; however, the report states that pupil-teacher ratios were examined and 




Education Trust completed two similar analyses in Texas and Ohio and found 
results similar to those in the California study. Looking at the 50 largest Texas districts, 
they found approximately $1000 TCEFTE gaps between the highest- and lowest-poverty 
elementary and high schools (2006). This analysis was presented in a research brief, not 
an in depth report, and the salary gaps they present are not the average gaps, but the gaps 
between the highest-poverty school and the lowest-poverty school in these districts. 
While these results may be accurate, they highlight a problem by only focusing on two 
schools at the extremes of poverty in each district and provide little clear information 
about the breath of the salary gaps in Texas schools. Further, the report does not discuss 
pupil-teacher ratios differences in these schools. 
Looking at elementary schools in the 14 largest Ohio school districts, Education 
Trust (2008) again found substantial TCEFTE differences between the highest- and lowest-
poverty schools. In 11 of the 14 districts, the highest-poverty schools had lower TCEFTE 
compared to the lowest-poverty schools, with differences ranging from $204 to $7,176. 
Unlike the report on Texas districts, the Ohio report examined pupil-teacher ratios and 
TCEPP and found more teachers per pupil in the lowest-poverty schools in 9 of the 14 
districts studied. The differences in pupil-teacher ratios in these schools were small (less 
than five students per teacher) in all but two districts. However, the analysis of TCEPP 
showed that in 10 of 14 districts the highest-poverty schools had higher TCEPP. The 
authors note that though the majority of districts spend more teacher salary dollars per 
pupil in the poorest schools, the differentials are small compared to the amount of 
compensatory resources intended to go to these schools. As was the case with their report 




school poverty in these districts leaving little indication of the scope of the problem for 
the districts’ remaining schools. Neither report gauges the number of schools or students 
affected by salary gaps in these districts. 
Two research reports released by the Center for American Progress use a 
hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) framework to analyze average teacher salaries across 
schools within districts. An important advantage of these two reports is that they analyze 
a large number of schools in multiple districts and can therefore estimate the average 
district differences in teacher salary. One of these examined actual salaries for a 
representative sample of California districts to evaluate the association between poverty 
and average teacher salaries (Miller, 2010). The report took advantage of data from 
California School Report Cards which state law recently required include real school 
salary averages. Relying primarily on data from California School Report Cards, this 
report analyzed actual school-level salary expenditures using an HLM framework that 
nested schools within districts. The report decomposed the variation in teacher salaries 
between and within districts and found more than 70% of the variation was between 
schools within districts. The models revealed that a 10% increase in student poverty, as 
measured by reduced price meals eligibility, was associated with an average increase in 
teacher salaries of $411. For schools with the average number of teachers for California 
schools that differ in student poverty by 50%, the average estimated difference made by 
salary differences totaled more than $75,000, holding all else constant. This difference is 
roughly equivalent to the salary and benefits of an additional teacher with average 
qualifications for California. While the primary model in this study did not control for 




measure of pupil-teacher ratios did not substantially alter the results. In this report, the 
authors did not present the results of the robustness check. 
In a similar analysis on all districts in Florida, the Center for American Progress 
found just over half of the variation in average salaries was within districts (Cohen & 
Miller, 2011). Again using HLM analyses, the analyses of Florida found that a 10% 
increase in student poverty was associated with a decrease of $213 in average teacher 
salary, roughly half as large as the relationship found in the California study (Miller, 
2010). Though the model did include a measure of schools size (specifically, the natural 
log of student enrollment) it did not include pupil-teacher ratios. With no control for 
pupil-teacher ratios, this analysis only examined average teacher salaries and failed to 
examine the quantity/quality trade-off in Florida schools. 
Summary of research focused on the intradistrict distribution of TCE. The 
research focused on intradistrict differences in TCE has consistently found that similarly 
to the research on teacher qualifications, teacher salaries are higher in lower-need 
schools. The research on TCE goes a step beyond the research on teacher qualifications 
by quantifying the magnitude of these differences in dollars terms, which have proven 
substantial in a number of districts and states. While these studies effectively highlight an 
equity problem, they fall short of fully gauging equity of TCE. Further, the scope of 
available empirical evidence is thin. In the following section I discuss the limitations of 
this research in detail in a separate section below in order to highlight several issues that 
my methodology is designed to address.  
Limitations to the research on the intradistrict distribution of TCE. While the 




issue, two significant limitations remain. First, most of this research looks at average 
salaries, which are insufficient evidentiary bases for equity conclusions. Second, the 
number of districts assessed limits the scope of the research on TCE differences as does 
the proportion of district schools that are included in the analyses. I explore these two 
limitations below in turn. 
Limits to making equity conclusions. Given that TCE is one component of the mix 
of resources allocated to schools, analyses of intradistrict teacher-salary differences can 
make valid equity claims only after controlling for two primary means by which districts 
could balance TCE differences to achieve equity. The first means would be to allocate 
more teachers to schools with below-average salaries, thereby reducing pupil-teacher 
ratios and increasing TCE per pupil in those schools. The second means would be to 
allocate non-teacher resources to schools with below-average salaries. The failure of 
existing research to control for additional allocations of teachers is a conceptual 
shortcoming, while the failure to explicitly deal with additional allocations of non-teacher 
resources is a limitation of the data available. 
 First, by focusing on measures of school-average salaries while either ignoring or 
inadequately addressing per-pupil measures of TCE, these studies consistently fail to deal 
with the often-mentioned teacher quantity/quality trade-off. These studies establish 
clearly that high-need schools often have below-average teacher salaries, but they usually 
fail to establish whether additional teachers in these high-need schools make per-pupil 
TCE equitable within districts. The single study reviewed above (Education Trust, 2008) 





 Education Trust’s Ohio analysis found average salary gaps favoring lower-
poverty schools in 11 of 14 districts. The report characterized the between-school 
differences in student teacher ratios as small in most districts; however, adjusting for 
these ratios essentially reversed their findings on average salary differences. Ten of the 
14 Ohio districts studied had higher TCEPP in the highest poverty schools. While many of 
these studies either ignore or gloss over between-school differences in teacher student 
ratios, these findings from Ohio suggest that even “small” differences in teacher student 
ratios have substantial impacts on the equity of TCE. 
Analyzing per-pupil TCE measures is only a first step in effectively evaluating 
equity in TCE. A second hurdle for evaluating horizontal and vertical equity is 
determining what portions of TCE are base allocations and what portions are associated 
with compensatory needs. Decomposing total TCE into base and compensatory funding 
is difficult or impossible when analyzing single districts, and all the more difficult when 
examining multiple districts (Roza, 2007 &, 2010; Miller & Rubenstein, 2008). Research 
has repeatedly shown that compensatory funding is often layered on top of inequitable 
base allocations, and research suggest that differences in teacher salary averages are a 
primary driver of inequitable base allocations. Without the ability to separate base and 
compensatory allocations of teachers, or some other means of controlling for 
compensatory allocations of teaching positions, analyses could reveal equal TCE per 
pupil between schools, yet still be unable to say whether the distribution of TCE is 
equitable relative to student compensatory needs. 
The second limitation for equity conclusions in this research is that districts may 




in per-pupil instructional expenditures. The primary reason that analyses do not control 
for these alternative resources is the available data’s limited depth. Real school-level 
salary data have been uncommon, and most of the research on intradistrict teacher salary 
spending has been in response to this lack of accurate salary data and the resource gaps 
that remain hidden without it. If accurate per-pupil spending data that included both real 
teacher salary data and other non-teacher resource allocations at the school level were 
available, there would be no need for these studies in the first place. While data limits 
preclude explicit control for differences in non-teacher resources vis-à-vis teacher salary 
differences, there are several reasons to believe that districts do not typically alternative 
resources to balance school differences in TCE in most districts. However, until available 
data capture school-level real salaries and all other non-teacher resources, TCE equity 
conclusions must assume that other resources are not systematically allocated to balance 
differences in TCE and thereby achieve equity. 
Limits to the scope of TCE research. While the limited depth of available data has 
constrained the school-level resources that analysts can control for, the limited breadth of 
available data has constrained the scope of research on intradistrict TCE. The evidentiary 
base is insufficient to describe the scope of the problem of intradistrict TCE differences 
across districts, and the predominant analytic approaches limit the ability to describe the 
scope of this problem across schools within districts. Many of the intradistrict TCE 
analyses have focused on a small number of districts for which detailed data are available 
(Roza & Hill, 2004; Argue, Honeyman & Schlay, 2006), while others use data on a larger 
number of districts within a single state (Education Trust West, 2005; Miller, 2010; 




Progress (Miller, 2010; Cohen & Miller, 2011), these analyses have been limited to large 
urban districts. Researchers focused on large, urban districts because such districts have 
enough schools and enough diversity between schools, to exhibit variation in TCE (Roza, 
2010). Research in mid-sized districts has shown the antecedents of TCE differentials are 
not limited to large districts alone (Miller & Rubenstein, 2008; Lankford et al., 2002). 
However, the focus on large urban districts has left little descriptive evidence on what 
proportion of districts exhibit substantial TCE variation. Even in the two HLM analyses 
with broader scopes (Miller, 2010; Cohen & Miller, 2011) the distribution of TCE 
variation across districts is not well described.  
The lack of evidence on the portion of districts’ schools affected by TCE variation 
is a result of researchers’ analytic approaches. Most researchers have reported TCE 
differences only between schools at the ends of the spectrum of poverty or race/ethnicity 
(e.g., Roza & Hill, 2004; Education Trust West, 2005, 2008). By focusing on the 
extremes these studies effectively highlight a policy problem, but they neither indicate 
the proportion of schools affected by TCE variation, nor the degree of these impacts on 
schools.  
The data limitations that have hindered the description of TCE variation have 
similarly hindered analyses of the association between TCE variation and district and 
school characteristics. With school-level data usually limited to a small number of 
districts, multivariate analyses that might investigate the association between district 
characteristics and TCE variation are impossible. Data on the district characteristics most 
likely related to TCE variation, such as allocation, transfer, and budgeting policies, would 




without a large sample of districts, scholars have been unable to test relationships 
between TCE variation and even the simplest of district characteristics, such as size and 
variation in the student composition of district schools. In two studies that use an HLM 
framework, in which these relationships could have been investigated, the authors do not 
do so (Reagan, 2010, Cohen & Miller, 2011). There is little empirical evidence on what 
kinds of district policies and characteristics are associated with TCE variation.  
For similar reasons, scholars have not been able to assess thoroughly the 
relationships between school characteristics and schools’ gains or losses due to TCE. All 
of the TCE studies reviewed here present simple bivariate relationships between teacher 
salaries and school characteristics. However, few have even attempted multivariate 
analyses of these relationships. Further, in the two HLM analyses, the multivariate 
framework for analysis has not been used to advantage. The authors of the HLM analyses 
use them to establish that there are differences in teacher average salaries by student 
poverty controlling for other characteristics, but they do not detail the implications of 
other measures in the model. Primary among these neglected controls are pupil-teacher 
ratios at schools, which would better inform equity claims. Compared to the detailed 
analyses that have examined the distribution of teacher qualifications across schools (e.g., 
Iatarola & Stiefel, 2003), the HLM models examining teacher salary within districts are 
under-parameterized, including only measures of student poverty, school level, district 
level (elementary or high school), and a wage index. Adding school and district measures 
to such analyses would substantially add to the understanding of the intradistrict 




In summary, the available data has limited the scope of the empirical evidence on 
intradistrict TCE, and the conceptual and measurement approaches have limited equity 
comparisons of TCE. Fortunately, the availability of detailed school-level data is on the 
rise and may provide new opportunities to expand the empirical base and conceptual 
approaches to explore intradistrict TCE, which will add to the understanding of 
intradistrict equity generally. 
Chapter Summary.  
The literature reviewed in this chapter establishes the context for the analysis of 
intradistrict TCE in this dissertation. The first section of this chapter shows that the same 
equity framework and standards that have been applied to interdistrict school-finance, 
have been adapted for application to intradistrict analyses using numerous resource 
measures, often using inclusive funding measures. The literature on intradistrict funding 
differences shows that substantial portions of total resource variation lie between schools 
within districts and that school-level data are necessary to capture the full range of 
resource variation. This research has found that in many districts schools low-need 
schools receive a greater per-pupil share of general funding and that compensatory funds 
often supplant, rather than supplement general funds. This literature has also shown that 
the distribution of teachers is a significant driver, if not the significant driver, of total 
intradistrict resource differences. Further, teacher sorting and teacher quantity/quality 
tradeoffs are key factors in the variation in teachers across district schools. 
The second section presents commonplace school district resource allocation 
practices and policies that are intended to provide resources to schools equitably with 




research has shown numerous sources of variation in these systems that thwart their 
design such that resources are often allocated not according to legitimate educational 
needs, but based on the preferences of district staff, parents, administrators and teachers. 
District accounting and data systems make it difficult to detect this variation, posing 
challenges for researchers attempting to assess intradistrict equity and for district staff 
attempting to allocate resources and staff. Given the lack of evidence of an allocation 
mechanism that works to balance TCE differences with non-teacher resources, that the 
proportion of school-level expenditures that go to TCE, and that TCE differences drive 
overall intradistrict resource differences, evaluating the intradistrict distribution of TCE is 
an important vantage for evaluating resource equity in general. 
The third section of this review covers research focused on the intradistrict 
distribution of teachers, which has examined how human resource systems allow teachers 
to concentrate in schools in terms of their quality, qualifications and compensation. In 
many districts, these studies show substantial intradistrict variation in these teacher 
attributes, and further, that these distributions of teacher characteristics are not 
independent of one another. The research suggests that with respect to teacher quality, 
qualifications, and compensation, many schools are divided between the “haves”, whose 
teacher quality, qualifications and compensation are above the district average, and the 
“have-nots”, whose teachers fall beneath district averages.  
While research specifically focused on intradistrict differences in TCE is not 
expansive, the available studies consistently show that many districts shortchange high-
need schools in terms of TCE. These studies have highlighted an important equity issue, 




TCE among districts and schools and the district and school characteristics associated 
with TCE variation. The following chapter outlines a methodological approach that 
leverages newly available data to create a novel measure of TCE variation that may better 





Chapter 3: Methodology 
This chapter contains three sections, beginning with a description of the data 
sources, and the data collection procedures of the primary data source for this study—the 
2006-07 Teacher Compensation Survey (TCS). After I overview of the data sources, I 
explain my empirical framework for this study and describe the variables included in this 
analysis. In the third section, I review the statistical analyses for this study.  
Description of Data Sources 
The TCS, 2006-07 is the primary data source for this dissertation. I will 
supplement the TCS using additional data from the Common Core of Data, 2006-07 
(CCD), the National Longitudinal School-Level State Assessment Score Database 
(NLSLSASD), administrative records from departments of education in states that 
participated in the TCS, and data from the American Community Survey (ACS)  
Teacher Compensation Survey (TCS), 2006-07. The TCS, 2006-07 is a pilot 
restricted-use dataset that collects universe teacher-level data for public schools in 
participating states, and is part of NCES’s CCD survey program. Participating states 
include Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and 
Texas. The TCS includes 1.1 million records on nearly 1 million full-time-equivalent 
(FTE) teachers. Unlike many NCES surveys, TCS is not nationally representative and is 
not a sampled survey, and thus only supports direct inferences about the states included in 
these data. However, the TCS includes teacher-level compensation data of greater breadth 




school teachers who worked in the 2006-07 school year (Cornman, Johnson, Zhou, 
Honegger, & Noel, 2010). The TCS includes data on public school teachers’ 
compensation, demographics, and salary-determinant qualifications. The TCS does not 
contain individually identifiable teacher data, but it is a restricted-use dataset that requires 
a license from NCES. 
The TCS is well suited for a large-scale analysis of the intradistrict distribution of 
TCE because it is a universe survey, including compensation data for all teachers in all 
schools in participating states. The TCS includes measures of teachers’ base and total 
salaries. In states that provided benefits data, the TCS includes the amount of total benefit 
compensation, and disaggregates total benefits into retirement, health, and other benefits. 
The TCS provides data on salary-determinant teacher qualifications (licensure, graduate 
education, and experience) in addition to compensation data, allowing for concomitant 
analyses of the distribution of teacher qualifications and compensation. With actual 
teacher-level salary data, the TCS allows real school-level salary averages to be 
calculated rather than estimated, and with data for every school in each district, the full 
distribution of TCE across schools can be analyzed. Such comprehensive data are a 
definite advantage over datasets that include only a sample of district schools (e.g., 
Miller, 2010), and no weighting is necessary because TCS has population data.  
TCS, 2006-07 is the second administration of the TCS by NCES. The TCS is 
collected from voluntarily participating states through an online reporting system 
developed by the U.S. Census Bureau. NCES provided state officials with secure access 
to the data collection systems, as well as directions for submitting single-state data files. 




plans for state officials. After submission, NCES edited state files according to NCES 
statistical standards. NCES collected data for the 2006-07 TCS between March 2008 and 
January 2009 (Holland, Zhou, & Noel, 2010).  
Not all states provided all the data requested for the TCS. Although 16 of the 17 
participating states included data on all teachers, Arkansas could not supply data for its 
largest district, Little Rock. Neither was Arkansas able to provide district IDs for its 
schools. Without districts IDs, no intradistrict analyses of Arkansas schools are possible 
and so Arkansas will not be included in the analytic dataset.  
NCES sent questionnaires to state department of education officials who then 
prepared the data files for submission to the TCS. These questionnaires were not surveys 
but only contained questions designed to clarify the administrative data that states 
submitted. For instance, to ensure that teachers’ years of experience were reported 
similarly in all states, the questionnaires ask two questions about the states means of 
counting years of experience. The questionnaire asks for no information on teachers, 
schools, or districts, but only about data definitions and disclosure rules. The “Data Plan 
Questions” questionnaire and states answers are available in the TCS documentation 
(Holland, Zhou, & Noel, 2010). 
Supplementary data. I will supplement TCS data with the Common Core of 
Data (NCES), supplemental data files obtained from the Colorado, Florida, Minnesota 
and Texas state departments of education, the NLSLSASD, and the American 
Community Survey. I overview these supplementary data sources in turn below. 
Common Core of Data (CCD). The TCS is part of NCES’s CCD survey program 




supplementary data from other NCES and state databases. The CCD is a universe listing 
of all public and private schools in the US and includes data on school location, school 
type, Title I status, grade span, student membership totals, student race, and poverty. This 
dissertation study requires school-level data on students’ educational needs. The CCD 
provides several key measures for this study, including student membership totals 
required to compute school-level pupil teacher ratios, and school measures that are 
associated with district allocation formulae. The school characteristics that are commonly 
associated with the allocation of teaching positions are Title I status, the proportions of 
students in a school who are classified as poor (defined as the percentage qualified for 
free and reduced price meals (FARM)), limited English proficiency (LEP16), or special 
education students. The CCD provides schools’ Title I status and the percentage of FARM 
eligible students, for all schools in the TCS, as well as school-level race/ethnicity data for 
use in equity analyses. The CCD does not provide school-level data on the percentage of 
LEP or special education students, or on measures of student achievement. School-level 
LEP, special education, and academic performance measures are required for the full 
analyses in this dissertation. The sources for these important data elements are detailed 
next. 
Supplementary State Data. Supplementing the TCS with school-level percentages 
of students classified as LEP or special education required data from state departments of 
education. The availability of state data varies considerably across states. Only three 
states that participated in the TCS, Texas, Florida, and Minnesota have 2006-07 data 
                                                 
16 States differ in the titles they use to designate students who have limited proficiency in English. In this 
study, I use the term "limited English proficiency" (LEP) for the varied state designations by which 




posted on the internet that include school-level special education data. School-level LEP 
percentages are available on the web for these three states and five other TCS 
participating states (Arizona, Florida, Iowa, Kentucky, and Louisiana).  
Publicly available state data are sufficient for a complete analysis in three states: 
Texas, Florida and Minnesota. The data from Texas and Minnesota contain school-level 
counts of students classified as special education and LEP students.  I had to estimate 
school-level data for some Florida schools based on school-level F-CAT assessment data. 
Florida students in grades 1, 2 and 12 are not tested and counts or percentages for these 
students were not available. To estimate this data for schools that included students from 
these grades I calculated school percentages of special education and LEP students in 
grades for which the assessment data was available. I then multiplied these percentages 
by the total number of students in the schools found on the CCD.  The resulting estimated 
counts of students with special education or LEP designations were used to derive de 
facto district allocation weights and in the multivariate analyses. The students in grades 1, 
2, and 12 for whom there are not exact counts were a small portion of the total students in 
these schools and these estimated counts are a reasonable approach to include the Florida 
schools in the analysis. However, to the degree these counts are inaccurate there will be 
some bias in the results which is a necessary limitation for this study. 
I submitted data requests for all the remaining states in the TCS. Of these, only 
the Colorado Department of Education has provided all the data I have requested. 
Complete data for the analyses described in this chapter were available for the following 





the states in the TCS would be overwhelming so I completed the full set of analyses for 
these four states. 
 National Longitudinal School-Level State Assessment Score Database. The 
National Longitudinal School-Level State Assessment Score Database (NLSLSASD) is 
collected and housed by the American Institutes for Research (AIR) for the National 
Center for Education Statistics (NCES). The NLSLSASD includes data from state testing 
programs across the US and includes state proficiency percentages at the school level for 
all states participating in the TCS for the 2006-07 school year. The NLSLSASD data 
include school-level percentages of students in state defined proficiency categories based 
on state testing programs. State tests differ in the subjects assessed, their difficulty, in the 
number of proficiency categories, and in the benchmarks states set for various 
proficiency levels. However, the data provided are suitable for comparing schools within 
districts and districts within states and thus provide an adequate measure for comparing 
intradistrict performance. I use these data to create standardized measures of school 
performance by averaging schools’ percentage of student categorized as proficient in state 
mathematics and reading/English-language arts tests and then standardizing these average 
proficiency percentages within states. The resulting measures have a mean of zero and a 
standard deviation of one for each state and are suitable for the comparisons of districts 
within states and schools within districts that I make in this dissertation. 
The American Community Survey. The American Community Survey (ACS) is 
and annual data collection of the Census Bureau that provides a wide variety of data 
previously gathered on the long form of the decennial census. The ACS is the least 
central source of data for my analyses, but it provides a number of measures to 
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characterize the district labor markets in this study. Though I performed exploratory 
analyses with multiple ACS measures, the only measure included in the final models 
presented in this dissertation is district unemployment rates for the 2006-07 school year.  
Empirical Framework 
Based on the conceptual framework presented in the first chapter, I applied the 
combined dataset to the conceptual framework presented in Figure 1 above. The 
empirical framework illustrates the measures I used to examine total district variation in 
TCE and school TCE gaps. Below I describe the measures used as dependent and 
independent variables in these analyses. Table 2 contains a full description of the 
variables used in the district and multilevel models. 
Dependent variables. This study has three primary TCE measures dependent 
variables measured in two different ways to gauge equity in teacher compensation at the 
school level and at the district level. These measures (described in more detail below) are 
average teacher salary, per-pupil teacher salary, and a weighted measure of per-pupil 
teacher salary. At the school level, all three dependent variables calculate each school’s 
TCE measure relative to the TCE received by other schools in the district. I calculate 
school differentials for each outcome measure as the difference between the measure of 
TCE and the district average of the same measure. At the district level, I measure 
variation in each dependent variable by the district Gini coefficient.  
Two of the measures of TCE are straightforward. Average teacher salaries are 
simply the average salary for full-time teachers in each school. Salary per pupil is a 
measure of the total salaries at each school divided by the number of students in the 




student  counts in each school. This weighting scheme, discussed in detail in chapter 3, 
adjusts student counts based on the average number of teachers its district allocates for a 
variety of compensatory needs. I designed this adjusted measure, which I detail below, to 
overcome two significant limitations of TCE measures used in previous intradistrict 
analyses. 
Previous examinations of TCE have most often-examined schools’ average 
teacher salaries (TCE per full-time employee, referred to as TCEFTE). TCEFTE is an 
informative measure because it clearly reflects teacher sorting (in terms of salary-
dependent qualifications) across schools, however it cannot account for allocation trade-
offs between teacher qualifications and teacher quantities. This dissertation examines 
TCEPP which can capture these trade-offs in dollar per-pupil terms. The second limitation 
to TCEFTE is also a limitation to TCEPP, because neither measure controls for between-
school differences in student compensatory needs (e.g., special education) that may 
legitimately reduce pupil-teacher ratios. To control for these differences, I adjust the 
number of pupils in each school by de facto district allocation weights, which are 
described below.  
Derived de facto district teacher-allocation weights. Districts have their own 
formulas and systems by which they allocate teachers to schools. Each district weights 
student needs differently. Data on the formula weights for each compensatory need in 
every district would allow me to estimate how closely school staff allocations follow 
districts’ formulas, and I would be able to use deviations from the formula-predicted 
staffing to evaluate TCE equity across district schools. Unfortunately, the formula’s 




Fortunately, the weights can be estimated using regression analyses (in districts that have 
a sufficient number of schools to yield reliable estimates).  
Previous research has used similar approaches, which use weights to remove 
resource variation that is attributable to legitimate compensatory needs, to validly 
compare illegitimate resource variation across schools or districts. Miles and Roza (2002) 
and Roza, Guin, Gross and DeBurgomaster (2007) use estimated weights for student need 
types (such as free or reduced-price lunch eligibility and bilingual, vocational, or gifted 
education) to compare categorical and non-categorical expenditures between and across 
large Texas districts. Using non-categorical expenditures (per pupil), the authors create a 
ratio by dividing expenditures in a given school by the district average. Since these ratios 
compare school spending to the average spending of their district, variation in the ratio is 
intradistrict variation by definition. Similarly, for categorical expenditures, the 
researchers average categorical per-pupil expenditures at each school to the district level, 
and then convert deviations from the average into a ratio they call the Weighted Student 
Index. The authors are unclear as to exactly how they calculated different categorical 
expenditures to deal with the non-exclusivity of these categories. 
 Toutkoushian and Michael (2007) use a similar approach, again looking at 
expenditure data for Indiana in 2004 and 2005, but using districts instead of schools as 
the unit of analysis. Toutkoushian and Michael’s purpose was to compare vertical equity 
adjustments in districts to the state finance formulas used in Indiana. They use regression 
to calculate the weights for multiple categories that might affect the per-pupil revenues 
directed to school districts. The advantage of using multiple regression is that each 




for the other categories. Toutkoushian and Michael use the residuals from these equations 
to calculate how much district revenues deviate from the state formula. The power of this 
approach is that they can assess the direction and magnitude of vertical equity 
adjustments, and thereby detect whether districts receive too little or too much revenue 
for a given categorical need. The ability to establish the magnitude of these deviations is 
a great advantage over approaches that can establish the directionality of funding, but 
cannot compare the amount of those funds to a standard. Toutkoushian and Michael’s 
multivariate approach to adjusting for compensatory needs is also advantageous for 
horizontal equity comparisons, because the deviations from their regressions (measured 
by regression residuals) represent deviation from the state average after controlling for 
compensatory needs. 
I synthesize these approaches and use multiple regression to estimate the average 
weight each district gives to student compensatory needs, not in allocating revenues or to 
compare expenditures, but in allocating FTE teaching positions. Then, using these de 
facto weights I compare the total number of FTE teaching positions each school receives 
to what they should receive if all teachers were allocated exactly according to district 
averages. Deviations from the district averages are by definition intradistrict deviations in 
teacher allocation, as was the case with the expenditure ratios calculated in Miles and 
Roza (2002) and Roza et al. (2007). 
I use the term “de facto” to describe the weights because they do not estimate the 
formula weights for each district, but the actual average weight associated with 
compensatory student needs in each district. Having universe data on schools in these 




FTE allocations and a number of potentially related school characteristics. Therefore, for 
each district, the resulting regression coefficients are actual average relationships, and not 
estimates of the associations based on a sample of schools. Because these weights are not 
estimated from a sample of schools, the sample sizes requirements associated with using 
regressions to produce inferential statistics are not required for my analyses. Instead, I 
apply regression equations to universe data to calculate the average allocation weights for 
multiple compensatory needs in each district for which I have data. 
To estimate the de facto district teacher-allocation weights, I apply the following 
regression formula (3.01) for each district: 
Formula 3.01  FTE=  β1(NAll_students) + β2(NSPED) + β3(NLEP) + β4(NFARM) + 
     β5(High School) + e 
Where FTE is equal to the number of full time equivalent positions at a school 
and NAll_students is the number of all students enrolled, regardless of their inclusion in the 
other compensatory categories. NSPED, NLEP and NFARM are school student counts of 
students classified as learning disabled, limited English proficient (LEP), or free and 
reduced priced meals eligible (FARM), respectively.17 To ensure stable estimates, I center 
all these measures on the district mean.18 I constrain the coefficients for special 
                                                 
17 To be clear, the NSPED, NLEP and NFARM categories are not exclusive and may be counted once in 
NAll_students and possibly again for each compensatory category. Since the regression controls for the 
allocation according to each characteristic, holding the others constant, the estimates are category-specific 
and additive. 
18 That is, the district elementary school average number of students in SPED, LEP or FARM is subtracted 
from each school total. Centering does not affect the interpretation of the coefficients but does ensure that 
estimates are based on the range of schools present in the district. For instance, in a regression equation 
with un-centered predictors, the estimates would be based on a school with zero percent SPED, LEP and 
FARM.  In many districts no such school exists and the derived weights from such a model can be biased. 




education, LEP and FARM students to be positive based on the assumption that no 
district would reduce the number of teachers for these student compensatory needs. 
High_sch is a binary indicator for high schools (elementary schools are the default school 
level in the equation). The betas (β) are the coefficients associated with the adjacent 
parameters. There is no intercept in the model because the number of FTEs in a school is 
based on the number of students attending and an intercept would result in insensible 
allocation weights. I index the coefficients β2 through β6 by the weight for NAll_students (β1) 
to calculate the allocation weight for each student type using formula 3.2 below (e.g., 
SPED weight= (β2+ β1) / β1). The resulting weights equal the district average teacher FTE 
position allocation weight associated with each type of legitimate compensatory student 
need and with the school level.  
Formula 3.02  Compensatory allocation weight =    
(βcompensatory_category+ βAll_students) /  βAll_students 
Using the de facto weights produced in the regression equations I calculate the 
predicted number of FTE teachers each school would have received in a perfectly 
equitable distribution. I calculate this number of teachers by multiplying appropriate 
measures for the school (the numbers for each kind of student and the school level) by the 
estimated coefficients (see Formula 3.02). Additionally, I can use the coefficients to 
adjust the number of students in each need category by the associated allocation factor. 
For instance, in a hypothetical district19 where β1= 0.055, the pupil-teacher allocation for 
all students is roughly one teacher for every 18 students (18.21=1/0.055). If the  
                                                 





Table 1. Hypothetical example of district derived teacher-allocation weights by student need 
and adjusted school enrollment counts. 















All students 0.050 1.000 20.137 250 250
Special education 0.064 2.282 8.823 40 51
LEP 0.007 1.146 17.578 60 9
FARMS 0.015 1.300 15.484 125 38
High school -0.001 0.974 20.677  0 0
Total 250 348 
School total TCE $810,000 
Average Salary $45,000 
Number of teachers 18
Number of students 250
Adjusted number of students 348
Pupil-teacher ratio   (250/18) 13.9
TCEPP $3,240.00 
TCEPPW $2,330.35 
Difference (TCEPP-TCEPPW)     $909.65 
Note: District weights are the average weights derived from ~300 school districts. 
Schools’ student numbers and TCE numbers are hypothetical. No actual school data is 
used in this table. 
 
coefficient for special education students is 0.067 the average allocation of teachers for 
special education students is 2.2 times the base weight [(SPEDweight=(β2+ β1) / β1) and 
in this case (0.055+0.067)/0.055)=2.2)]. The district-average teacher allocation for 
special education students would be one teacher for every eight special education 
students (8.17=1/ (0.055+0.067)). I similarly calculate the weights for other student needs 
and average district allocations for those needs.  
To adjust the number of students at the school by the derived weights, I multiply 




hypothetical example presented in table 1, the total number of students in a school is 250, 
40 of whom have special education needs, 60 of whom are LEP, and 125 of whom 
receive FARMs. Multiplying the number of students in each category of need by the beta 
weight for the given category equals the number of additional base weighted students that 
would be needed to receive the additional increment of teachers (e.g., 40 SPED students 
times the SPED weight minus the base weight (2.228-1.0=1.228) or 40*1.228=49.1 
additional base weighted students).20 I use these adjusted pupil numbers, which I use to 
remove variation in teacher FTE allocations that would be attributable to the 
compensatory needs in the regressions specified in formula 3.01, to per-pupil TCE. 
Adjusted per-pupil measures of TCE. The adjusted pupil numbers result in 
substantially different measures of per-pupil TCE. I calculate the adjusted teacher 
compensation expenditures by dividing the school total of teacher salaries by the 
weighted number of students. I call this measure teacher compensation expenditures per-
pupil, weighted (TCEPPW). Using TCEPPW, I can make comparisons across schools that 
have different pupil-teacher ratios and different proportions of student compensatory 
needs, both of which may account for the two critical aspects of the quantity/quality 
trade-off found in previous research.  
School-level outcomes: TCE differentials. To measure each schools relative 
standing in the distribution of TCE within the district, I subtract schools’ TCE from the 
district average TCE. I call these deviations from districts’ mean TCE the “TCE 
differentials”, which are the primary dependent variable for the HLM analyses. Schools 
                                                 
20 Because some measures are centered in each district, actual calculations use centered numbers of 




that receive fewer teachers per pupil (conditional on the average allocation for their 
district), schools that receive below-average teacher salaries, and schools that receive less 
of both, will have below-average TCE. For these schools, TCE differentials will be a 
negative dollar amount equal to what schools would receive in a perfectly equitable 
district TCE allocation. Schools with below-average pupil-teacher ratios, above-average 
salaries, or both will have a positive differential. I will use these measures as the 
dependent variable in a HLM framework to determine what school and district 
characteristics are associated with TCE differentials. Further, by using a HLM framework 
I can examine cross-level interactions, which are differential impacts of school 
characteristics depending on characteristics of the districts they are in, which likely 
influence TCE differentials. 
District-level outcomes: Gini coefficient of TCE. I will measure district variation 
in my three TCE measures using the district Gini coefficient for each. Scholars frequently 
use the Gini to examine distributions of wealth, but have used the Gini in many other 
contexts, including interdistrict school finance analyses (Burke, 1999; Hertert, 1999). The 
Gini coefficient is a measure of inequality that represents the area between the Lorenz 
curve and the line of perfect equality in an ordered cumulative distribution where schools 
are ordered by TCE on the X-axis and by the cumulative TCE on the Y-axis (Odden & 
Picus, 2004). The Gini coefficient ranges from zero to one, with higher coefficients 
indicating more inequality. The Gini coefficient is mathematically equal to half of the 
relative mean difference, which is the average absolute difference21 in a measure between 
two observations, divided by the overall mean (in this case the district average TCE). 
                                                 
21 This average absolute difference is also called the mean difference or the Gini mean difference, and in 




Equations for both are below; where y is schools’ TCE in an ordered distribution where 
school i receives the least TCE in the district: 








Formula 3.05                       
 
These district-level Gini coefficients are the dependent variable in regression 
analyses that estimate the association between district characteristics and variation in 
TCE across schools. The Gini is an excellent measure of district variation for this study 
because it includes data from each point on the distribution of TCE and because it has a 
normal distribution suitable for multivariate analyses. The Gini coefficient also has some 
unfortunate attributes. One of these is that marginal differences in the Gini are not 
intuitively meaningful. It must suffice to understand that higher Ginis indicate a district 
has more TCE variation relative to districts with lower Gini’s, and vice versa. Another 
unfortunate attribute is that the Gini does not have a clear standard or benchmark that 
defines what amount of variation is equitable and what is not. This challenge of 
benchmarking the Gini, and the method I choose for this study, deserves some 
consideration. 
                                                 
22 I have included formulas 3.04 and 3.05 because I calculate the Gini coefficient using the RMD and these 




Benchmarking the Gini Coefficient. The standard for the Gini coefficient typically 
used in school finance is 0.05 (Odden & Picus, 2004). The 0.05 standard has been a 
functional standard in school finance literature that primarily evaluated per-pupil revenue 
or expenditure data in inter-district or interstate contexts. However useful the 0.05 
standard has been for comparisons in this literature, the standard is not particularly 
meaningful in an absolute sense and may not apply to the interdistrict context or 
measures of TCE with the same functionality found in the other school finance literature. 
Comparing the application of the Gini coefficient in different research contexts 
may help clarify the difficulties of benchmarking the Gini coefficient for this analysis. 
The Gini is most widely applied to income inequality, often within national contexts (e.g., 
Davies et al., 2009). When applied to national income inequality, Gini coefficients range 
from 0.23 for Sweden to 0.71 for Namibia, with the United States falling in between at 
0.45. In contrast, Gini coefficients found in U.S. school finance analyses of per-pupil 
expenditures are far lower with interstate analyses yielding average Ginis below 0.1 and 
interdistrict (e.g., Burke 1999), and intradistrict analyses yielding lower Ginis still, from 
0.045 to 0.065. 
These differences highlight that the Ginis range and mean are dependent on the 
measure used, and the level of aggregation across groups. For example, income differs 
from per-pupil expenditures in that income can be zero for a substantial portion of a 
population and differences between the mean and the top percent by income can be many 
orders of magnitude. This is not so with U.S. per-pupil expenditures, for which the lowest 
and highest measures will be marginally different from the mean (perhaps by one or two 




income would have larger Gini coefficients than per-pupil expenditures. 
Perhaps these different Ginis reflect different amounts of variation, where income 
is highly inequitable and per-pupil expenditures less so. Calculations and statistics cannot 
answer this question, because the answer requires defining what equity should be for two 
very different measures. Arguably, there are good reasons that income should vary much 
more than per-pupil expenditures, and thus the 0.05 benchmark typically used in school 
finance for per-pupil expenditures within states would not cross over to evaluate income 
within countries.  
There are analogous differences, though by a smaller degree, between the 
measures and contexts of intradistrict TCE and the measures and contexts of inter-district 
per-pupil expenditures, which justify different benchmarks for the Gini coefficient. As 
variation in per-pupil expenditures is limited compared to income, TCE variation within 
districts is limited compared to per-pupil expenditures. Within districts, school average 
salaries are bounded by a single salary schedule and are funded from the same district 
pool of funding, and the only source of variation should be between-school differences in 
teacher qualifications. In comparison, interdistrict per-pupil expenditures are not bounded 
by any similar schedule and are funded from variable pools of funding (e.g., different tax 
bases). Given these bounds, not only would one expect the intradistrict TCEFTE Ginis to 
be smaller, one could argue that they should be smaller since there are fewer legitimate 
sources of variation across schools within districts than there are across districts within 
states. One would also suspect that per-pupil measures of TCE would have larger Ginis 
than TCEFTE because there are two sources of variation, differences in teacher 




reasons, Odden and Picus’s often cited 0.05 benchmark for the Gini used in other school 
finance research does not readily apply to the measures and contexts of this study, as one 
of the authors of the cited work agrees (personal communication with Larry Picus, April 
19, 2012). This indeed is what I find in this study (See Chapter 4). 
Establishing an alternative benchmark for this study is necessary, but there are 
few rules to guide identifying the benchmark.23 I combine a measure of equity differences 
that directly relates to the Gini coefficient and a subjective judgment on what could be 
considered the limit of equity to establish benchmarks for two tiers of inequity: a stricter 
Gini benchmark of 0.25 and a more generous benchmark of 0.05. 
Returning to the mathematical basis for the Gini, recall from equation 3.05 that 
the relative mean difference (RMD) is the average absolute difference in a measure 
between two observations in a distribution, divided by the mean of the same. More 
intuitively, the RMD of TCE is the average intradistrict difference between schools as a 
percentage of the district mean TCE measure. For example, if a district’s average salary 
was $45,000, and the average salary difference between schools in that district were 
$2,250, the RMD would be $2,250/45,000 or 5%. According to equation 3.04, the Gini is 
simply half the RMD, in this case 0.025. Therefore, I use the RMD to connect Gini levels 
to a subjective judgment about functional benchmarks. 
There are few sources to base a subjective equity benchmark on, but the few that 
exist are instructive. One suggestion comes from federal legislation. The Fiscal Fairness 
Act of the 112th Congress (HR 1294 and S.B. 701) addresses Title I funding 
                                                 
23 In a personal communication, Larry Picus (April 19, 2012) indicated as much saying that there are no 
clear grounds for establishing an objective benchmark for the Gini in any context and that I should develop 





comparability within districts. The law holds that for Title I funds to be distributed on an 
equitable level of base district and state funding, Title I schools must receive 97% of the 
base district and state funding that non-Title I schools receive. A 97% benchmark would 
require and RMD of .03 and a Gini of 0.015, a narrow threshold for equity. Two 
suggested benchmarks are found in a ED report on intradistrict Title I comparability 
(Heuer & Stullich, 2011) which uses three levels for between-school differences in 
personnel expenditures, +/- 3% described as “about the same”,24 4-10% and 10%. 
While these benchmarks are suggestive, I choose two benchmarks for the Gini, 
0.025 and 0.05 based on their associated impact on schools. A Gini of 0.025 is associated 
with a RMD of 0.05, meaning that the average difference between schools in a district 
with a Gini of 0.025 would be 5% of the district’s school salary average. In more concrete 
terms, if such a district had an average salary of $45,000 and an average of 44 FTE 
teachers per school the average difference in funding would be $99,000 or enough to hire 
two additional teachers at average salary. In a similar district with a Gini of 0.05 and an 
RMD of 0.1, the difference would be twice that. While these levels are somewhat 
arbitrary (as any other benchmarks would be), they are functional for these analyses and 
are clearly associated with a proportion of variation. It should be noted that since the Gini 
is only useful as a horizontal equity measure they are only applicable to two of my TCE 
measures, TCEFTE and TCEPPW. Since TCEPP compares schools with differently situated 
students, it is not valid to make equity inferences based on a Gini measure. Nonetheless, I 
include parallel results for all three measures because the differences between the results 
are illuminating. 
                                                 




The Gini coefficients for TCEFTE, TCEPP, and TCEPPW serve as the dependent 
variables in parallel analyses of district TCE variation. In the next section, I review the 
independent variables I will use in these regressions, beginning with the measures applied 
to school TCE differentials followed by those used in analysis of total district TCE 
variation. 
Independent variables for analyzing school-level TCE differentials. This 
dissertation will examine the relationship between school TCE differentials and a variety 
of school and district characteristics using an HLM framework where schools are nested 
within districts. There is no single primary independent variable in these analyses because 
the literature on intradistrict variation includes numerous hypothesized relationships 
between TCE variation and school and district characteristics. Most of the school-level 
independent variables included in this study fall into the categories of school type, and 
school compositions measures of student and teacher. District characteristics that may be 
associated with TCE differentials fall into three categories: district-wide characteristics, 
aggregated school compositional characteristics, and measures of the variability of school 
compositional characteristics. In the empirical framework illustrated in Figure 2, I have 
illustrated the association of district measures with TCE differentials with arrow e 
affecting arrow b. Similarly, arrow c affecting arrow b represents the association between 
school-level independent variables and TCE differentials. I detail the school- and district-
level independent variables in turn below. 
School-level independent variables. School variables for these analyses include binary 
indicators for school level (e.g., elementary), and categorical measures of school size, 




and teacher sorting (e.g., Imazeki, 2004), schools’ urbanicity is the most likely “school 
type” measure to be associated with TCE differentials. The literature on teacher sorting 
(e.g., Lankford et al., 2002) suggests that student compositional variables will be 
associated with TCE differentials, especially the percentage of minority, poor, and low-
performing students. To measure school minority and poverty, I standardize the 
percentage of minority students and the percentage receiving free or reduced priced 
meals. To measure school academic performance I average school percentages of 
students scoring proficient on state tests of mathematics and reading/ELA, and then 
standardize these percentages within states. 
I purposively add teacher composition variables to analyses of TCE in order to 
detect whether the distribution of teachers, in terms of FTE positions per pupil and in 
terms of qualifications, explain differences in TCE. I will enter variables into models by 
blocks, first establishing a primary model and then exploring changes in these results 
with secondary models. I will only use salary related teacher characteristics in secondary 
analyses to determine if these measures explain away differences in TCE. For instance, if 
primary results show TCE differentials between schools, and secondary analyses that 
include teacher-salary related characteristics explain away these differentials, it would 
follow that TCE differentials relate to the distribution of teacher qualifications rather than 
differences in the allocation of FTE teacher positions.  
District-level independent variables. District characteristics used to analyze TCE 
differentials include district-wide characteristics, average school compositional 
characteristics and measures of the variability of compositional characteristics across 




Table 2. Definition of variables used in this study. 
Level Variable Name Description 
Dependent Variables 
TCE measures 
Average teacher salary (TCEFTE) 
TCE divided by the number of FTE teachers 
at a school.  
Teacher Compensation 
Expenditures per pupil (TCEPP) 
TCE divided by the number of students in 
each school.  
Teacher Compensation 
Expenditures per pupil, weighted 
(TCEPPW) 
TCE divided by the weighted number of 
students in each school.  
School Level 
TCEFTE Differential 
School TCEFTE minus the district average 
TCEFTE  
TCEPP Differential 
School TCEPP minus the district average 
TCEPP  
TCEPPW Differential 
School TCEPPW minus the district average 
TCEPPW  
District Level 
Gini Coefficient for TCEFTE District Gini coefficient for TCEFTE 
Gini Coefficient for TCEPP District Gini coefficient for TCEPP 
Gini Coefficient for TCEPPW District Gini coefficient for TCEPPW 
Independent Variables 
School Level 
Elementary school  Binary indicator for elementary schools  
Middle school Binary indicator for middle schools  
High school Binary indicator for high schools  
Urban school Binary indicator for urban school 
Suburban school Binary indicator for suburban school 
Town/rural school Binary indicator for town or rural school 
Total enrollment  Standardized School student count  
Pupil-teacher ratio  Pupil-teacher Ratio  
Percent minority students  School percentage non-White students 
Percent LEP students (LEP) School percentage LEP students  
Percent special education 
students  
School percentage students with disabilities 
Percent poverty (FARMS) 
School percentage students eligible for free 
and reduced price meals  
Title I eligible school  Binary Title I eligible school indicator  
School proficiency  
Standardized average percentage of students 
scoring proficient on state mathematics and 
reading exams (standardized within states) 
Teacher experience  Average teacher experience  
Percent of teacher with advanced 
degrees 
Percentage of teachers with a an advance 
degree (MA or PhD) 





Number of schools in the district Number of schools in the district  
Urban district Binary indicator for urban district 
Suburban district Binary indicator for suburban district 
Town/rural district Binary indicator for town or rural district 
District average pupil-teacher 
ratio  
Average Pupil-teacher Ratio  
Percent Title I schools District Title I school percentage 
District average student poverty 
percentage 
District average for the school percentage 
students eligible for free and reduced price 
meals 
CV school poverty 
 CV for district average student poverty 
percentage 
District average minority 
percentage 
District average for school- percentage non-
White students (CCD) 
CV minority percentage  CV for district average minority percentage 
District average percentage LEP 
students  
District's school average percentage LEP 
students  
District average percentage 
special education students  
District's school average school percentage 
students with disabilities  
CV special education  
CV school percentage students with 
disabilities  
District average school 
proficiency  
Districts' school average student proficiency 
CV proficiency CV of district average school proficiency  
 
terms of the number of schools and the modal urbanicity. I will aggregate many of the 
school-level student and teacher compositional variables to the district level, such as 
measures of student performance and minority, and FARMS percentages. Aggregated 
teacher measures will include average teacher experience and percentage of teachers with 
advanced degrees. 
 While district compositional measures of student and teachers characteristics are 
important for these analyses, the amount of dispersion in these measures may be more 
strongly related to total district TCE variation. The more between-school variation there 
is on these measures, the more likely that teacher preferences for “attractive” schools will 




concentrations of teacher qualifications across schools should be associated with greater 
differences in TCE. To capture the dispersion in the various schools characteristics I 
calculate coefficients of variation (CV’s) for the compositional characteristics, and 
include the standardized CV’s in the district-level model.  
Independent variables for analyzing total district TCE variation. The 
analyses of total district variation, as measured by the Gini coefficients, include many of 
the same measures that I use in the HLM analyses. The same district type characteristics 
and measures of variation in school compositional characteristics will be used, including 
district averages and coefficients of variation for school percentages of minority, FARM, 
and academically proficient students. I illustrate the indirect associations between these 
measures and total district TCEPPW variation with the flow of arrows e to b, which affect 
the amount of variation across schools, which is in turn captured by arrow g in the 
empirical framework. Finally, I will use measures of the variation in pupil-teacher ratios 
and teacher salary-determinant qualifications in secondary analyses to determine how 
much of the variation in TCE is attributable to the distributions of these factors. 
Analytic Data. The TCS, 2006-07, is a universe survey including data on all 
schools in 16 states. Arkansas is missing data for Little Rock and further, Arkansas does 
not have district id numbers so these data are not usable for an intradistrict analysis. The 
remaining 16 states are Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Oklahoma, South 
Carolina, and Texas. Very small districts are not practical for inclusion in these analyses 
because with only a few schools there is little opportunity for variation across schools. 




Table 3. States, districts, and schools included in the TCS, 2006-07 by total number, total 





























Arizona 1,265 186 861 47 68% 25%
Colorado 1,362 158  1,008 36   74% 23%
Florida 2,371 71  2,276 49   96% 69%
Idaho 513 106 271 21 53% 20%
Iowa 1,310 357 392 29 30% 8%
Kansas 1,207 278 508 32 42% 12%
Kentucky 1,157 175 680 51 59% 29%
Louisiana 1,122 70 1,051 52 94% 74%
Maine 563 195 148 18 26% 9%
Minnesota 1,367 332  549 40   40% 12%
Mississippi 868 152 432 36 50% 24%
Missouri 1,974 483 880 56 45% 12%
Nebraska 833 236 330 18 40% 8%
Oklahoma 1,588 509 511 27 32% 5%
South Carolina 1,022 85 900 53 88% 62%
Texas 6,630 1008  4,268 177   64% 18%
Total 25,152 4,401  15,065 742   56% 26%
Case Study 
State  11,730 1,569  8,101 302   69% 30%
* Total state schools do not include charter schools, kindergarten or pre-kindergarten schools, schools specifically 
designated for the education of students with special education needs, with persistent behavior problems, or 
students in the penal system. 
Note: Data for this drawn from the public use version of the Teacher Compensation Survey, 2006-07 and the 
Common Core of Data, 2006-07.  Minimum district size for deriving allocation weights is 7 schools. Case study 
states are in italics and have complete data for HLM models. 
 
one middle, and one high school—variation due to school level would not be discernable 
from that due to any other factor.  
Ultimately, the decision rule for inclusion in this analysis hinges on the whether 
the districts contain enough schools to yield reliable estimates of district teacher-




include more than six schools, because districts with six or fewer schools result in 
unreliable estimated de facto allocation weights. The second requirement is that the 
allocation weights must explain 90% of the variation in teacher allocations in the district;  
that is, the R-squared for the regression that estimates allocation weights must be 0.90 or 
above. The second requirement is included because where allocation weights do not 
explain 90% of the variance in teacher allocations across schools there may be anomalies 
in the data. The majority of districts, 96%, with seven or more schools had an R-squared 
above that threshold. This decision rule strikes a balance between maximizing the 
coverage of the analysis and retaining reliable estimates.  
Table 3 summarizes the number of schools and districts that will be included in the 
analysis by the first requirement of the decision rule. The number of districts that are 
included in the analysis appears rather small in the table below, averaging at 26% of all the 
districts in the TCS and 30% in the case study states. However, the number of schools 
included in the analytic dataset is much larger at 56 and 69%, respectively, because the 
removed districts contain the fewest schools. The coverage of schools in a state ranges from a 
high of 96% in Florida to a low of 26% in Maine. Taken as a whole, and for the case study 
states, these data provide ample power for multivariate statistical analyses. 
Another point that deserves clarification is the feasibility of using coefficients from 
regression equations based on a small number of schools. Typical sample size requirements 
for regressions in an inferential statistical framework do not apply to these analyses because I 
am not using the resulting coefficients to make inferences. Instead, I use regression as a tool 
to calculate average relationships between schools characteristics and teacher allocations 
concomitantly, using the population of schools. Since the data include the population of 




average relationships in these districts. 
Analyzing the entire set of available data, while ignoring differences between states, 
may potentially bias results in an unpredictable way. However conducting these analyses with 
multiple outcome variables across 16 states would produce more results than can be 
practically digested. To maintain a balance between the depth and breadth of analyses, I 
present descriptive results for the dataset as a whole and complete the full multivariate 
analyses for the four case study states.  
Table 4 presents a range of descriptive statistics that compare the TCE and school 
compositional characteristics across the case study states and in those states, between the 
total state districts and those included in the analytic sample. The most notable 
differences between the states is that Minnesota has higher teacher salaries, per-pupil 
expenditures and per-pupil instructional expenditures, than the other states, while Texas 
spends less on each.  
There are several notable differences between the analytic samples and the total 
districts in each state. First, the number of districts in the analytic sample is much smaller 
than the states’ totals because the districts with six schools or fewer, of which there are 
many in Colorado, Minnesota and Texas, are not included in the analytic sample. A large 
proportion of state schools are retained in the analytic sample because of the larger 
number of schools per district. The selection of districts for the analytic sample based on 
size influences a number of the differences between total state districts and those included 
in the analytic sample, including differences for Title I percentage, urbanicity and 
enrollments. The differences between the districts in the analytic sample and all the 




Table 4. Descriptive statistics for case study states, comparing all districts and those included in the analytic sample. 
State characteristics Colorado Florida Minnesota Texas 
National teacher salary rank 26 28 18 29 
Average Teacher Salary $45,833 $45,308 $49,634 $44,897 
Average per-pupil expenditures $9,152 $9,084 $10,048 $8,350 
Average per-pupil instructional 
expenditures $5,299 $5,473 $6,474 $4,993 
Total Sample Total Sample Total Sample Total Sample 
Number of districts 160 40  70 50  330 40  1010 180
Number of schools 1,360 1,010 2370 2280 1,370 550 6630 4270
Average number of schools per district 8.6 28.0  33.4 46.4  4.1 13.7  6.6 24.1
Average enrollment 520 600 910 730 550 730 660 810
Average pupil teacher ratio 16.4 17.2  16.0 17.6  16.4 17.6  14.3 15.3
Average percent free/reduced price lunch 39% 39% 51% 33% 33% 33% 49% 50%
Average percent minority 38% 42%  50% 29%  18% 29%  60% 70%
Average teacher salary $43,846 $46,804 $44,343 $53,672 $48,797 $53,672 $44,548 $46,090
Average teacher experience 12.8 12.5  11.4 14.3  15.1 14.3  12.6 12.0
Average percentage teachers with 
advanced degrees  49% 53% 31% 60% 45% 60% 20% 22%
Title I school percentage 38% 33%  72% 44%  50% 44%  72% 68%
Urbanicity distribution 
  Urban 30% 40%  23% 34%  14% 34%  36% 53%
  Suburban 30% 39% 50% 40% 22% 40% 20% 28%
  Town 12% 8%  8% 14%  21% 14%  15% 7%




because I exclude smaller districts on purpose. Many of these districts have too few 
schools to separate TCE differences from differences in school levels. Further, the current 
analyses do not attempt to be representative of all state districts, but only of those of 
sufficient size. The analytic samples in all four states include a large portion of state 
schools and together make up a large sample for multivariate analyses. 
Statistical Procedures 
The statistical procedures I propose for this dissertation consist of five parts. The 
first set of procedures, detailed above, allow me to estimate de facto allocation weights 
within each district I will analyze. The estimation of these weights is a necessary 
preliminary step to the remaining four statistical procedures. These four analyses are 
designed to answer my research questions, though not necessarily in a direct linear 
fashion. To review, the research questions for this dissertation are: 
1. What proportions of school districts have substantial between-school variations in 
TCE as measured by the Gini coefficient? What district characteristics are associated 
with this variation?  
2. What proportions of schools are affected by substantial TCE variations? What is the 
average magnitude of between-school TCE differentials? What school characteristics 
are associated with greater or lesser TCE?  
3. Do legitimate student compensatory needs- such as poverty, special education status, 
limited English proficiency, and low performance explain between-school TCE 
differentials? 
 
The first set of analyses provides descriptive statistics for multiple measures of 
TCE that will extend the findings in previous research by controlling for per-pupil teacher 
allocations and student compensatory needs. These descriptive will also examine the 




part of my first research question, “What proportions of school districts have substantial 
between-school variations in TCE as measured by the Gini coefficient?” For the district-
level analysis of district-level variation, I will use OLS regression to examine district 
Gini coefficients for multiple measures of TCE; these analyses will address the second 
part of my first research question, “What district characteristics are associated with 
[substantial between-school variations in TCE as measured by the Gini coefficient]?” 
Finally, to address question raised in my second and fourth research questions, I will 
conduct multilevel analysis of schools nested within districts, with school-level TCEPPW 
differentials from the district-level TCEPPW average as my dependent variable. I detail 
each set of analyses in turn below. 
Descriptive analyses. To compare my descriptive data to findings from previous 
literature, I compare school average salary measures across schools by poverty, minority 
and proficiency quartiles (Roza, 2010; Roza & Hill, 2004; Education Trust West, 2005). 
Additionally, I extend prior research by examining differences in TCEPP and TCEPPW by 
the same quartiles. Comparing these three TCE measures using the same evaluative 
methods used in previous studies provides context for my findings vis-à-vis the findings 
from prior research. Further, the magnitudes of the differences between TCE measures by 
these quartiles indicate the importance of controlling for pupil-teacher ratios and student 
compensatory needs. 
Regression analyses of total district variation. Descriptive and regression 
analyses of district Gini coefficients of TCEFTE, TCEPP and TCEPPW address the third 
research question regarding what district characteristics are associated with total TCE 




above. I will present tables with average Gini coefficients for all three TCE measures for 
each state, using the two Gini benchmarks. These tables will provide the first empirical 
evidence on the proportion of districts that have substantial TCE variation.  
I will conduct a series of regression analyses to explore what district 
characteristics are associated with total district TCE variation as measured by the Gini 
index for TCEFTE, TCEPP and TCEPPW. The Gini Index is simply the Gini coefficient 
multiplied by 100. Using the Gini index returns more readable results (using fewer 
decimal places) than the Gini coefficient and return the same relationships. The 
generalized regression equation is in formula 3.06: 
Formula 3.06  Gi=a + β1 (Wi)+ β2 (Xi) + β3 (Yi) + β4 (Zi) + e 
where G is the outcome measure (the Gini coefficient for the ith district), where a is the 
average Gini coefficient holding all other variables in the model to zero. Where Wi, Xi, 
Yi, and Zi are vectors of variables I will enter in stepped or blocked models, and e is the 
error term. I will run stepped models by adding blocks of variables to the regression 
model in turn. The first block will be a vector of district characteristics I hypothesize to 
relate to teacher sorting that will serve as my base model (Wi). The first block of district 
measures includes average schools measures for student compensatory needs such as the 
standardized percentage of students classified as LEP, special education, and those 
receiving free and reduced priced meals. Three school compositional measures—student 
poverty, minority composition, and proficiency— are key independent variables in these 
analyses. Unfortunately, these measures are highly correlated at the schools and district 
levels, and entering all three to the model simultaneously could hide important 




measures of the schools’ average compositions of minority students and students scoring 
proficient on state tests in blocks. Minority composition and student proficiency included 
in the second vector of variables (Xi). Examining these key independent variables in turn 
reveals important relationships between each and district TCE variation, and 
interrelationships between these three key measures that would be invisible in a single 
cumulative model. 
Between-school variation in these key school composition measures may be 
related to the severity of teacher sorting across schools, and thus TCE variation. The third 
vector of measures (Yi) includes coefficients of variation (CV) for average school 
poverty, minority composition and proficiency. Again, I enter each CV on the model 
using a blocked presentation. 
Finally, the distribution of teacher qualifications—specifically the variation in 
salary related teacher qualifications— are hypothesized to be directly related district TCE 
variation and the final vector of variables (Zi), includes such measures. If adding the final 
vector of variables reduces either the constant (a) or the coefficients for variables in the 
first two vectors, it will suggest that teacher sorting is indeed a significant driver of TCE 
variation within districts.  
Hierarchical linear models of school TCE differentials. To address my second 
research question, I will investigate the school and district characteristics associated with 
school-level TCE differentials with a series parallel HLM analyses. I will use parallel 
models across all three TCE measures for the four case study states that have complete 
data. My data for these analyses will come from all districts that meet my decision rules 




TCE differentials with schools nested in districts.  
The within-district (Level 1) model. For the within district (level 1) model, I will enter 
school and district variables into the HLM to estimate the relationships between TCE and 
various school and district characteristics. I will add school-level variables to the model 
to estimate their average relationship to TCE and to determine whether those 
relationships have random effects across districts. I will enter the school-level variables 
into the model in five blocks. The first block (see “Block 1” in the equation below) of 
school-level measures include a standardized measure of school size and binary 
indicators for elementary schools, Title I schools, urban schools and town or rural 
schools. The second block of variables includes measures of student compensatory needs 
for each school, including district-centered25 standardized percentages of LEP, special 
education, and FARM eligible students. In the third and fourth blocks, I add the district-
centered standardized measure for minority percentage and percent proficient, 
respectively. In the fifth block, I add a cross-level interaction between school proficiency 
and the districts’ Gini for average school salary (TCEFTE). The final blocks of variables 
(presented in secondary tables) include two measures of salary-determinant teacher 
qualifications: teacher experience and education. Continuous variables will be group-
mean centered because their effects on TCE differentials are a function of the district 
context, rather than the grand mean across all districts. 
This blocked variable strategy is informative because as blocks of variables are 
                                                 
25 “District-centered” indicates that the scores for each school are standardized with a standard deviation of 
one centered on the schools’ district mean of zero.  This is the same as “group-centering these standardized 
measures.  Group-centering is sensible because I am trying to model TCE differences within districts that 




added to the model they can explain a portion of the variation in TCE differentials 
estimated in the base model, and the portion of variance that is explained by these 
variables indicates the relative importance of each block. Further, when latter blocks of 
variables are entered into the model, they can reduce the magnitude and significance of 
the coefficients for variables in earlier blocks. The changes made to block-1 coefficients 
by adding subsequent measures to the model may provide a basis for inferences that 
could not be had by entering all the variables into a single model. For instance, assume 
that block 1 variables reveal significant associations with TCE differentials when entered 
on the model alone. If those associations are reduced when salary-determinant teacher 
qualifications are added to the model, I can infer that the sorting of teacher qualifications 
is related to TCE differentials and that these relationships explain away the differences in 
TCE that are associated with student body characteristics. In short, such a pattern of 
results would suggest that student composition drives the distribution of teacher 
qualifications and that those qualifications drive TCE differentials. The relative power of 
each measure will be reflected in the amount of school-level variance explained by 
blocks entered, and in the changes in coefficients for variables in preceding blocks. 
HLM can test whether the slopes of school-level measures—that is, the average 
relationships between these measures and TCE differentials— vary across districts. 
Random slopes are those that have significant amounts of variation across districts and I 
can model such variation with district-level measures. For example, the association 
between the percentage of poor students in schools and TCE differentials may be small in 
districts with relatively few students in poverty, or in districts where schools have similar 




variation in the school percentage of poor students, the relationship between the school 
percentage of poor students and TCE differentials may be stronger. Identifying and 
modeling random slopes can evaluate these cross-level interactions. When fitting the 
HLM models for each state, I test the school-level measures of student composition and 
teacher qualifications for random effects. I model slopes that have significant random 
effects with the same district characteristics used to model variation on the intercept. 
I present the total school-level model in formula 3.07 below by blocks: 
Formula 3.07   
Yij= β0j +  β1j (School size) + β2j (Elementary School) +β3j (Title I school) +  
β4j (Urban school) + β5j (Town/Rural school)  
Block 2 + β6j (Percent LEP) + β7j (Percent Special Education) β8j (Percent Poverty)   
Block 3 + β9j (Percent Minority) 
Block 4 + β10j (Percent Proficient) +  
Block 6 26  β11j (Mean Teacher Experience) + β12j (Mean Advance Degree) + rij  
where  
     Yij                     is the predicted TCE differential for school i in district j; and 
     β 0j              is the intercept or mean TCE differential for district j; and 
     β1j -β5j           are the coefficients associated with the respective dichotomous or 
categorical variables in school j; and  
       β6j – β10j       are the coefficients associated with the continuous measures of student 
body composition and performance; and 
       β11j – β12j   are the coefficients associated with the continuous measures of salary-
determinant teacher qualifications; and 
     ri                       is a random “school effect”, that is, the deviation of school i’s TCE 
differential from the predicted TCE differential based on level-1 model. 
Residual school effects are assumed normally distributed with a mean of 
zero and variance σ2.  
                                                 
26 Block 5 includes a cross-level interaction between school proficiency and the district Gini for TCEFTE, 




The between-district (Level 2) model. The district-level model examines the 
associations between-district characteristics and school-level TCE differentials. I will 
specify the level-two model in part based on the findings from the district Gini regression 
models explained above. District measures will include binary measures for urban 
districts and town or rural districts and a standardized measure of the number of schools 
in a district. District averages and coefficients of variation for percent LEP, percent 
special education, percent FARM eligible students, percent minority, and proficiency are 
included in the model as well as a standardized measure of district unemployment. The 
model also includes state fixed effects to control for differences between states (Texas, 
the state with the largest sample, is the reference group.) I will use these district measures 
to model the mean school TCE differentials. The resulting level-two equation is in 
formula 3.08 below:  
Formula 3.08   
 β0j=  γ00 + γ01 (Urban District) + γ02 (Town/Rural district)+ γ03 (Number of 
schools) + γ04 (Special Education %) + γ05 (LEP %) + γ06 (Poverty %) + γ07 
(Minority %) + γ08 (Mean proficiency) + γ09 (District mean unemployment) 
+ γ10 (CV LEP%) + γ11 (CV Special Education %) + γ12 (CV Poverty %) + 
γ13 (CV Minority %) + γ14 (CV Proficiency %) + γ15 (Minnesota) + γ16 
(Florida) + γ17 (Colorado) + γ17 (Gini TCEFTE) + μ03  
where 
γ00         is the grand mean TCE differential; and 
γ01 - γ02 are the estimated difference in the average TCE differential in districts 
where schools modal urbanicity is Urban and Town/Rural, respectively; 
and  
γ03  is the estimated difference in the average TCE differential in districts per 
standard deviation of the number of district schools; and 
γ04 -γ08   is the estimated difference in the average TCE differentials associated 





γ09 is the estimated difference in the average TCE differentials associated 
with a standard deviation increase in district unemployment; and 
γ10 –γ14   are the estimated differences in the average TCE differentials associated 
with a percent increase in the CVs for student composition characteristics; 
and 
γ15 –γ17   are the State fixed effects for Minnesota, Florida and Colorado; and 
γ18 is the estimated difference in the TCE differential associated with a 
standard deviation increase in the Gini for TCEFTE ; and 
μ03 is a unique random effect for the district number of schools in district j. 
 
Typically, HLMs have a random effect for the intercept. These models differ from 
this form because the dependent variable, TCE differentials, are centered on the district 
mean at zero, and thus have no variation across districts. HLM remains the appropriate 
framework for these analyses because they are designed to capture variation in the nested 
structure of schools within districts. Several of the school-level variables have significant 
random effects, which are left free to vary though they are largely unmodeled. The 
random effect for districts’ number of schools is significant and allowed to vary across all 
models. The only modeled random slope is the school measure for proficiency. I include 
a cross-level interaction between total district variation in teacher salaries, as measured 
by the Gini for TCEFTE, and school proficiency. I add this interaction in the fifth block of 
the model. For brevity’s sake, I do not present all the formulas for each block here. 
The fully specified HLM models will address research question three by 
estimating what school and district characteristics are associated with TCE differentials. 
Further, because the resulting coefficients will be in per-pupil dollars, the magnitude of 
these differentials is easily interpretable. These models will provide substantial new 
empirical evidence on the associations and magnitude of TCE differentials while 




these models suggest that TCE differentials are substantial, there will be strong evidence 





Chapter 4: Findings 
This chapter presents the findings of these analyses in the order of the research 
questions and consists of three sections. The first section addresses the first part of 
research question one, which asks, “What proportions of school districts have substantial 
between-school variations in TCE as measured by the Gini coefficient?” This section 
includes descriptive statistics on the Gini coefficients by state, first with the means and 
standard deviations in Table 5, and then by the percentage distribution of districts by the 
Gini benchmarks used in this dissertation. The Gini coefficient has a number of 
advantageous properties for measuring district variation, but it is not an intuitively 
meaning metric. In an effort to provide some association between total district variation 
as measured by the Gini coefficient and the impact this TCE variation has on schools, this 
section also includes a number of tables and charts that contextualize these Gini 
coefficients. The second section addresses the second part of research question one, 
which asks, “What district characteristics are associated with this variation?” The second 
section presents the results of OLS regressions on district TCE variation as measured by 
the Gini coefficients for TCEFTE, TCEPP and TCEPPW. The third section addresses the 
second and third research questions. Section 3 begins with statistics that describe the 
proportion of schools affected by TCE differentials, and their average magnitudes. The 
remainder of the third section presents the results of the HLMs that examine school TCE 
differentials. The results of these HLMs reveal several important relationships between 
school characteristics and TCE differentials, and examine how student compensatory 




Results on District TCE Variation 
Table 5 presents the means and standard deviation of the Gini coefficients for TCEFTE and 
TCEPP in all 16 states in the TCS, and for TCEPPW in the case study states. Across all 16 
states, the average Gini coefficient is .028, which is slightly above the 0.025 Gini 
benchmark, but well below the 0.05 benchmark. Among these states, Texas has the lowest 
Gini for TCEFTE at .021 and Colorado has the highest at .037. The Ginis for TCEFTE in 
Minnesota and Florida are slightly above the overall average at .031. As discussed above 
in the section on benchmarking the Gini, the Gini coefficients for TCEFTE are 
substantially smaller than the Gini coefficients for TCEPP and TCEPPW. For TCEPP, the 
Gini ranges from a high in Colorado of .087 to a low in Texas of .063. As with the 
TCEFTE, Florida and Minnesota had TCEPP Ginis near the average for all sixteen states, at 
around .076. Across the four case study states for which the Ginis for TCEPPW were 
calculated, the measures were much larger than the Ginis for TCEFTE, but less than for 
TCEPP. As with the other two measures, the Ginis for TCEPPW ranged from a high in 
Colorado of .069 to a low in Texas of .054, while Florida and Minnesota were close to the 
middle of that range. 
The state’s average Gini coefficients for these three measures indicate that there is 
a substantial amount of variation in each measure. Recall that the 0.025 Gini benchmark 
is associated with a district average TCE absolute difference between schools that is 
equal to 5% of the districts average for the same measure. For TCEFTE, 5 of the 16 states 
had average Gini coefficients below that level. For all 16 states, the average is well below 




Table 5. Means and standard deviations for the Gini coefficients for average teacher 
salary, per-pupil teacher salary and per-pupil weighted teacher salary 
TCEFTE TCEPP TCEPPW 
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
Arizona .029 (.009)  .073 (.025)       
Colorado .037 (.011) .087 (.032) .069 (.030) 
Florida .031 (.009)  .074 (.019)   .062 (.016) 
Idaho .028 (.009) .079 (.038) 
Iowa .030 (.009)  .074 (.019)       
Kansas .025 (.006) .081 (.029) 
Kentucky .025 (.007)  .074 (.022)       
Louisiana .020 (.007) .081 (.029) 
Maine .026 (.007)  .065 (.015)       
Minnesota .031 (.009) .076 (.028) .063 (.022) 
Mississippi .031 (.008)  .084 (.028)       
Missouri .027 (.008) .075 (.020) 
Nebraska .029 (.006)  .078 (.017)       
Oklahoma .023 (.008) .076 (.042) 
South Carolina .033 (.008)  .076 (.021)       
Texas .021 (.006)  .063 (.021)   .054 (.020) 
Total .028 (.008)  .076 (.025)   .062 (.022) 
 
all of the states’ district averages above the .05 threshold. Again, this indicates that the on 
average, the districts in each state have average absolute schools differences for both per-
pupil measures of greater than 10% of the district average of the same.  
Table 6 presents the distributions of districts in each state by each Gini category, 
which reflects the patterns found in Table 5. As an overall average, 60% of the districts in 
these states had Gini coefficients for TCEFTE above the 0.025 benchmark, but very few 
were above the 0.05 benchmark. In contrast, almost all the districts in these states were 





Table 6. Percentage distribution of districts by categories of Gini coefficients for 
TCEFTE, TCEPP, and TCEPPW, by state 
Gini TCEFTE 
















Arizona 36% 62% 2%  0% 23% 77%   - - - 
Colorado 11% 75% 14% 0% 8% 92% 0% 21% 79%
Florida 22% 76% 2%  0% 14% 86%   2% 19% 79%
Idaho 33% 67% 0% 0% 24% 76% - - - 
Iowa 28% 72% 0%  0% 14% 86%   - - - 
Kansas 56% 44% 0% 0% 13% 88% - - - 
Kentucky 61% 39% 0%  0% 12% 88%   - - - 
Louisiana 83% 17% 0% 0% 10% 90% - - - 
Maine 44% 56% 0%  0% 17% 83%   - - - 
Minnesota 23% 75% 3% 3% 15% 83% 0% 28% 73%
Mississippi 28% 72% 0%  0% 11% 89%   - - - 
Missouri 39% 61% 0% 0% 11% 89% - - - 
Nebraska 33% 67% 0%  0% 0% 100%   - - - 
Oklahoma 63% 33% 4% 0% 26% 74% - - - 
South 
Carolina 11% 87% 2%  0% 9% 91%   - - - 
Texas 75% 25% 0% 0% 29% 71% 2% 46% 51%
Average 40% 58% 2%  0% 15% 85%   1% 28% 70%
 
The statistics in tables 5 and 6 describe the Gini coefficients in these states, but  
these numbers are not intuitively meaningful. Before presenting the results of 
multivariate analyses of the Gini coefficients, I present several tables and charts to 
provide a meaningful description of the variation associated with these Gini coefficients. 
I do this in two sections. First, I present tables and charts that gauge the size of the 
between-school differences associated with different Gini coefficients. Second, I present 
charts that examine what relationships the variation measured by these Gini coefficients 






Table 7. Interquartile ranges for TCEFTE, TCEPP, and TCEPPW, by Gini categories 
Gini TCEFTE categories Gini TCEPP categories Gini TCEPPW categories 
State 0-.025 
.025-
.05 .05+   0-.025 
.025-
.05 .05+   0-.025 
.025-
.05 .05+ 
Arizona 2,037 3,219 4,147   219 449       
Colorado 2,037 3,879 4,595 230 573 144 376
Florida 1,747 3,586 5,552   278 513   89 199 334
Idaho 1,930 3,368 391 479 
Iowa 1,421 3,856    304 559       
Kansas 2,153 2,848 220 579 
Kentucky 2,019 3,200    279 514       
Louisiana 1,628 3,083 220 561 
Maine 2,404 2,956    423 604       
Minnesota 2,329 4,329 8,493 88 296 614 220 389
Mississippi 1,949 3,333    230 551       
Missouri 1,938 3,784 296 558 
Nebraska 2,432 3,656    0 561       
Oklahoma 1,659 2,433 1,043 211 429 
South 
Carolina 1,981 3,479 5,362   260 517       
Texas 2,025 3,015 303 516 128 241 365
Average 1,981 3,376 4,865  88 260 536   108 201 366
Impact on average 
sized school 
($1,000s) $91 $155 $224 $70 $208 $429 $112 $209 $381
 
Contextualizing the Gini coefficient  
Table 7 displays states’ average interquartile ranges27 for each TCE measure by 
categories of the Gini coefficient. These average interquartile ranges are useful indicators 
of the variation measured by the Gini coefficient but only contain data from two points in 
the distribution of schools in a district— the 75th and 25th percentiles. Nonetheless, they 
are useful because they indicate the minimum difference between 50% of the schools in a 
district—those above the 75th percentile and below the 25th percentile. Examining TCEFTE 
                                                 




first, there is a clear positive association between the Gini and the interquartile range. On 
average, the 40% of districts (see Table 5) with TCEFTE Ginis below the 0.025 standard 
have an interquartile salary range of just under $2000. The average interquartile salary 
gap for the 58% of districts between the 0.025 and the 0.05 benchmarks is nearly $3,400. 
The bottom row of Table 7 contains estimated total impacts for a school of average size 
in terms of the number of teachers (46 FTE teachers) and in terms of enrollment (801 
students, 1040 students weighted). For the lowest Gini category, the average difference is 
$91,000, while the second and third categories of Gini coefficients are more than 
$155,000 and $223,000 respectively. Interquartile ranges are the minimum differences 
between half of districts’ schools, and thus larger differentials exist in every district. 
Examining the per-pupil measures reveals a similar pattern where districts in the 
lowest Gini category have small differences, amounting to less than $90 per pupil or $110 
per pupil, weighted. In the middle Gini category, the average interquartile ranges are 
roughly twice that, at $260 per pupil for TCEPP and $201 for TCEPPW. In the .05 and 
above Gini category, which includes most districts, the interquartile gaps average $536 
and $366, respectively, and amount to large differences of roughly $429,000 and 
$380,000 in average sized schools.  
Tables 8 and 9 present two additional means of gauging these variations by 
looking first at the average absolute mean differences28 across states, and second at the 
90/10 range across states, which is similar to the interquartile ranges but examines the top 
and bottom 10% of schools in each district. Both of these measures reflect the differences 
in teacher salary expenditures in different ways and both complement the differences 
                                                 
28 Also called Ginis mean difference, this figure is equal to the average of the absolute value of school 




Table 8. Average absolute mean differences for TCEFTE, TCEPP, and TCEPPW, by Gini 
categories 
Gini TCEFTE categories Gini TCEPP categories Gini TCEPPW categories 
State 0-.025 
.025-
.05 .05+ 0-.025 
.025-
.05 .05+ 0-.025 
.025-
.05 .05+ 
Arizona 1,704 2,826 4,002   197 397      
Colorado 1,840 3,327 4,802 202 522 152 339
Florida 1,563 2,922 5,782   226 452  67 174 293
Idaho 1,645 2,710 274 425
Iowa 1,678 3,066    246 501      
Kansas 1,766 2,649 177 528
Kentucky 1,673 2,738    247 446      
Louisiana 1,387 2,420 225 493
Maine 1,845 2,649    328 499      
Minnesota 2,082 3,533 5,609 154 250 531 181 326
Mississippi 1,634 2,827    205 477      
Missouri 1,595 2,979 223 495
Nebraska 1,913 2,914    0 494      
Oklahoma 1,437 2,056 4,526 186 442
South 
Carolina 1,720 2,927 4,139   238 474      
Texas 1,670 2,524 260 427 112 202 313
Average 1,697 2,817 4,810  154 218 475  89 177 318
Impact on 
average sized 
school ($1,000s) $78  $130 $221  $123 $175 $380  $93  $184 $331 
 
displayed in Table 7. The absolute mean differences displayed in Table 8 include data 
from all the schools in each district and can be interpreted as the average school 
differential from the district TCE mean. The absolute mean differences are similar to the 
interquartile ranges in Table 7, though slightly smaller.  
Table 9 presents the 90/10 ranges in the same format as the previous two tables. 
By definition, the 90/10 ranges are equal to or larger than the interquartile ranges, and 
represents the differences between 20% of the schools in those districts. The 90/10 ranges 




Table 9. Differences between the 90th and 10th percentiles for TCEFTE, TCEPP, and 
TCEPPW, 
by Gini categories 














Arizona 4,059 6,589 10,824   492 862       
Colorado 4,173 7,736 11,418 479 1174 352 745
Florida 3,208 6,669 11,434   485 995   143 379 649
Idaho 3,888 6,224 612 1003
Iowa 4,278 7,245    602 1180       
Kansas 3,923 6,102 446 1221
Kentucky 3,800 6,530    622 1058       
Louisiana 3,105 5,218 533 1108
Maine 4,511 6,689    729 1239       
Minnesota 4,981 7,974 12,193 390 611 1222 409 748
Mississippi 3,651 6,741    420 1062       
Missouri 3,790 6,714 504 1153
Nebraska 4,202 6,452    0 1134       
Oklahoma 3,306 4,813 18,792 429 1101
South 
Carolina 3,930 6,857 6,797   580 1102       
Texas 3,804 5,731 598 956 273 449 697
Average 3,913 6,518 11,910  390 509 1098   208 397 710
Impact on 
average sized 
school ($1,000s) $180  $300 $548  $312 $408 $880   $216  $413 $738 
 
sized schools, shown in the bottom row of Table 9, indicate that for 20% of schools in the 
districts the teacher compensation expenditures differ substantially. For instance, even in 
the lowest Gini category for TCEFTE, the average gap between the top and bottom 10% of 
schools is $180,000 on average. In the higher Gini categories, the average minimum 
differences between the top and bottom 10% of schools approach $300,000 and 
$548,000, respectively. For TCEPP and TCEPPW, the 90/10 ranges are much larger.  
To make it easier to look across these differences concurrently, and to focus on the 




same data contained in tables 6, 7, 8, and 9 for the cases study states alone. Compared to 
all states a greater percentage of districts in Colorado, Florida, and Minnesota have 
TCEFTE Gini coefficients between .025 and .05 (75, 76, and 75% respectively), however 
Texas has larger percentage of districts with TCEFTE Ginis of less than .025 (75%) than 
all the other states except for Louisiana. The relatively higher Gini coefficients for 
TCEFTE, TCEPP and TCEPPW in Colorado, Florida and Minnesota result in larger average 
interquartile ranges, absolute mean deviations and 90/10 ranges (across the four cases 
study states) compared to the other case study states. As a result, the estimated impacts on 
average size schools are larger for each measure in Table 13. 
Taken together, these tables show that there is substantial variation in all three 
measures of teacher salary in a majority of districts. However, variation alone only 
indicates that in many districts, some schools receive more teacher compensation 
expenditures than others. The simple variation indicated by the Gini coefficients for 
TCEFTE and TCEPPW is a significant equity issue in and of itself, because some schools—
and the students enrolled in them— receive less TCE than other schools.29 However, if 
there are systematic associations with this variation and school or student characteristics 
then the problem moves beyond simple horizontal variation and becomes either a 
question of vertical equity or an issue of equality of opportunity. To present relationships 
between school characteristics and different amounts of TCE variation at the district level 
is impossible in tabular format. I use a series of bar charts that display district-level data 
on the differences between the averages of TCEFTE, TCEPP, and TCEPPW for the top and  
                                                 
29 The variation in TCEPP may or may not be an equity problem since the differences between schools’ 





Table 10. Percentage distribution of districts by Gini categories for TCEFTE, 
TCEPP, and TCEPPW, by case study state 







.05 .05+ 0-.025 
.025-
.05 .05+ 
Colorado 11% 75% 14%  0% 8% 92%  0% 21% 79%
Florida 22% 76% 2% 0% 14% 86% 2% 19% 79%
Minnesota 23% 75% 3%  3% 15% 83%  0% 28% 73%
Texas 75% 25% 0% 0% 29% 71% 2% 46% 51%
Average 33% 37% 11%  17% 35% 33%  36% 44% 16%
Table 11. Interquartile ranges for TCEFTE, TCEPP, and TCEPPW, by case study states 
Gini TCEFTE categories Gini TCEPP categories Gini TCEPPW categories 
State 0-.025 
.025-









Colorado 2,037 3,879 4,595   230 573    144 376
Florida 1,747 3,586 5,552 278 513 89 199 334
Minnesota 2,329 4,329 8,493  88 296 614    220 389
Texas 2,025 3,015 - 303 516 128 241 365
Average 2,035 3,702 6,213  88 277 554  108 201 366
Average total 
effect ($1,000s) $94  $170  $286  $70 $222 $444  $112  $209 $381 
Table 12. Absolute mean differences for TCEFTE, TCEPP, and TCEPPW, by case study states 
Gini TCEFTE categories Gini TCEPP categories Gini TCEPPW categories 
State 0-.025 
.025-
.05 .05+   0-.025 
.025-
.05 .05+   0-.025 
.025-
.05 .05+ 
Colorado 1,840 3,327 4,802   202 522    152 339
Florida 1,563 2,922 5,782 226 452 67 174 293
Minnesota 2,082 3,533 5,609  154 250 531    181 326
Texas 1,670 2,524 260 427 112 202 313
Average 1,809 2,756 5,398  237 377 500  202 282 384
Average total 
effect ($1,000s) $83  $127  $248  $190 $302 $401  $210  $293 $399 
Table 13. Differences between the 90th and 10th percentiles for TCEFTE, TCEPP, and 
TCEPPW, by case study states 
Gini TCEFTE categories Gini TCEPP categories Gini TCEPPW categories 
State 0-.025 
.025-
.05 .05+   0-.025 
.025-
.05 .05+   0-.025 
.025-
.05 .05+ 
Colorado 4,173 7,736 11,418   479 1,174    352 745
Florida 3,208 6,669 11,434 485 995 143 379 649
Minnesota 4,981 7,974 12,193  390 611 1,222    409 748
Texas 3,804 5,731 598 956 273 449 697
Average 4,029 6,241 11,682  541 843 1,076  450 626 795
Average total 




bottom quartiles of schools in about 300 districts. I categorize schools into district 
quartiles on multiple measures to show different relationships. 
The first of these charts is in Figure 3, which consists of six panels. The panels in the left 
column of Figure 3 present the difference between the average measure of TCE in the 
bottom and top quartiles of the same measure for each districts. Each line in each chart 
represents a single district. To illustrate, the top panel on the left side of Figure 3 displays 
the difference in the between the average TCEFTE of schools in the highest quartile of 
TCEFTE, and the average of the schools in the bottom quartile. The following discussion 
involves a number of differences, between states, TCE measures and between quartiles. 
For clarity of reference, I call the TCE differences between top and bottom quartiles Q4-
Q1 gaps. The lines are sorted by state and by ascending Q4-Q1 gaps, and show that some 
districts have relatively small Q4-Q1 gaps (beginning, for instance, around $3,250 in 
Colorado) and others have much larger Q4-Q1 gaps (beyond $11,000 in some Colorado 
districts). The distribution in between is smooth and reflects a cumulative normal 
distribution. The second panel in the first column shows Q4-Q1 gaps in TCEPP, and the 
third displays gaps in TCEPPW. In both panels, the scale is equivalent, but both differ from 
the scale for TCEFTE due to their different ranges. The shape of the bottom two panels are 
similar, however in all cases the TCEPPW gaps are smaller than the TCEPP gaps, as would 
be expected because the de facto pupil weights control for compensatory teacher 
allocations. 
The panels in the second column of Figure 3 are very similar to those in the first 
column because they are the same data but sorted in a slightly different way. The first
 
 




column of panels is sorted by state and by Q4-Q1 differences, while the second column is 
sorted by state, Gini categories for the TCE measure being presented, and then by the Q4-
Q1difference. One can see the differences in the graphs in the “hitches” in the curves for 
each state. These show that the Q4-Q1 difference are not perfectly in line with the Gini 
coefficients for these measures (if they were all the states curves in the panels one the 
right would mirror the curves on the left exactly as is the case with Colorado in the 
bottom two panels). However, the similarities between the curves demonstrate that the 
relationships between school characteristics and the Q4-Q1 gaps are similar to those 
characteristics and the Gini coefficients. 
Figure 4 presents a different set of Q4-Q1 gaps for all three measures of TCE. The 
Q4-Q1 gaps in Figure 4 are not based on the TCE measure quartiles, but on three school 
characteristics. Previous literature on intradistrict differences in teacher salary have 
focused on school poverty, minority composition, and performance. The Q4-Q1 poverty 
gaps in Figure 4 are calculated by subtracting the average TCE for district schools in the 
highest-poverty quartile from the TCE average for district schools in the lowest-poverty 
quartile. The Q4-Q1 minority gaps and Q4-Q1 proficiency gaps are similarly calculated. 
Figure 4 displays these gaps graphically for student poverty in column 1, minority 
composition in column 2, and percent proficiency in column 3.30 As in Figure 3, each line 
represents a district’s Q4-Q1 gap. In contrast to Figure 3, where the Q4-Q1 gaps are 
absolute differences and are therefore all positive, the Q4-Q1 gaps in Figure 3 may be 
                                                 
30 The quartiles are arranged such that the “highest quartile” is the quartile of schools with the lowest need.  
Therefore, for poverty and minority composition the “highest quartile” is actually the least poor or lowest 





negative (for instance, if the schools in the highest poverty quartile have higher TCEFTE 
than schools in the lowest poverty quartile). Lines on the right of the zero line indicate 
the Q4-Q1 gaps in a district favor low-need schools, and lines on the left indicate the 
differences favor high-need schools.31 The length of each line indicates the magnitude of 
the Q4-Q1 gap.  
For example, the top line of the top left panel in figure 4 indicates the poverty Q4-
Q1 gap in TCEFTE is over $5000 for the Colorado district with the largest gap favoring 
low-need schools. The last line in the same panel for Colorado indicates the poverty Q4-
Q1 gap in TCEFTE favoring low- need schools is just over $4,000. These charts use a 
novel format to present a large amount of data and therefore take a moment to digest; 
however, once the form of the chart becomes clear the multiple charts present a great deal 
of information in a compelling and parallel fashion. 
  Examining Figure 4 from left to right by rows allows one to compare the 
relationships between poverty, minority composition and proficiency for each measure of 
TCE. Examining TCEFTE first (the top row), the first panel shows the magnitudes of the 
Q4-Q1 poverty gaps are lowest in Texas and greatest in Minnesota. Another important 
aspect of the magnitude of these gaps is that they are smaller than the absolute gaps 
presented in Figure 3, which indicates that the relationships between poverty and TCEFTE 
differentials only explain a portion of total TCEFTE differences. Although not universal, a 
majority of districts in the case study states, favor low-poverty schools in terms of 
TCEFTE, while a substantial minority of districts favor high-poverty schools. This small 
                                                 
31 These Q4-Q1 differences are better than interquartile ranges because they include data from half the 
schools in each district. The Q4-Q1 differences include less data than the absolute mean difference, 
however since this measure includes all schools in the district, there is no intuitive means to sort the schools 




portion of district that favor high-need schools is important because it illustrates that 
though many of these gaps indicate substantial variation in districts— and therefore 
substantial Gini coefficients— the systematic relationship with poverty is not absolute. 
The middle panel in the top row shows a similar relationship for TCEFTE and school 
minority composition. In Colorado, Florida and Texas, the Q4-Q1 minority gaps are 
slightly larger in proportion and magnitude, than the Q4-Q1 poverty gaps. Minnesota 
shows a different pattern in which more districts favor the high-minority schools, while 
more districts have Q4-Q1 minority gaps of greater magnitude compared to Q4-Q1 
poverty gaps. 
The right panel in row 1 shows Q4-Q1 proficiency gaps for TCEFTE. In Colorado 
and Minnesota, the Q4-Q1 proficiency gaps are similar in number to the minority and 
poverty gaps, but have greater magnitudes. The opposite is true in Florida and Texas, 
where the magnitudes and proportions of the Q4-Q1 proficiency gaps are smaller than the 
poverty and minority gaps. 
The second row in Figure 4 illustrates the very different association between 
school compositions and TCEPP. Though the TCEFTE gaps between these same districts 
favor low-need schools, differences in the pupil-teacher ratios that result from 
compensatory allocations of teachers leave the vast majority of districts in Colorado, 
Florida and Minnesota with Q4-Q1 poverty gaps that favor high-poverty schools.32 The 
majority of districts in Texas also have Q4-Q1 poverty gaps that favor high-poverty 
schools, but a sizable minority (30%) favors low-poverty schools. The center panel in the 
                                                 
32 It is important to note that the magnitudes on the first row of panels are on a different scale than the 
second and third rows, and are thus not comparable. 
 
 
Figure 4. District differences between average TCE measures in the top and bottom quartile of student poverty, minority composition, and proficiency 





second row of figure 4 shows that for all three states, the majority of districts Q4-Q1 
minority gaps for TCEPP favor high-minority schools, but to a lesser degree in terms of 
magnitude and proportion, compared to the Q4-Q1 poverty gaps. The right panel of row 2 
shows the Q4-Q1 proficiency gaps for TCEPP in Colorado and Minnesota move further to 
the right, compared to the minority or poverty gaps. The effect is more pronounced in 
Florida where a large majority of districts have Q4-Q1 proficiency gaps that favor high-
proficiency schools and by large magnitudes. Texas shows a different pattern than the 
other states in which fewer districts have Q4-Q1 proficiency gaps that benefit low-need 
schools compared to the number of districts with Q4-Q1 minority gaps than benefit low-
need schools. 
The third row in Figure 4 shows Q4-Q1 gaps for TCEPPW. These charts show a 
different pattern than the Q4-Q1 gaps for TCEFTE and TCEPP, though the influence of 
both is apparent. Examining Q4-Q1 poverty gaps in the left panel of row three, the Q4-
Q1 poverty gaps are more balanced for Colorado, Florida and Minnesota than in either of 
the panels above it. In Texas, the Q4-Q1 poverty gaps favor low-poverty schools in a 
large majority of districts. The middle panel of the third row shows that the Q4-Q1 
minority gaps favor low-minority schools by greater magnitudes and in greater 
proportions, compared to the Q4-Q1 poverty gaps. The shift to the right in the minority 
panel is more evident for Colorado, Florida and Minnesota than in Texas. The final panel 
in the third row shows Q4-Q1 proficiency gaps for TCEPPW. Compared to the Q4-Q1 
minority gaps panel, the curves for Colorado, Florida and Minnesota all shift further to 
the right, indicating the proficiency has a stronger relationship with TCEPPW than 




Texas shows a weaker relationship between TCEPPW and proficiency compared to 
minority composition, but most districts still favor schools with higher proficiency by 
substantial magnitudes and proportions. 
The charts in Figures 3 and 4 display a large amount of district-level information 
regarding the nature of TCE variation and the bivariate relationships between TCE and 
school poverty, minority composition and proficiency. Figure 3 shows that there are 
substantial TCE gaps in many districts, and that variation differs widely in districts in 
each state. Figure 4 shows that TCE variation is associated with the composition of 
schools’ student populations. The comparative magnitudes of the Q4-Q1 gaps in Figures 
3 and 4 indicate these associations are loose and only explain a portion of the total TCE 
variation within districts. With some exceptions, Figure 4 indicates that in general, 
minority composition is more strongly associated with TCE than poverty, and with the 
exception of Texas, proficiency is even more strongly associated with TCE. Figure 4 also 
shows that all districts systematically but not universally favor high-need schools, since a 
small proportion of districts in each state have higher TCEFTE and TCEPPW in schools in 
the highest poverty, minority, and performance quartiles. 
Of course, in most schools and districts, poverty, minority composition, and 
proficiency are highly correlated, so the bivariate data in these charts are useful and 
illustrative but do not evaluate these relationships concurrently. Multivariate analyses are 
required to analyze these relationships. In the next section, I present the results from OLS 
regression of district Gini coefficients for TCEFTE, TCEPP, and TCEPPW to examine what 
district characteristics are associated with overall between-school TCE variation. In the 




and district characteristics are associated with school differentials from district TCE 
averages. 
Results from OLS Regressions on District TCE Variation  
This section presents the results from three sets of regressions that model district 
variation for case study state as measured by the Gini Index33 for TCEFTE, TCEPP, and 
TCEPPW (Tables 14, 16, and 18, respectively). I present the results for each table in seven 
blocks. The blocked presentation allows the reader to compare the impact of additional 
predictors to the model. Figure 4 separately exhibited the relationships between TCE 
variation and school poverty, minority composition and proficiency. However, since these 
school characteristics are typically correlated at the school level, it is helpful to see how 
the addition of one measure– like minority composition– affects the coefficient of an 
existing measure– like student poverty. The three sets of regressions are parallel, and 
analyze data from the four case study states. 
Findings for the district-level regression for the Gini Index for TCEFTE. The first 
column of coefficients in table 14 includes the following standardized34 measures: the 
number of schools; percent Title I schools; percent elementary schools; unemployment in 
the district during 2006-07; average school special education enrollment percentage, and 
poverty (measured by the percentage of students qualified for free and reduced price 
meals). The model also includes binary measures for urban districts, town or rural 
                                                 
33 The Gini Index is equal to 100 times the Gini Coefficient and is more readable in tables (e.g., 2.5 instead 
of 0.025), when looking small coefficients (e.g., 0.08 instead of 0.0008). 




districts, and districts with high percentages of LEP students35 (the reference groups are 
suburban school districts–the modal urbanicity category– and low LEP districts). To 
control for differences between states, fixed effects are included for Colorado, Minnesota 
and Texas.36 
In block 1, the intercept for the Gini Index for TCEFTE is 3.09, which matches the 
average for Florida in Table 5. The fixed effects for Colorado, Minnesota and Texas also 
match the differences between states found in Table 5 and show that Colorado has a 
higher average Gini by 0.56 and Texas has a much smaller Gini by about 1.10 index 
points. The only other significant predictor in the model is number of schools in the 
district, which indicates that districts that are a standard deviation above the mean 
number of schools have a Gini index 0.11 points higher than average. Controlling for all 
other measures, the model show no relationship between district variation and district 
poverty. The results for urban and town or rural districts are in the expected directions 
(positive for urban and negative for town or rural) however neither effect is significant. 
The R-squared for block 1 is 0.43, most of which is dues to the state fixed effects.37  
Block 2 introduces the standardized measure of district average minority composition, 
which has a positive relationship with TCEFTE variation. A standard deviation increase in 
minority composition is associated with a 0.27 point increase (approximately one-third of 
a standard deviation) in the Gini Index. The coefficients in block 2 show little change 
                                                 
35 The distribution of the district average percentage of LEP students was skewed sharply, so a binary 
measure for districts one standard deviation or more above the mean is used to control for LEP student 
percentage. 
36 State fixed effects at the bottom of the table; Florida is the reference group. 




from block 1. In block 3, the added standardized measure for mean school proficiency is 
negative and not significant. The only change between blocks 2 and 3 is a reduction in the 
coefficient for minority composition by about a third. The standardized measure for 
average teacher experience in block 4 is not significant and has little effect on the 
coefficients from the block 3. Blocks 1 to 4 include measures of central tendency for 
student and teacher composition in districts. Taken together, these measures explain 2.3 
percent more variation in the Gini Index for TCEFTE than block 1 (R-squared block 4, 
0.456- R-squared block 1, 0.456-.023).  
As mentioned in the methods section in chapter 3, the district averages of school 
composition measures may not be as strongly related to the variation in TCE as are the 
between-school variation in those measures. Blocks 5, 6 and 7 add the standardized 
coefficient of variation (CV) as a measure of variation for each of school poverty, 
minority and proficiency. 
The first of these, the CV for poverty shows a significant positive association with 
the Gini for TCEFTE. One standard deviation increase in the CV is associated with a 0.13 
point increase on the Gini Index. Adding the CV for poverty to the model increases the 
coefficient for percent elementary schools slightly, but enough that it becomes significant. 
The addition of the CV for minority percentage results in a significant coefficient that is 
slightly larger (0.15) than the coefficient for the CV for poverty in the previous block. 
Further, it explains a portion of the variance that the CV for poverty explained in block 5. 
Thus, the CV poverty coefficient is reduced and no longer significant. The CV for 




Table 14. District-level regressions of the Gini Index for average teacher salary (TCEFTE) 
by block 
 
standard deviation increase in the CV for proficiency is related to an increase of 0.48 of a 
point on the Gini Index for TCEFTE, which is more than half of a standard deviation. The 
addition of the CV for proficiency explains much of the variance explained by the 




substantially smaller and no longer significant. It has the same effect on the coefficient 
for the number of schools reducing the coefficient by nearly half. The block 7 model 
explains 50% of the total variance in the Gini Index for TCEFTE, up from 43% in block 1. 
In several ways, the patterns of regression results for TCEPP and TCEPPW are 
similar to those for TCEFTE found in Table 14. Before reviewing the results for the other 
two TCE measures, it is worthwhile to point out two primary implications of the patterns 
of results in Table 14 models. The first implication is that these relationships are linear 
and thus indicate what kinds of districts may have higher and lower TCE variation. The 
second implication is that the district characteristics that are associated with TCE 
variation are not independent of one another, but are still important, even if some are no 
longer significant in the later blocks. 
The pattern of results in the blocks indicates that the measures of variation in 
school composition are all linearly associated with TCEFTE variation in districts. For 
instance, in block 7 the CV for proficiency is positively associated with variation, which 
indicates that more intra-district variation in proficiency is associated with more TCE 
variation. The converse—that districts with below-average proficiency variation have less 
TCEFTE variation—is also true. The positive linear associations between teacher salary 
variation and variation in school poverty, minority composition, and proficiency are 
consistent with the hypothesis that teacher sorting is a driver of TCE variation. 
The second implication of these results is that the correlates of TCEFTE variation 
are interdependent. Readers might interpret the results in block 7 to indicate that only the 
CV for proficiency is associated with variation in TCEFTE and further, that the number of 




meaningfully related to TCEFTE variation. However, that would be an oversimplification 
of these results and would dismiss important information. The CV for proficiency 
explains enough variation in the dependent variable that the other measures in the model 
are no longer significant, but that does not negate the importance of the relationships that 
are significant in prior blocks. For example, in blocks 1 through 6, there is a significant 
relationship between district size (in terms of number of schools) and TCEFTE variation. 
While this relationship is no longer significant in block 7, it is not because the 
relationship is spurious or inconsequential. Instead, it means that controlling for the CV 
for proficiency, that relationship is no longer significant. Larger districts have greater 
variation in both proficiency and TCEFTE. The relationship between district size and 
TCEFTE variation remains, and is policy relevant because it allows policymakers to 
understand the district contexts where TCE variation is more likely to be an issue. The 
same logic applies to the other coefficients in the model.  
Still, the changing magnitudes and significance evident in these models indicate 
important patterns. For example, the shifting coefficients for the poverty, minority 
composition and proficiency CVs indicate that these three kinds of variation are 
interdependent and correlated. The fact that latter measures displace the former indicates 
the latter are stronger predictors of TCEFTE variation. The confirmatory models in Table 
15 illustrate this point and confirm the association between school characteristics and 
teacher sorting. Table 15 contains four blocks of models. The first is block 7, the final 
block in table 14. The following three blocks add first the CV’s for teacher experience, 
second the pupil teacher ratios, and finally both. The addition of the CV for teacher 




Table 15. District-level regressions of the Gini Index for TCEFTE by block 
including measures of the distribution of teachers 
 
block 8 jumps from 50% to 60%, indicating that variation in teacher experience is a much 




“displaced”38 coefficients found in Table 14, the reduction of the CV proficiency 
coefficient does not mean the relationship between proficiency variation and TCEFTE 
variation is in fact smaller than block 7 indicates. Far from undermining the importance 
of this relationship, the displacement in blocks 8 and 14 underscore the importance of the 
CV for proficiency by indicating that variation in teacher experience is a direct driver of 
overall TCEFTE variation. The fact that the CVs for school compositional measures are 
displaced by the addition of measures of teacher qualifications provides evidence that 
variation in proficiency drives variation in teacher experience, although imperfectly. The 
changes to or displacements of the coefficient in these models adds evidence in support 
of the theory that teacher sorting drives overall TCEFTE variation. These patterns are also 
evident in the regression results for TCEPP and TCEPPW variation presented in the 
following sections. 
Findings for the district-level regression for the Gini Index for TCEPP. Table 
16 presents the results from the regressions on the Gini Index for TCEPP. In block 1, the 
intercept is 7.01 and none of the coefficients is statistically significant. As was the case 
for the urbanicity coefficients in block 1 in table 14, the coefficients for urbanicity, 
district number of schools, and school average poverty are in the expected directions, but 
not significant. At .15, the R-squared for block 1 is much less than in the regressions for 
TCEFTE, because the state fixed effects explain less of the variation in per-pupil TCE. In  
block 2, the coefficient for average minority composition is significant at 0.56,39 and the
                                                 
38 I use the term “displaced” to refer to the reduction in a coefficient from a previous model due to the 
addition of another measure. 
39 Note that though the coefficient is larger in table 11 compared to table 10, the standard deviation of the 




 Table 16. District-level regressions of the Gini Index for per-pupil teacher salary (TCEPP) by 
block 
 
coefficient for poverty shrinks. In block 3, the addition of average proficiency is not 
significant, but does affect the size of the mean school minority coefficient, reducing it by 
half and leaving it no longer significant. Adding mean teacher experience in block 4 
results in no substantial change to any of the coefficients from block 3, and is not itself 
significant.  




to the pattern in Table 14. The coefficient for the CV of poverty is significant in block 5, 
at 0.39 and with its addition, the coefficient for mean school poverty grows from 0.02 in 
block 4 to 0.52 though it is not significant. In block 6, the coefficient for the CV of 
poverty falls in magnitude and falls out of significance with the addition of the CV for 
minority composition, which has a larger (0.46) and significant effect. In block 7, the CV 
for proficiency has a similar effect on the CV minority composition coefficient found in 
block 6. The results in block 7 indicate that a standard deviation change in the CV for 
proficiency is associated with about a full point change in the Gini Index for TCEPP, 
roughly equivalent to 40-50% of a standard deviation. Block 7 explains 22% of the 
overall variation in the Gini Index for TCEPP.  
The supplementary models for Table 16 are found in Table 17. The CV for teacher 
experience is significant at 0.41, and its addition reduces the coefficient for CV 
proficiency and yields it no longer significant. However, the importance of teacher 
experience is dwarfed by the addition of the CV for the pupil-teacher ratio, which is 
associated with nearly a three-point change in the Gini Index. Controlling for the 
variation in the pupil-teacher ratio greatly reduces the magnitudes for the CVs for 
poverty, minority composition and proficiency and the R-squared in blocks 9 and 14 
exceeds 0.80. As with the TCEFTE regression, these results confirm that both variations in 
teacher experience and in the compensatory allocation of teachers (CV pupil-teacher 
ratio) are strongly related to TCEPP variation. Again, the fact that controlling for measures 
of the distribution of teachers explains away the coefficients for the student composition 
CV’s supports the theory that the distribution and allocation of teachers drives TCEPP 




Table 17. District-level regressions of the Gini Index for TCEPP by 









Findings for the district-level regression for the Gini Index for TCEPPW. Table 
18 presents the results for the regressions on the district Gini Index for TCEPPW. In block 
1, the intercept is 6.42, again similar to the means presented in Table 5. The coefficient 
for the number of schools in a district indicates that a standard deviation increase in the 
number for district schools is associated with a 0.24 unit change in the Gini Index for 
TCEPPW, or approximately 12% of a standard deviation. The percentage of elementary 
schools in a district is negatively associated with the Gini Index for TCEPPW with a 
coefficient of 0.38. The negative relationship between TCEPPW variation and the 
percentage of elementary schools suggests that in districts fewer elementary schools, and 
therefore the more middle and high schools, the higher the TCEPPW variation. 
40 The 
coefficient for mean school poverty is 0.38, suggesting that districts with more poor 
students have greater variation in TCEPPW. Block 2 includes the average minority 
composition, which explains some of the variance previously explained by the average 
poverty measure, which is about 30% smaller and no longer significant. In block 3, the 
addition of the average proficiency measure reduces the coefficients for average poverty 
and minority composition, neither of which is significant. The only other substantial 
change in block 3 is that the coefficient for Title I percentage increases by about 10% at
                                                 
40 It is also possible that there is a relationship between the percentage of elementary schools, or more 
specifically the diversity of school types, in a district and the de facto weights used to create the TCEPPW 
measure. If the de facto weights do not sufficiently control for the different school levels, the relationship 
between the Gini Index for the TCEPPW measure could be an artifact of the weighting. It is more probable 
that the relationship is real, as the coefficients are in the same direction in the regressions presented in 
tables 10 and 11, and these effects could be additive when applied to TCEPPW, which combines both teacher 
salaries and teacher allocations into the same dependent measure. 
 
   
Table 18. District-level regressions of the Gini Index for per-pupil teacher salary 
weighted (TCEPPW) by block 
 
which point it becomes significant. In block 4, the district average for teacher experience 
is not significant and makes almost no difference to the coefficient found in block 3.  
Block 5 includes the CV for poverty, which is significant, and with this addition, 
the coefficient for mean school poverty increases threefold. These results indicate that 
controlling for the CV for poverty, districts that are standard deviation above the average 
in school poverty are 0.62 points higher on the Gini Index (28% SD). In addition, holding 
 
   
all else constant, including district average poverty; districts with a standard deviation 
increase in the CV for poverty are 0.32 points higher on the Gini Index (14% SD). The 
coefficient for mean school proficiency remains statistically significant in block 5. In 
block 6, the CV for minority percentage is not significant but is in the expected direction 
and of moderate magnitude, and it reduces the schools is associated with a 0.24 unit 
change in the Gini Index for TCEPPW, or approximately 12% of a standard deviation. The 
percentage of elementary schools in a district is negatively associated with the Gini Index 
for TCEPPW with a coefficient of 0.38. The negative relationship between TCEPPW 
variation and the percentage of elementary schools suggests that in districts fewer 
elementary schools, and therefore the more middle and high schools, the higher the 
TCEPPW variation.
41 The coefficient for mean school poverty is 0.38, suggesting that 
districts with more poor students have greater variation in TCEPPW. Block 2 includes the 
average minority composition, which explains some of the variance previously explained 
by the average poverty measure, which is about 30% smaller and no longer significant. In 
block 3, the addition of the average proficiency measure reduces the coefficients for 
average poverty and minority composition, neither of which is significant. The only other 
substantial change in block 3 is that the coefficient for Title I percentage increases by 
about 10% at which point it becomes significant. In block 4, the district average for 
teacher experience is not significant and makes almost no difference to the coefficient 
found in block 3.  
                                                 
41 It is also possible that there is a relationship between the percentage of elementary schools, or more 
specifically the diversity of school types, in a district and the de facto weights used to create the TCEPPW 
measure. If the de facto weights do not sufficiently control for the different school levels, the relationship 
between the Gini Index for the TCEPPW measure could be an artifact of the weighting. It is more probable 
that the relationship is real, as the coefficients are in the same direction in the regressions presented in 
tables 10 and 11, and these effects could be additive when applied to TCEPPW, which combines both teacher 
salaries and teacher allocations into the same dependent measure. 
 
   
Block 5 includes the CV for poverty, which is significant, and with this addition, 
the coefficient for mean school poverty increases threefold. These results indicate that 
controlling for the CV for poverty, districts that are standard deviation above the average 
in school poverty are 0.62 points higher on the Gini Index (28% SD). In addition, holding 
all else constant, including district average poverty; districts with a standard deviation 
increase in the CV for poverty are 0.32 points higher on the Gini Index (14% SD). The 
coefficient for mean school proficiency remains statistically significant in block 5. In 
block 6, the CV for minority percentage is not significant but is in the expected direction 
and of moderate magnitude, and it reduces the coefficients for the CV and average 
poverty enough that they are no longer statistically significant. As was the case in Tables 
14 and 16, the addition of the CV for proficiency in block 7 of Table 16 yields the largest 
coefficient of all at 1.23 Gini Index points, well beyond half a standard deviation. The 
addition of the CV for proficiency also reduced the intercept from 6.44, roughly where is 
had remained for blocks 1 to 6, to 5.89. The large effect for the CV for proficiency makes 
a profound difference in the estimated Gini Index of a district. For instance, compare a 
district that is a standard deviation below the mean for the CV for proficiency, which 
would have an estimated Gini index of 4.66, to one a standard deviation above the CV for 
proficiency, which would have an estimated Gini index of 7.12. Neither of these Ginis are 
below the 2.5 Gini Index benchmark,42 but the difference between the two is striking. 
With this addition to the model in block 7, all the coefficients that were significant in 
previous blocks are substantially reduced and none remains statistically significant. The 
model in block 7 explains 21 percent of the variation in the Gini Index for TCEPPW. 
                                                 
42 A 2.5 on the Gini Index is equivalent to Gini coefficient of 0.025. 
 
   
Table 19. District-level regressions of the Gini Index for TCEPPW by block 
 
The supplementary models for TCEPPW are presented in Table 19. Like the 
previous supplementary tables, these indicate that variation in teacher experience and 
 
   
pupil teacher ratios completely explain the CV coefficients, once again supporting the 
theory that teacher sorting along the lines of school composition drives overall TCEPPW 
variation. In block 8, the CV for teacher experience is significant at 0.57 and reduces the 
coefficient for the CV of proficiency. In block 9, the CV for pupil-teacher ratio reduces 
the coefficient for CV proficiency even further and the R-squared for the model increase 
dramatically, to 58%. In block 10, the addition of both measures are each significant, 
further reduce the coefficient for CV proficiency, and explain 62% of the variation in the 
Gini Index for TCEPPW. 
Summary of Results of District-level regression on TCE variation. Taken as a 
whole, these parallel district-level regressions reveal several associations between district 
characteristics and TCE variation that are worth highlighting. The first is that districts 
with more schools tend to have greater variation in TCE and those with fewer schools 
tend to have less. For all three dependent measures of TCE, the coefficients are in the 
same direction, though they are only significant for the TCEFTE and TCEPPW regressions. 
This relationship is consistent with the theory that teacher sorting drives salary variation 
as districts with more schools are likely to have more diverse school contexts for teachers 
to sort between. Of course, when controlling for district variation the district size measure 
is no longer significant. The district size coefficients are not significant in the TCEPP 
regressions, perhaps because the majority of the variance in TCEPP is due to differential 
teacher allocations, which may have a more varied relationship to district size. 
Consistently, the proportion of elementary schools is negatively related to TCE 
variation in all three regressions, though they are only significant in some of the TCEFTE 
and TCEPPW models. Again, this might indicate that the allocation of positions does not 
 
   
vary with the proportion of elementary schools as teacher salaries do. The significant 
negative effects for TCEFTE and TCEPPW variation in districts with higher proportions of 
elementary schools may be due to more pronounced teacher sorting across high schools 
and middle schools, which would yield greater overall variation in districts with 
relatively fewer elementary schools. The exact nature of this relationship is uncertain. 
The district averages student composition variables (poverty, minority 
composition and proficiency) all indicate significant relationships with TCE variation, 
under various controls. Of these correlated measures, minority composition generally 
shows a stronger association than poverty does, with proficiency stronger still. Each of 
these is associated with TCE variation such that districts with more high-need schools, or 
those with higher need schools, have more overall variation.  
The CV’s for the student composition measures show a similar pattern, in which 
the CV for minority composition displaces the CV poverty effect, and the CV for 
proficiency further displace both. Again, the displacing effect each CV has on the 
previous measure does not indicate that there is no association between the displaced 
measures and TCE variation. There are associations as indicated in the bivariate displays 
in Figure 4. However, proficiency is the strongest among these correlated and 
overlapping associations. 
The supplementary tables for each dependent variable show that adding direct 
measures of the variation in district teacher experience and pupil-teacher ratios explain 
away much or all of the relationships between the CV’s for school compositional 
measures and TCE variation. The relationships between TCE variation and the CV’s for 
teacher experience and pupil-teacher ratios are not surprising given the direct links with 
 
   
single-salary schedules and compensatory allocations. However, the displacement effect 
these measures have on the CV’s for school compositional measures supports the theory 
that teacher sorting is greater in districts with more variation in school composition, and 
that greater variation in TCE results from the sorting along those aspects of schools. 
These regression results add important findings to understand what districts have 
more or less TCE variation. Nonetheless, the equity implications are still unclear. 
Certainly, districts with more variation in TCE are likely to have schools with larger 
between-school TCE differentials. However, these regressions do not establish a 
relationship between TCE variation and specific school characteristics. To determine 
what school characteristics are associated with TCE advantages or disadvantages requires 
school-level analyses. The following sections presents descriptive statistics on the 
proportion of schools affected by different magnitudes of school-level TCE differentials 
followed by the results of hierarchical linear models of within-district school-level TCE 
differentials. 
Findings on School-level TCE Differentials 
The first part of the second research question for this dissertation asks what 
proportions of schools are affected by substantial TCE variations. Table 20 presents the 
average district percentage of schools whose TCE differs from the district mean by 5 and 
10%. These results are presented for all three TCE measures. The first column in table 20 
indicated the average percentage of district schools with at least ±5% deviation from the 
district mean for TCEFTE is 28% across all states. Deviation of ±10% is much less 
common with an average across states of about 5% (column2, table 20). A much larger 
proportion of district schools have ±5% and 10% deviation for TCEPP with averages of  
 
   
Table 20. Average percentage of districts schools with 5% and 10% deviation from 
the district TCE mean, by state 














Arizona 30% 5%  66% 40%     
Colorado 42% 12% 73% 46% 64% 36%
Florida 33% 7%  70% 45%  64% 33%
Idaho 28% 5% 71% 41%
Iowa 34% 6%  73% 42%     
Kansas 23% 4% 70% 43%
Kentucky 22% 2%  67% 42%     
Louisiana 13% 1% 69% 43%
Maine 25% 1%  66% 37%     
Minnesota 32% 7% 67% 43% 66% 33%
Mississippi 33% 6%  74% 45%     
Missouri 26% 4% 69% 45%
Nebraska 30% 4%  72% 46%     
Oklahoma 20% 1% 63% 38%
South Carolina 36% 6%  70% 39%     
Texas 17% 1% 64% 33% 58% 26%
Average 28% 5%  69% 42%  63% 32%
 
69% and 42%, respectively. In the four case study states, the percentage for district 
schools that deviate by ±5% and 10%, are somewhat smaller than for TCEPP, but these 
deviations are still substantial for a large proportion of schools. Table 20 indicates that in 
most districts, TCE differentials affect substantial proportions of schools are affected by 
TCE differentials.  
Results from HLM models of intradistrict TCE differentials. Tables 21, 23 
and 25 present the results from the models of school TCE differentials from the district 
average. Each table presents parallel HLMs for schools in case study states using a 
blocked presentation. The tables present the results in six parts, four for model 
 
   
coefficients—school characteristics, district characteristics, district variation, state fixed 
effects— one for random effects, and one for fit measures. An important difference 
between traditional HLM models and those in this study is that the intercept is fixed to 
zero in these models. The intercept typically varies in HLM models, but since the 
dependent variable is centered at zero in each district (since the dependent measure is the 
deviation from the district average of zero) there is no between group variation in the 
dependent variable.  
HLMs of TCEFTE differentials. The first block in Table 21 contains the base model for 
TCEFTE differentials. Beginning with schools characteristics, larger schools have above-
average teacher salaries with a standard deviation in the number of students associated 
with a $213 salary advantage. Elementary schools, on average have below-average 
salaries by about $179. These are relatively small effects compared to a standard 
deviation for TCEFTE differentials of about $2500. Title I schools have a much lower 
average salary compared to non-Title I schools in the same district. On average the 
differential is -$872, about 35% of a standard deviation below the district average. This 
finding is consistent with previous research examining the effect of teacher sorting on 
Title I schools (Roza & Hill, 2004; Roza, 2005; Heuer & Stillich, 2012). 
The effect for town or rural schools appears large at -$592, compared to the 
suburban school reference group. However, this coefficient is largely an artifact of the 
model. The first significant district characteristic is for town or rural districts, which is 
positive and of a comparable magnitude. Since the majority of town or rural schools are 
in town or rural districts, for the vast majority of schools these two effects cancel out. The 
net difference for these schools is about the same size as the differential for urban 
 
   
schools, which is not statistically significant. There are no other significant relationships 
between-school differentials and district characteristics or measures of district variation 
(CV’s). The lack of significant relationships is not surprising given that the dependent 
variance is centered on zero in every district. 
The state fixed effects show some moderate differences for the intercept. In 
Colorado and Minnesota, the average school has a negative differential of between -$226 
and -$260, while Florida has a positive fixed effect that is not significant. These effects 
are primarily included as controls that allow the model to isolate relationships within 
districts while controlling for between state differences, and therefore are not focused on 
here. 
In block 2, the group-centered standardized scores for percent special education, 
LEP and poor students are added with random effects for each. All three measures have 
significant relationships to TCEFTE differentials. On average, schools with a standard 
deviation above their district mean for Special Education students have a $100 salary 
advantage, while the same change in the percentage of LEP and poor students is 
associated with salary deficits of $243 and $377, respectively. The poverty salary deficit 
is a moderate effect of about 15% of a standard deviation for salary differentials. The 
additions of these measures make two changes to the base model. First, the effects for 
elementary schools and Title I schools essentially disappear. The change in the Title I 
effect is not surprising given the direct relationship between Title I status and percentage 
of poor students. The other change is the dramatic reduction in the magnitude and 
significance of the state fixed effects. These added measures explain 8% of the school- 
 
   
Table 21. Results of blocked HLM models for intradistrict school differentials in TCEFTE 
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level variation in TCEFTE differentials.
43  
The group-mean centered standardized measure schools minority percentage is 
added in block 3. Schools that are a standard deviation above their districts’ mean 
minority percentage have an average salary deficit of $418. Controlling for minority 
compositions reduces the effects associated with special education, LEP and poor 
students, and leaves the effect for poverty no longer significant; the displacement of these 
relationships by the minority composition effect is once again due to their correlation at 
the school level and is similar to the pattern of findings in the district OLS regressions. 
The relative strength of the percent minority measure, relative to the special education, 
LEP and poverty measures, suggests than on average, schools’ minority composition has 
the strongest relationship to the sorting of teacher qualifications and salary of all these 
measures. The random effects for the special education, LEP and poverty measures are 
lower in block 3, though all remain significant. With the added control for minority 
composition, the coefficient for urban schools increases and becomes significant. This is 
likely due to the higher proportion of minority students in urban schools, which have 
higher salaries after controlling for their increased minority populations. Block 3 explains 
about 2% more of the variance in the base model than was explained in block 2. 
Adding the group-centered, standardized measure of school proficiency in block 4 
reduces the relationship between TCEFTE differentials and a minority composition, but 
only slightly. On average, schools a standard deviation above the district proficiency 
mean have a salary advantage of $324, holding all else constant, including minority 
                                                 
43 The variance explained is computed by taking the block 3 residual minus block 1 residual, and dividing 
by the block 1residual ((5,642,576-5,175,865)/ 5,642,576=8.3 percent). Similar calculations are made for 
other blocks but calculations will not be shown. 
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composition, which still has an associated deficit of $369. Controlling for school 
proficiency further reduces the poverty coefficient and its random effect, but makes little 
change to the LEP and special education coefficients. The only other substantive change 
in the model is that the coefficient for district mean proficiency becomes significant at -
$171. 
In block 4, the random effect for school average proficiency is significant and left 
free to vary across districts. There are two more coefficients in the model in block 5. The 
first is the standardized district Gini coefficient for TCEFTE, which has no significant 
relationship to TCEFTE differentials. The second addition is a cross-level interaction 
between the Gini for TCEFTE and school proficiency. This interaction is significant and 
indicates that in districts with greater variation in teacher salary there is stronger 
relationship with proficiency. In districts with an average Gini, the proficiency gap is 
similar to what it is in block4 at $343, however in districts with a standard deviation 
higher Gini coefficient, the effect is $483 ($343+140). Again, this interaction is a linear 
relationship, meaning that while the effect of proficiency is greater in districts with more 
salary variation, the relationship is weaker in districts with less variation.44 
Taken together, these models reveal several important relationships. The first is 
that Title I schools have a large salary deficit. This deficit is of particular interest because 
of the Title I comparability policy that excludes salary differences from comparability 
requirements. The average Title I differences amount to more than a $40,000 deficit in 
average sized, perhaps enough to fund an additional FTE teacher. There is also a set of 
                                                 
44 Similar interactions were significant in exploratory analyses for minority composition and poverty under 
various controls. However, to keep the presentation of results manageable and parallel across TCE 
measures, the only one presented here is the proficiency. 
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school characteristics related to teacher salary averages that include school percentages 
for LEP, special education, poor, minority and proficient students. Except for the 
percentage of special education students, all of these relationships benefit low-need 
schools with higher TCE, and with the exception of poor students, these relationships 
compound to some degree such that schools with multiple needs have lower teacher 
salaries compared to the average schools in these districts. Finally, the interaction 
between proficiency and the Gini for TCEFTE indicates that proficiency has a stronger 
relationship with salary in districts with greater salary variation. This interaction does not 
negate the base relationship, suggesting that the influence of school characteristics on 
teacher sorting and TCE are not limited to a few districts, but occur in most districts. 
Similar to the district regressions, adding measures of teacher qualifications to the 
model confirm the link between school characteristics and teacher sorting. Table 22 
compares the final two blocks of table 21 to models with controls for teacher 
qualifications. In block 4a, the group- centered standardized measures of teacher 
experience and advanced degrees are large and significant predictors of salary 
differentials. Controlling directly for schools’ teacher qualifications account for all the 
relationships between salary differentials and all the school compositional measures, 
except for LEP composition, which is diminished. The measures of teacher qualifications 
explain 73% of the school variation found in the base model in table 21. Block 5b 
includes an interaction between teacher experience and the Gini coefficient for TCEFTE, 
similar to the interaction between the Gini and school proficiency in block 4b. As was the 
case with the interaction of proficiency and the Gini for TCEFTE, the interaction with 
teacher experience indicates that the relationship between teacher qualifications and 
 
 
Table 22. Secondary Results of blocked HLM models for intradistrict school differentials in 
TCEFTE including measures of teacher sorting 
 
 
salary differentials is substantially greater in districts with more salary variation. The interaction 
between teacher experience and the Gini coefficient in block 6b explains about 84% of the 
variation in the random effect for teacher experience found in block 5b, though the relationship 
still varies measurably across districts in the final block. The interaction with experience and the 
Gini coefficient also reduces the effect for the proficiency interaction, though it is still positive 
and significant. These confirmatory HLM results show that school’ composition drives TCEFTE 
differentials through teacher sorting. They also show that these relationships only partially 
explain teacher sorting, as a large amount of variation remains in block 5. These results are 
consistent with the district differentials by Q4/Q1 gaps presented in Figure 4, which show that on 
average TCE gaps favor low-need schools, but not universally. 
HLMs of TCEPP differentials. Table 23 presents the results from the HLM’s for TCEPP. The 
intercept for the block one model is $53. Large schools and elementary schools both have 
significant negative coefficients indicating they receive less per-pupil compensation than 
average. Title I schools receive $150 more than average per-pupil TCE (more than 33% of a 
standard deviation), which is expected given that Title I schools receive targeted compensatory 
funds. Given the average salary gap found in table 21, the positive relationship for per-pupil 
salary confirms the notion that Title I schools receive more teachers, but with lower average 
salaries than non-Title I schools. The net Title I surplus in table 23 suggests the compensatory 
allocation of teaching positions is widespread and substantial. Town or rural schools have lower 
TCEPP than average by $76, and this gap is not balanced by the town or rural district coefficient 








Several small relationships exist between TCEPP differentials and district 
characteristics or variation. Schools in urban districts and in districts with higher 
unemployment receive slightly less TCEPP than average, while larger districts, districts 
with higher average proficiency and those with higher variation in minority composition 
have slightly above-average TCEPP. All of these effects are relatively small. All three 
state fixed effects are significant indicating each differs from Texas. These differences 
may be due to more aggressive compensatory programs in these states, but the ultimate 
import of the fixed effects is uncertain. 
Block 3 includes measures of school LEP, special education and poverty 
percentages. The coefficient for LEP is not significant, which is not what one would 
expect since districts typically allocate additional teachers to schools with higher 
proportions of LEP students. However, given the persistent salary deficit in Table 21 and 
the correlation between poverty and LEP in many districts, the flat finding for LEP 
students may indicate that districts make compensatory allocations for LEP students, but 
not with enough strength to have a net positive effect on TCEPP. The percentage for 
special education and poor students are both positively associated with TCEPP 
differentials of between $80-100, or roughly 20% of a standard deviation. Controlling for 
these measures, the Title I relationship again disappears, as would be expected, as do the 
small district effects found in block 1. The model in block 2 explains 21% more of the 
school-level variation in TCEPP differentials than block 1. 
In block 3, the addition of the measure for school minority composition makes no 
substantive differences to the model and is not significant. The lack of an association 




positions are not allocated to minority students as they are to students in poverty. Further, 
the salary deficit for high-minority schools in Table 21 is correlated with the poverty 
deficit, so controlling for both in block 3 unsurprisingly shows no minority relationship. 
The addition of school average proficiency in block 4 and of the interaction 
between school proficiency and the Gini for TCEFTE in block 5 have little effect on the 
other coefficients in the model, however both are related to TCEPP surpluses. The 
stronger relationship between proficiency and TCEFTE, relative to the other compositional 
measures in Table 21, appears to carry over into the distribution of TCEPP resulting in 
small surpluses for schools with above-average proficiency. The majority of the variance 
explained in TCEPP differentials is attributable to the coefficients added in block 2, as the 
model in block 5 only explains 3% more variation. 
The models in Table 24 show a different pattern of results than the models in 
Table 22 because the nature of the variation in TCEPP differentials is dissimilar from that 
of TCEFTE differentials. The addition of school measures of teacher experience and 
advanced degrees are both significant and substantial at $110 and $48 dollars per-pupil 
respectively. However, these measures do not change the coefficients for school special 
education and poverty percentages as they did in the same block in table 21. The poverty 
and special education relationships persist in these models because their influence on per-
pupil salaries relates to the allocation of positions, not average salaries. The measures of 
teacher qualifications explain a good deal of variation in TCEPP differentials, 37% of the 
base model residual in block 5b, but the extra variance explained is in addition to that 
which is explained in block 5. This stands in stark contrast to table 22, where the teacher 
qualifications explain the same variation previous models explain, and more. 
 
 
Table 24. Secondary results of blocked HLM models of intradistrict school 




Taken together, the models in tables 23 and 24 reveal a different set of patterns 
between school characteristics and TCEPP differentials than were found for TCEFTE 
differentials. The different set of patterns show that TCEPP is a fundamentally different 
measure of TCE, because so much of its variation across schools is due to the number of 
teachers per-pupil. Schools with greater percentages of special education and poor 
students have higher TCEPP because more teachers per-pupil are allocated to these 
schools. There remains a positive association between proficiency and TCEPP because 
proficiency is positively related to TCEFTE, which is an important component of TCEPP 
differentials. 
The results from Tables 21 and 23 indicate that TCEFTE favors low-need schools 
and that, TCEPP generally favors high-need schools. The TCEPP models are insufficient 
bases for equity claims, because it is impossible to determine whether the legitimate 
compensatory allocations that alter the TCEPP relationships are completely attributable to 
compensatory needs or whether they also compensate for differentials in TCEFTE. The 
following section presents results from the HLM on TCEPPW differentials, which provide 
a better basis to evaluate school-level TCE equity. 
HLMs of TCEPPW differentials. Table 25 presents the results from the HLM’s 
for TCEPPW differentials. The patterns in these results show similarities to the results for 
TCEFTE and TCEPP because TCEPPW is a composite of both measures. The intercept for 
block 1 in table 25 is small but significantly different from zero, indicating a slight 
TCEPPW surplus, on average controlling for other factors. However, the differential is 
quite small and with so many controls in the model is not particularly meaningful. School 




deviation larger than their district mean have a TCEPPW deficit of $62. Elementary 
schools also have a small average deficit of $20 TCEPPW. On average, Title I schools have 
a TCEPPW deficit of $85 which is a large effect of about 29% of a standard deviation. The 
average overall effect of this Title I deficit, based on the school-average number of 
weighted students in case study states, is almost $90,000, and based on the median the 
deficit totals to over $72,000, on average.45 The Title I deficit is of great importance 
because it shows a net deficit after controlling for the compensatory allocations that 
yielded a positive effect for TCEPP. This is the first indication in these analyses that after 
controlling for compensatory differences between schools (not in the model, but in the 
weighted measure of TCE) Title I schools do not receive a fair share of district TCE 
dollars. Urban and town or rural schools also have significant effects; however, the 
district effects for the same urbanicity largely cancel these out. 
The only significant district effect in block one is a very small $8 surplus for 
schools with above-average CV’s for special education. The state fixed effects in the 
model are significant and positive for Minnesota and Florida, and not significant for 
Colorado. 
Again, block 2 contains measures of school LEP, special education, and poverty 
percentages. The percentage for LEP and poor students are associated with deficits of $38 
and $28, respectively. These deficits indicate that after controlling for differences in 
school’s compensatory needs, high-need schools receive fewer TCE dollars than low-
need schools. The random effects for of school LEP, special education, and poverty 
                                                 
45 Under the weighting scheme, students are weighted by adding to the actual student count for each school. 
Thus the TCEPP coefficients are multiplied by the average number of students (801) the TCEPPW 
coefficients are multiplied by the weighted number (mean=1,046; median=870). 
 
 
Table 25. Results of blocked HLM models for intradistrict school differentials in TCEPPW 
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percentages are significant and left free to vary across districts. The addition of school 
poverty to the model negates the Title I effect found in block 1, as expected. There are no 
other substantive changes to the model. 
The school minority measure added in block 3 is significant and indicates that 
schools that are one standard deviation above the district mean for minority percentage 
have an average TCEPPW deficit of $21. Again, this coefficient indicates that schools with 
higher proportions of minority students receive less TCE than schools with fewer 
minority students, with an average total deficit of $22,000. As was the case in the TCEFTE 
HLMs, the minority measure displaces the effect for poverty in block 2. Beyond its effect 
on the poverty measure, the school minority measure makes no other substantive changes 
to the model. 
In block 4, the addition of the school proficiency reduced the minority coefficient. 
Schools that are a standard deviation above their district proficiency mean have an 
average $34 TCEPPW surplus, which is about 12% of a standard deviation. While reduced, 
the minority measure associates with a $15 deficit. The addition of the proficiency 
measure and its random effect also reduces the random effect estimates for the poverty 
and minority measures. The only other substantive change to the model is for the district-
mean proficiency measure, which indicates that after controlling for school proficiency, 
schools in districts that are a standard deviation above the mean for proficiency have a 
TCEPPW deficit of about $24. In block 5, the interaction between the Gini for TCEPPW and 
school proficiency is again significant with an associated surplus of $12 TCEPPW. The 
interaction indicates that the effects of school proficiency on teacher sorting are more 
influential in districts with greater variation in teacher pay. In districts that are a standard 
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deviation above the mean for Gini for TCEFTE, schools that are a standard deviation 
above the district proficiency mean have a TCEPPW deficit of $47, averaging to a total 
average difference of $49,000. 
Table 26 presents models that include teacher qualifications. Both the coefficients 
for teacher experience and advanced degrees are associated with TCEPPW surpluses of 
$85 and $37, respectively, which are equivalent to about 30% and 14% of a standard 
deviation for TCEPPW. As in the TCEFTE models, teacher qualifications explain the 
variation previously explained by school composition measures (with the exception of 
percentage LEP students). The only other interesting change to the model is that the 
addition of teacher qualifications to the model reduces coefficients for town or rural 
school and town or rural district in tandem. The simultaneous reduction of these 
coefficients supports the earlier interpretation than these coefficients are interdependent 
effects that effectively cancel each other out. In block 5a, the added interaction between 
teacher experience and the Gini coefficient for TCEFTE is again significant and explains 
away some of the interaction between proficiency and the Gini found in block 5. As in 
previous tables, the addition of teacher qualifications explains a much larger portion of 
the between-school variation in TCEPPW differentials than earlier models (26% versus 
10% for the earlier models). 
These dissertation analyses present a great deal of new information about the 
intradistrict distribution of TCE for a large sample of states and districts. The following 
chapter summarizes the key findings of the current research and discusses the 
implications of these findings for policy and research. 
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Chapter 5: Discussion and Future Research 
This dissertation contributes novel conceptual and methodological approaches and 
substantial new empirical evidence on the intradistrict distribution of TCE. In this 
chapter, I discuss the current dissertation in four sections. In the first section, I overview 
the empirical, conceptual, and methodological contributions this study adds to the 
literature on TCE.  The second section reviews the key findings from this dissertation 
study and discusses how those findings corroborate and extend prior research on TCE. In 
the third section, I discuss the implications the key findings from this study have for 
policy and research. The final section reviews the limitations to this study.  
Contributions of this Study 
The purpose of this dissertation research is to investigate intradistrict TCE 
variation at the school and district levels. The findings of this study significantly expand 
the empirical evidence on TCE variation through the examination of a larger sample than 
scholars have used previously. This study examines all schools in a large number of 
districts across several states. Further, with this expansive database, this research is the 
first to use multivariate methods to examine district TCE variation and the district 
characteristics that are associated with it.  
In addition to empirical contributions, the conceptual and methodological 
approaches in this dissertation add to the research on TCE variation because they enable 
analyses that look beyond average teacher salaries (TCEFTE), to make valid per-pupil 
TCE comparisons. Most prior research looks only at average teacher salaries to measure 




teaching positions to balance salary differences. This dissertation expands previous 
conceptual approaches that gauge TCE equity by comparing weighted per-pupil TCE. 
The methodological application of district de facto allocation weights makes this 
conceptual shift possible. The de facto weighting scheme statistically controls for 
between-school differences in the number of FTE teachers allocated according to student 
compensatory needs. I use the de facto weights to create the TCEPPW measure that allows 
for valid per-pupil TCE comparisons. Further, since the de facto weights control for 
between-school differences in student compensatory needs, the analyses of TCEPPW 
provide a better vantage to evaluate TCE equity. Similar TCE comparisons have not been 
possible with the methods employed in previous TCE research because prior methods did 
not control for between-school differences in either pupil-teacher ratios or differences in 
student compensatory needs.  
The current research also includes multivariate analyses that examine district TCE 
variation and school-level TCE differentials within districts in multiple states. 
Researchers have not published multivariate analyses of district TCE variation to date, 
and they have not used data for school-level TCE multivariate analyses as wide ranging 
or as detailed as the data in this study.46 Specifically, the analyses in this dissertation 
gauge the scope of TCE variation to measure the distribution and magnitude of TCE 
variation at the district level and the distribution and magnitude of school-level TCE 
deviations from the district mean. The multivariate analyses and the weighted measure of 
TCE are possible thanks to newly available data in the TCS and to supplemental state 
                                                 
46 To date, scholars have conducted school-level analyses of TCE differentials in only two states, and have 




data files, which provide a breadth (across many states) and depth of data (sufficient to 
estimate district de facto weights and include all district schools).  
Key Findings. 
 This dissertation has three overarching findings. First, this research shows that 
intradistrict TCE variation is a widespread phenomenon that has substantial impacts on a 
large percentage of schools. Second, this research finds that TCE variation usually 
advantages low-need schools and disadvantages high-need schools. Third, this research 
indicates that teacher sorting across schools within districts drives TCE variation. In the 
pages that follow, I examine each key finding in turn and discuss how each finding relates 
to prior research. 
Intradistrict TCE variation is widespread. This study uses two functional 
benchmarks for the Gini coefficient, at 0.025 and 0.05, which are useful for TCE 
measures and the context of this study. Table 5 (page 127) reveals that the average district 
Gini coefficient for TCEFTE is above the 0.025 Gini benchmark in most states but well 
below the 0.05 benchmark in all states. The average Gini coefficients for both per-pupil 
measures are substantially greater than for TCEFTE. The percentage distribution of 
districts by Gini benchmarks presented in Table 6 (page 128), show the TCE Gini 
coefficients are above the benchmarks for a large proportion of district. The descriptive 
statistics found in tables 5 and 6 are consistent with the intercepts in the OLS regressions 
on district Gini coefficients. These descriptive statistics corroborate findings from 
previous research and indicate a large proportion of school districts in this study’s sample 
have significant amounts of TCE variation. Since the Gini coefficient measures the 




indicate that in most districts the average between-school difference in TCEFTE is greater 
than 5% of the district average teacher salary (based on the 0.025 Gini benchmark). For 
TCEPP and TCEPPW, the average between-school difference in the majority of districts is 
beyond 10%. These TCE differences are widespread and substantial.  
The results of these analyses not only show substantial TCE variation in a large 
proportion of districts, but also show that TCE differentials affect a large proportion of 
schools. Table 20 (page 159) indicates that TCEFTE differed by more than 5% from the 
district average for about three in ten schools, while only about one in twenty schools 
differed by 10% or more. A much larger share of schools had more the 5% deviation for 
TCEPP (69%) and for TCEPPW (63%), and a sizable share differed by 10% for each (42% 
and 32%, respectively). These figures are averages across all districts, not just districts 
with Ginis above the benchmarks, and indicate that a large proportion of schools receive 
TCE that are substantially higher or lower than their district’s mean TCE. While the 
magnitudes of the TCE deviations found in these analyses are consistent those found in 
previous research on TCEFTE (e.g.; Roza & Hill, 2004; Argue, Honeyman, & Schlay, 
2006), earlier research has not provided a sense of the proportion of schools with 
significant TCE differentials. The descriptive statistics in this study are the first to offer 
insight into the proportionality of the phenomenon and suggest that TCE differentials 
substantially affect about one in four schools. 
School-level TCE differentials are policy relevant not only because of their 
frequency, but also because of their magnitudes. Tables 6 through 9 (pages 128-133) 
include various measures of the between-school differences found in districts above and 




and 9 indicate that, on average, the TCEFTE AMD (or the average between-school salary 
difference) for districts ranges from $1,700 to $2800 to $4,800 by Ginis categories. The 
TCE gaps for TCEPP are $150, $220, and $475 by the same categories. For TCEPPW the 
AMDs are slightly lower than for TCEPP, at $90, $177, and $318. To put this in 
perspective, these are the average TCE differences between all schools in the districts, 
and the gaps are substantial enough that in average-sized schools, these differences sum 
to more than enough to fund at least one FTE teacher.47 
 The size of the TCE differentials found in this study are in line with the 
differences found in previous research on TCE differentials (e.g.; Roza & Hill, 2004; 
Argue, Honeyman, & Schlay, 2006). However, previous research examined either only a 
few districts or only a portion of the schools in a larger number of districts (Education 
Trust, 2005; Miller, 2011). Table 8 presents average differences for a much larger number 
of districts and all the schools within those districts. The findings in tables 6 through 9 
indicate that substantial TCE differences are common. The interquartile and 90/10 ranges 
presented in Tables 6, 8 and 9 offer additional descriptions of the magnitude of school 
TCE differentials. The tables show that between-school differences are large for half the 
schools in the districts and even larger for the 20% of schools in the top and bottom 
deciles of TCE.  
The descriptive results in the current study corroborate and add to findings from 
previous literature. For instance, as does the current study, multiple prior studies have 
                                                 




found that intradistrict resource variation48 is substantial (e.g., Burke, 1999; Hertert, 
1999; Lankford, Loeb, & Wyckoff, 2002). Research like Roza and Hill’s (2004) found 
substantial between-school TCE differentials in large urban districts (see also Argue, 
Honeyman, & Schlay, 2006; Education Trust West, 2005; Miller, 2011), which are in line 
with the current study results for the size of TCE differentials and are consistent with the 
finding of high TCE variation and large Gini coefficients. The results of my analyses 
confirm these earlier findings and extend them across a much larger range of districts, 
suggesting the results from earlier studies with a few districts are neither anecdotal nor 
limited to a small proportion of district schools.  
While prior TCE studies focused primarily on large urban districts, the current 
results do not provide compelling evidence to support any particular association between 
TCE variation and urbanicity. Although in this study it is difficult to measure the 
association between TCE variation and urbanicity, these analyses do not suggest that TCE 
variation is a phenomenon particular to urban districts. The measurement difficulty arises 
for two reasons. First, the models in this study controls for many of the features by which 
urban districts are distinct from other districts (such as district and school size, and school 
compositional measures). Second, HLM models control for district and school urbanicity 
simultaneously. While it is important to control for urbanicity at each level it makes for 
difficult interpretation. Nonetheless, as a whole, the current results indicate that TCE 
variation affects a large proportion of schools and districts in the states I examined. 
TCE variation shortchanges high-need schools. The descriptive statistics and 
the multivariate results presented here provide strong evidence that TCE differentials 
                                                 




advantage low-need schools and disadvantage high-need schools. The HLMs results for 
TCEFTE and for TCEPPW indicate that school poverty, minority composition and 
proficiency level all associate with TCE differentials. These three relationships are linear 
and indicate that schools above their district’s mean in poverty and minority percentage 
and below their district’s mean in proficiency have average salaries and average TCEPPW 
that is below the district average. The converse also holds. Lower poverty, lower minority 
and higher proficiency schools received more TCEFTE and TCEPPW. Further, the 
relationship between TCE and Title I schools indicates that Title I schools have lower 
TCEFTE and TCEPPW than non-Title I schools. 
The results from the HLMs for TCEFTE and TCEPPW are consistent with previous 
research that showed how average salaries favor low-need schools (e.g., Roza & Hill, 
2004; Education Trust West, 2006; Miller 2010). Thanks to HLM results from the 
expansive database, the current findings substantially extend previous research because 
they reveal average relationships across all schools in many districts in several states. The 
statistically significant relationships in my sample indicate that relationships between 
school composition and TCE function in similar ways across a large number of districts. 
If the relationships between benefit and low-needs schools that were present in earlier 
research existed in several districts but not across a range of districts, one could conclude 
that TCE differentials are a local phenomenon rather than a wide-ranging occurrence. 
However, based on the evidence in this dissertation, TCE variation and differentials are a 
broad policy concern. 
The findings in this dissertation provide evidence on why districts allocate staff to 




proportions of student populations with compensatory needs. The TCEPP HLMs show 
that compensatory needs play a role in the distribution of TCE. The TCEPP HLMs reveal 
substantial positive associations between student compensatory needs, primarily the Title 
I, special education and student poverty coefficients, and TCEPP. Given the negative 
association between TCEFTE and poverty, the positive associations between TCEPP and 
poverty are only possible if districts allocate additional positions to high-poverty schools. 
In contrast, the TCEPP HLMs show no positive association with the percentage of 
minority students and indicate only a small positive relationship to proficiency.49 
Moreover, the addition of measures of school minority composition and average 
proficiency does not change the coefficients for compensatory needs in the TCEPP HLMs, 
as they do in the TCEFTE HLMs. Taken together, these models indicate that districts 
allocate additional positions to schools based on student compensatory needs rather than 
to balance differences in teacher salaries. 
The current findings are consistent with previous research that suggests that 
teacher sorting and the associated TCEFTE differentials influence federal, state, and local 
compensatory funds in ways that undermine the intent of compensatory programs. Title I 
funding is an apt illustration. Title I funds are sent to districts that use those funds to 
provide additional teachers to high-need schools. As Roza (2005, 2011) and others have 
argued because districts account for the associated with district average salaries, when 
low-salaried teachers fill these positions in Title I schools and when some of the 
compensatory funding does not reach targeted schools. The difference between teacher 
                                                 
49 The small positive relationship with proficiency is probably due to the higher average salaries in these 
schools. The TCEFTE HLMs show that proficiency is the compositional measure most strongly related to 




salaries that teach in Title I schools and the district average salary ultimately funds the 
above-average salaries in non-Title I schools. Salary differentials in high-need schools 
can influence the flow of other categorical funds in similar ways. The findings in this 
dissertations show that Title I schools and high-poverty schools have substantial salary 
differentials, suggesting that the effects of compensatory funding may be frequently 
undermined. 
 The different effects on the TCEFTE and TCEPP HLM coefficients revealed 
through the block modeling of school compositional measures have significant 
implications for the possibility of teacher quality/quantity tradeoffs. The TCEPP HLM 
results are consistent with the often-observed teacher quality/quantity tradeoffs, discussed 
in chapter two of this dissertation. However, the pattern of HLM results indicate that 
apparent tradeoffs are not tradeoffs at all, but result from extra FTE teaching positions 
allocated through categorical funding streams to schools with students who have 
legitimate educational needs. The finding regarding compensatory needs and teacher 
allocation is an important addition to the research on intradistrict TCE because it casts 
doubt on the likelihood that districts commonly allocate extra teaching positions to 
balance TCEFTE differentials. That tradeoff assertion, found so often in earlier studies of 
the intradistrict distribution of teacher salaries, is important because it fosters the notion 
that district officials allocate additional positions to balance TCEFTE differentials. As 
noted in the literature review in chapter 2, there is no evidence in the literature on district 
resource allocation that supports the idea that district officials attempt to balance TCEFTE 
differences with additional staff. Likewise, the findings in this dissertation do not provide 




The differences between the TCEFTE and TCEPP HLM results show that legitimate 
compensatory needs do substantively affect per-pupil TCE. As the charts in figure 4 (page 
116) suggest, districts allocate additional teachers to schools with compensatory needs 
such that these schools receive above-average TCEPP. However, once district 
compensatory allocations are controlled for in the TCEPPW measure, the association 
between school compositional measures—those legitimately related to education 
resources and those that are not— and TCEFTE are still apparent. If teacher salary 
expenditures should be included in school resource equity comparisons, these results 
indicate that the districts often allocate compensatory funds to high-need schools without 
considering the already existing inequity based on TCE distribution. Specifically in terms 
of Title I funding, if districts closed the comparability loophole and included teacher 
salary differences to calculate the comparability requirements, many districts would 
prove to be supplanting instead of supplementing base funding with Title I monies. The 
findings in this study corroborate earlier claims regarding differentials in TCEFTE (e.g., 
Roza, 2011). However, the TCEPPW measure in this dissertation allows for legitimate 
comparisons between schools by controlling for between-school differences in 
compensatory need. The results provide evidence that districts inequitably distribute TCE 
in terms of both average salaries and salary per-pupil. 
Teacher sorting drives TCE variation. Researchers who study the distribution 
of TCE often attribute TCE differences to teacher sorting. The results from this 
dissertation corroborate those attributions. For instance, the results of the OLS 
regressions on district Gini coefficients found in tables 21, 23 and 25 (pages 161, 168, 




are more conducive to teacher sorting have greater TCE variation. The first two of these 
relationships are that district size and district-average minority student percentages are 
positively associated with TCEFTE variation. The opportunities for teachers to sort across 
schools are greater in districts with more schools, and districts with more minority 
students may have more diverse school compositions and thereby have weaker functional 
teacher preferences for sorting. The third finding is that variation in school poverty, 
minority composition and proficiency levels are interrelated predictors of TCE variation. 
Scholars have established all three predictors as components of teacher preferences in the 
literature on teacher sorting cited in chapter 2. The current results support previous 
literature that attributes between-school TCE differences to teacher sorting. Simply put, 
in districts where schools differ more on characteristics that are associated with teachers’ 
labor market preferences, we find greater variation in TCE. Additionally, prior research 
(Roza & Hill, 2004; Education Trust West, 2005; Miller, 2011) also concentrated on 
between-school differences in student poverty, minority, and proficiency levels as the 
drivers of teacher sorting and TCE differences. The current findings echo those 
concentrations. 
The supplementary tables for each set of regressions provide further evidence in 
support of the link between teacher sorting and TCE differentials. The secondary tables 
show that measures of variation in teacher experience and allocations substantially 
explain TCE variation. This relationship is expected. More important for this research is 
that school compositional measures no longer associate with TCE variation in the models 
that control for teacher experience and pupil-teacher ratios. The results do not suggest 




secondary regression models in this study support the connection between school 
composition and teacher sorting such that both associate with TCE variation.  
The secondary HLM results for TCEFTE and TCEPPW provide similar evidence at 
the school level because adding teacher qualifications to the models largely negates the 
associations between school composition and TCE differentials. As was the case in the 
district OLS regressions, the displacement of these relationships across HLM blocks is 
consistent with the theory that school composition influences teacher sorting which 
drives TCE differences. However, for the secondary HLM tables for TCEPP, the effects for 
poverty and special education percentages hold even after controlling for teacher 
qualifications. Taken together, the contrasts between the secondary analyses show that 
schools’ compositions affect TCE differentials through teacher sorting rather than through 
allocations of additional teaching positions. The contrasted findings not only support the 
theory that teacher sorting drives TCE differences, but also provide further evidence that 
districts do not allocate teaching positions to balance differences in average teacher 
salaries.  
The results in this dissertation generally affirm the findings of previous research. 
An additional affirmation of prior research by the current study is evident in the amount 
of variation the current models explain. In the HLM models, the amount of variation in 
the school-level residual term (in some ways akin to an R-squared in OLS regression) 
that the models explain is significant, but large portions of unexplained variation remain. 
One might consider the remaining unexplained variation as a limitation for the current 
results; however, I interpret the outstanding variation as consistent with the complexities 




labor market preferences for low-poverty, low-minority and high-performing schools. I 
include these measures in the HLM models. This literature has also shown other school 
characteristics—such as school leadership quality, school climate, location, resource 
availability, and student behavior (Rice, Rollke, Sparks & Kolbe, 2009)— that are as 
important or more important teacher preferences that vary substantially across districts 
(Clotfelter, et al., 2006; Hanushek, Kain & Rivkin, 2004). The HLM models in this study 
only include widely available measures that are not fine-grained enough to capture all of 
teachers’ preferences in the workplace. Thus, unexplained variation in school TCE 
differentials remains. 
The findings from this dissertation show that the intradistrict distribution of TCE 
is inequitable in a substantial portion of districts and schools. These findings add 
evidence to a body of research that have several implications for education policy and 
research. The following section discussed the implications of this research. 
Implications for Policy and Future Research 
The findings in this dissertation have several implications for education policy 
and research. To begin the discussion of the implications of this study, I review three 
policy issues related to the dissertation findings. After reviewing the policy implications, 
I discuss the implications for future research. 
Implications for policy. Based on the findings in this study, policymakers now 
have the opportunity to address the following three issues. First, policymakers can 
address and change policies to address intradistrict TCE inequity. Second, policymakers 
have reason to insist that districts use actual school-level salary data when calculating 




should create mechanisms to ensure that compensatory aide reaches targeted students and 
that between-school TCE differences do not divert compensatory funds. 
This dissertation demonstrates that many districts inequitably distribute TCE 
across schools in ways that disadvantage high-need schools and violate standards of 
horizontal and vertical equities, as well as equality of educational opportunity (as 
described in chapter 2). Policymakers should address these TCE inequities with policy 
change. The findings in this study corroborate previous research found using average 
salaries, and extend those findings by analyzing per-pupil TCE after controlling for 
students’ compensatory needs. Students with legitimate compensatory needs do receive 
more TCE per pupil. However, the surplus TCEPP is associated with compensatory 
funding, which indicates that for a large portion of schools in a large portion of districts, 
school-financing schemes inequitably distribute base TCE funding. Unequal base funding 
violates the horizontal equity standard. The TCEPPW HLMs show that a negative 
relationship between student poverty and TCE remains after controlling for compensatory 
teacher allocations. Districts allocate additional teachers positions to students in poverty, 
but the remaining net negative association with TCE indicates widespread violations of 
vertical equity. Further, the associations between TCE and students’ race and proficiency 
violate the equality of educational opportunity standard.  
This study also demonstrates that TCE variation is a widespread problem. TCE 
inequities are important at the student level, because they shortchange students on bases 
that have no legitimate association with resource allocations. While this dissertation study 
focuses on examining equity between students there is also a school-level equity 




differentials are also inequities for schools that share the same accountability 
requirements, but receive unequal resources.  
Several of the scholars cited in the literature review for this dissertation are 
consistent with Betts and colleague’s observation that in many districts schools are 
divided between the “haves”, and the “have nots” (Betts, et al. 2000; Presley, White, & 
Gong, 2005; Lankford, et al., 2002; DeAngelis, Presley & White, 2005; Roza, 2011). 
Schools with more historically difficult-to- educate students have been shown to also 
employ teachers who have the lowest qualifications. The current research confirms 
assertions made in studies on the distribution of average teacher salaries that suggest that 
“have not” schools not only have more difficult-to-educate students and lower teacher 
qualifications, but also receive less than their share of district salary dollars. The current 
study shows that school compositions relate to TCE in a large number of districts, and 
that allocations of additional teachers to “have not” schools do not ameliorate salary 
differences. In short, the current research establishes that researchers and policymakers 
should add TCE to the list of resources that high-need schools “have not.” 
Although policies need to address TCE inequities, a policy solution will not be 
easy because the root causes are structural. Teachers make job placement decisions in a 
labor market system substantially defined by district policies. Common structural staffing 
policies create the context in which teachers pursue their individual preferences for job 
placement. Ultimately, this is a structural problem and policymakers should not mistake it 
for a problem with teacher’s decision-making. Cumulatively, teacher-sorting decisions 
influence the distribution of TCE; however, it would be unreasonable to attribute the 




placement policy structures that allow, if not encourage, teacher sorting based on 
workplace preferences and reward systems. To assign blame to teachers for the 
downstream effects of their cumulative labor market decisions and build policies that 
only target teacher behavior would make no more sense than to blame principals for 
trying to hire the best teachers away from other schools to work in their schools. 
Specific policy recommendations to change the district policies that enable or 
encourage TCE inequity are beyond the scope of this dissertation. The purpose of this 
study is to empirically investigate TCE distributions and provide information that may 
improve future policymaking. To ameliorate TCE inequities will be a challenge because 
to change longstanding district policies will most likely be complicated and politically 
contentious. Nonetheless, TCE inequities will persist unless policymakers alter staffing 
policies or allocate additional resources to balance TCE differences.  
A policy recommendation that this study does permit is one of additional 
transparency in school-budget reporting and district accounting. The widespread use of 
district salary averages in school budgets and district accounting hides intradistrict 
differences in TCE and in total resources. This dissertation research required voluminous 
amounts of data and complicated analyses to uncover differences that would be plain if 
districts accurately reported school budgets. Federal, state and local policy have begun to 
change the use of salary averages and these policies should continue. District data 
systems have the capacity to report school budgets accurately and policy should ensure 
that districts do so. 
Transparency and accuracy are not only important for school budgets, they are 




with previous research that suggests that teacher sorting influences the flow of 
compensatory funds to schools, and this influence has substantial policy implications. 
The inadvertent transfers of federal, state, and local compensatory funding are possible 
when districts use compensatory funds to supply additional teachers to high-need schools 
and account for these funds with district salary averages. Unfortunately, these conditions 
are common. The current study adds weight to calls to close the Title I “comparability 
loophole” (the provision in Title I policy that allows districts to qualify for comparability 
by using district salary averages, discussed in detail in Chapter 3). Change at the federal 
level would not only help ensure that Title I funds reach targeted schools, but also be a 
positive influence on state and local compensatory policies. 
Researchers and practitioners should inform local policymakers and district 
officials on how TCE differences affect the flow of compensatory funds. Anecdotal 
evidence (Miller and Rubenstein, 2008) suggests that district policymakers do not grasp 
the impact teacher sorting has on TCE distribution and differentials. If true, it is nearly 
certain that policymakers do not understand the secondary effects that teacher sorting has 
on categorical aid. Given the size of categorical aid programs and their important equity 
goals, policymakers at the federal, state and local levels need to grapple with the 
implications of this research and amend policy to ensure compensatory funds provide 
resources for students in need.  
In summary, this dissertation adds substantial evidence to bolster the findings of 
previous research on intradistrict TCE. Policymakers should give careful and thoughtful 
consideration to the intradistrict distribution of TCE based on the magnitude of the 




and schools these differences affect. Additional research by the education research 
community will help policymakers to make changes. The second section on the 
implications of this study discusses possible avenues for future research in this area. 
Implications for research. While this dissertation study expands the research on 
intradistrict TCE variation, it also raises new questions that future research should 
address. I discuss five areas for future research. The first area involves expanding 
intradistrict TCE analyses to accumulate a greater breadth of evidence across more states 
and districts and to contextualize TCE variation within overall resource variation. 
Second, researchers can pursue smaller scale comparative analyses of TCE differentials 
across time and across different district contexts. Third, researchers can pursue 
methodological work that evaluates and improves the district de facto weighting scheme 
to validate and improve adjusted per-pupil salary measures (TCEPPW). Fourth, scholars 
can explore the theoretical and methodological bases to develop equity benchmarks for 
intradistrict TCE. Finally, as methods for evaluating teacher quality advance, researchers 
can try to measure the relationship between TCE differences and teacher quality across 
schools. Below I discuss each of these opportunities for research in turn. 
This dissertation study demonstrates that intradistrict TCE variation is widespread 
and substantial. Compared to the amount of interdistrict equity research, intradistrict 
equity is under-examined. The current findings add weight to previous calls for more 
intradistrict equity research (e.g., Berne and Stiefel, 1999; Guthrie, 2007). The pace of 
interdistrict equity research seems to have slowed in recent years because of the growing 
focus on adequacy. The growing attention to adequacy research is good; however, since 




intradistrict equity comparisons as it does between districts. Education scholars should 
pursue additional research on intradistrict equity because intradistrict inequity is a 
problem and the framework for intradistrict equity is straightforward. 
The substantial inequities found in this study are important but still represent only 
a fraction of US schools. This dissertation includes complete analyses of TCEFTE and 
TCEPPW for only four states, and is not representative beyond those states. The TCEPPW 
measure used in this dissertation provides more nuanced and compelling findings on TCE 
differences. This measurement approach allows for equity comparisons of schools with 
varying student populations, comparisons that have been previously impossible. 
Additional research should extend these analyses for TCEFTE and TCEPPW across more 
states and districts. 
Of course, equity in TCE is not the ultimate equity goal. The primary concern for 
intradistrict resource equity is total resource equity, not TCE equity. This dissertation 
finds widespread TCE inequity of sufficient magnitude to imply overall resource 
inequity; however, this study is not sufficient for such conclusions. Additional research 
should examine overall intradistrict resource equity as data become available. Further 
research should investigate whether TCE differences do in fact drive overall inequities, 
whether districts allocate additional resources to mitigate TCE differences, and whether 
districts distribute other resources equitably apart from TCE. 
 Future research should also gauge TCE variation with comparative analyses 
across varied district contexts. In particular, researchers need to examine TCE variation in 
districts across time, across budgeting methods and across districts with varied TCE 




are. The structure of schools makes their student compositions relatively stable over time, 
which suggests that TCE differential persist over time. If this is the case, the inequities 
students experience are likely to persist as they move through grade levels within schools. 
Further, since feeder schools typically draw from similar geographic areas and student 
populations, TCE inequities may not only be consistent over time within schools, but also 
with collections of schools connected by district feeder patterns. If TCE differentials 
follow school feeder patterns the effect of TCE differentials over a student’s educational 
career would be cumulative and represent greater inequities. 
Future research should also compare TCE differentials across districts with 
different budgeting and teacher-allocation mechanisms. For instance, districts that use 
student-based budgeting systems may have smaller TCE differentials compared to 
districts that used school-based budgeting. Alternatively, this research might identify the 
non-teacher resources that districts that use student based budgeting allocate to balance 
salary differentials. To identify such resources that counterbalance TCE differentials are a 
necessary first step to evaluate the productive capacity of resource tradeoffs. To flip the 
search for governance and budgetary mechanisms that might lessen TCE differentials on 
its head, future research should examine district that have equitable or progressive TCE 
allocations, which would favor high-need schools. A minority of districts in the four case 
study states display such a distribution in the charts in Figure 4. The identification of 
what separates these districts from the majority would add to our understanding of the 
products of varied district practices. 
Future research should evaluate the de facto weighting scheme used in this 




conceptual contribution of this dissertation is the use of the TCEPPW measure, which 
depends on effective de facto allocation weights. The TCEPPW measure allows equity 
comparisons between schools with varied compositions. Future research should 
independently replicate the methodology for estimating de facto weights to validate and 
improve it. Another way to test these methods would be in-depth, small-scale district 
studies that compare the derived de facto allocation weights to stated district allocation 
policies, and to actual distributions of teaching positions. Roza (2005; 2011) has written 
extensively on intradistrict allocation differences noting that in many districts the 
distribution of teaching positions is a product of historic allocations and political 
maneuvers, as well as policy. Additional research on how districts allocate teaching 
positions, in terms of base and compensatory allocations, would inform the methods and 
findings for this study and future intradistrict research. 
Future research should develop widely applicable frameworks to measure equity 
with varied resource measures in various contexts and provide rationales for setting 
appropriate benchmarks for those measures. This dissertation relied on the Gini 
coefficient to measure district TCE variation. While the Gini is well suited for this 
purpose, additional theoretical and methodological research should develop meaningful 
standards for intradistrict equity and for measures like the Gini coefficient. Scholars need 
to develop theoretical approaches to equity that establish at what magnitude differences 
in various measures amount to inequities. This theoretical work should carefully consider 
the contexts and measures under scrutiny. For example, most school-finance research 
uses Odden and Picus’s 0.05 Gini benchmark for interdistrict finance. While theirs is a 




two benchmarks for the Gini (0.025 and 0.05) which correspond to TCE variations of 5% 
and 10% of the district mean, respectively. These benchmarks are useful for intradistrict 
TCE differences because the sources of variation for intradistrict teacher pay are smaller 
than the sources of variation for interdistrict finance.  
The average between-school TCEFTE differences in districts with Ginis above 
0.025 but below 0.050 are too substantial to consider equitable ( The total estimated 
effect on average sized schools is $129,000 per Table 7, or enough to fund almost three 
additional FTE teachers at average salaries.). Thus, Odden and Picus’s (2004) 0.05 Gini 
benchmark is too generous an equity standard for this study. While the two benchmarks 
used here are functional for this study, they do not follow an established rationale. A 
comprehensive framework for setting such benchmarks would be useful. Scholars should 
ground theoretical work on equity standards in methodological work that examines the 
distribution of the resource under study and base benchmarks in a rationale that can apply 
to varied resource objects.  
The fact that the distribution of teacher qualifications drives TCE inequities has 
obvious policy implications for the distribution of district funds. However, examining 
TCE equity in isolation will prevent us from understanding the full extent of resource 
inequities. This dissertation research adds TCE to the list of resources that divide schools 
between the “haves” and “have nots.” Unfortunately, there is a possibility that to some 
degree, teacher quality may be similarly distributed. Researchers still need to examine the 
connection between the distributions of TCE dollars and teacher quality. As discussed 
earlier, research suggests that high-need schools may have below-average teacher quality. 




TCE also tend to have below-average teacher quality, the policy importance of both 
distributions would be greater than if these distributions were unrelated. Specifically 
regarding compensatory teacher allocations, the tradeoff between teacher quantity and 
quality is relevant as well. Some evidence suggests that additional teachers may not be as 
effective at educating students as higher-quality teachers (Clotfelter, Ladd & Vigdor, 
2007). If the unattractive aspects of high-need schools that push higher paid teachers 
away also push more effective teachers away then compensatory allocations of positions 
might not only be diluted in terms of TCE, but also in terms of effectiveness or capacity 
or both. Research on teacher quality is still under development, but as measures of 
teacher effectiveness improve, researchers should examine the overlap in the distributions 
of teacher pay, compensatory allocations and teacher quality. 
Taken together, the implications of this research are substantial. Intradistrict TCE 
equity is a longstanding problem in US public schools that deserves attention from 
policymakers and the education research community. It is my hope that the contributions 
of this study will spur additional research and effective policies to improve resource 
equity, especially for the most disadvantaged schools and students.  
Limitations of this Dissertation Study 
While this dissertation study provides additional empirical evidence on the 
intradistrict distribution of TCE, readers should consider several limitations when 
interpreting these findings. Limitations include limited representation, potential bias in 
the estimation of de facto allocation weights, omitted school-level measures, capturing 
causality regarding teacher sorting, and an inability to assess either overall resource 





Limited representation. While the data used in this dissertation substantially 
expands the empirical evidence on the intradistrict distribution of TCE, they are only 
representative of districts in states that are included in the analyses. For those states that 
are included in the analyses, these data are a full representation of the intradistrict 
distribution of teacher compensation, conditional on the quality of the state administrative 
records gathered in the TCS.  
Potential bias in the estimation of de facto allocation weights. A second 
limitation involves the validity of the measures of teacher compensation, particularly the 
validity of the TCEPPW measure. The TCEFTE and TCEPP measures are likely very 
accurate measures as they are drawn from administrative records; however, the derived 
de facto district allocation weights rest on two assumptions that may introduce some error 
into the TCEPPW measure. The first relevant assumption is that the regressions used to 
derive the teacher-allocation weights include all the measures that relate to district 
teacher-allocation practices. There are certainly districts that include factors in their 
teacher-allocation formulae that these relatively simple regressions do not capture. In 
defense of my weighting strategy, I based the regressions in the available literature on 
district resource-allocation practices, and I use the regressions to calculate de facto 
district-average teacher-allocation weights. I do not use regressions to specify district 
practices or recreate actual allocation formulae. These de facto weights can identify 
school staffing variations that differ from the district mean. However, to the degree that 
relevant measures are missing, these omissions may introduce measurement error to the 




The second relevant assumption is that I can reliably calculate de facto weights 
for all included districts. I have included business checks which remove districts whose 
estimates produce implausible values (e.g., special education weights greater than 5 times 
the district base weight) and districts where the variance explained by the regression 
models falls below 90% (R-squared must be greater than 0.9). Despite these checks, 
estimating de facto weights with such small sample sizes includes a risk that the weights 
will include some bias. While the 90% R-squared criterion for including districts should 
minimize the likelihood of including data with errors, a potential for bias remains 
especially in small districts. 
While some measurement error is unavoidable, I do not consider this a 
fundamental weakness in the current analyses for two related reasons, one that is 
methodological and one that is normative. First, for the majority of districts the de facto 
weights include the predominant policy levers associated with vertical equity 
adjustments. Thus, this method is consistent with all but marginally influential district 
policies and practices. Simply, this method captures the compensatory needs that make 
the largest differences in teacher allocations. While the first reason potential measurement 
error is not a fundamental weakness is based on a methodological concern, the second is 
based on a normative concern. That is, this weighting technique captures the 
compensatory differences that vertical equity adjustments are most concerned with from a 
normative perspective, specifically poverty, English proficiency and disability status. 
Capturing the average district teacher allocations associated with gifted students or 
students in vocational programs may improve the de facto weights in a few districts, but 




Simply, this weighting method captures the most important differences between students 
that are widely reflected in education policy and practice. Any weighting method for 
capturing district policies across such a wide range of districts is bound to include some 
measurement error; however, from both methodological and normative perspectives, this 
weighting approach captures the majority of the differences with which policymakers and 
researchers are concerned. 
Omitted school-level measures. Just as the validity of the de facto allocation 
weights are contingent on the inclusion of the appropriate variables, the district Gini 
coefficient regressions and the HLM models are dependent on proper specification and 
inclusion of all relevant variables. Measures of all potentially important constructs are not 
available in these data. For instance, district use of seniority privileges and LIFO policies 
that may strongly relate to TCE differentials and the total TCE variation within districts 
are not available measures at the district level. The omissions of some measures that 
influence the distribution of TCE are unavoidable limitations to this study. 
Causality and teacher sorting. This dissertation research includes a number of 
findings that associate teacher preferences and teacher sorting with TCE variation, but it 
cannot establish the causality of these associations. This study incorporates variables in 
blocked models and multiple measures of TCE to evaluate the association between TCE 
variation and school measures related to teacher sorting. However, these data are not 
capable of closing a causal loop between teacher sorting and TCE variation. Previous 
literature provides a theoretical basis for including school characteristics associated with 
teacher sorting and the findings in this dissertation are quite consistent with that 





Assessing overall resource distribution. Another conceptual limitation is that I 
cannot draw inferences about overall resource equity from this study with certainty. The 
literature reviewed for this study identifies no commonplace district-allocation 
mechanism that allocates non-teacher resources to make substantial intradistrict TCE 
differentials equitable, but formal or informal allocation mechanisms may function this 
way. Since the outcome measures used in this dissertation cannot account for the full 
value of resources that schools receive, the reader should interpret any equity 
implications as specific only to TCE differentials. Notably, the current analyses do not 
include data on the distribution of instructional aides across schools, which may be a 
significant limitation for this study. Instructional aides are expensive inputs that could 
account for a large portion of the TCEPPW gaps between schools, and the inequity 
measured by the district Gini coefficients. Put simply, district officials may allocate 
instructional aides to balance spending differences made by TCE differentials. Still, the 
literature on district allocation does not document instances where districts do allocate 
aides to balance TCE differences but as part of base allocations or compensatory 
programs. Without such documented instances, it is reasonable to surmise that districts do 
not systematically allocate aides to balance TCE differentials, especially differentials as 
large as previous literature and current findings reveal. Nonetheless, the reader should 
consider the results of these analyses with this limitation in mind. 
Educational productivity and the distribution of resources. Finally, while this 
study addresses resource input equity from a monetary basis, it does not directly address 




quality nor the aggregate productive capacity of schools strongly associates with teacher 
compensation. Previous research suggests a positive correlation between the distribution 
of teacher compensation and teacher quality at the school level, but this dissertation 
provides no evidence regarding this relationship. Further, some evidence suggests that 
teacher quantity/quality trade-offs may not result in equivalent productive capacities, but 
the per-pupil TCE measures used in this study would equate teacher quantity and teacher 
salary trade-offs on a dollar-for-dollar basis. Given that the primary concern for equity in 
schooling hinges on student outcomes rather than system inputs, the importance of 
variations in TCE is a debatable topic. 
Future research should seek to overcome the limitations in this study as we 
continue to examine these issues and promote resource equity. However, despite its 
limitations, this dissertation provides valuable and, to date, unequaled empirical evidence 
on a broad scale to measure intradistrict distribution of TCE. The study takes advantage 
of a richer and more detailed database than those used by earlier scholars, in order to 
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